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ABSTRACT
This work brings together quite heterogeneous sources for reasons, which at first glance 
seem marginal. For example, without delving too deeply into Naess’ problems Latour uses 
his constructs to sweep  them aside. Another example is how Naess makes multiple 
references to Nāgārjuna’s emptiness of own-nature in order to illustrate his relationism. 
Nevertheless, there are more important structural and philosophical reasons for bringing 
these three together. These are collected around two primary research points. 
Firstly, we want to offer an articulation of relationism for ecology, its scope and the 
difficulties it faces. These span between the problem of the concept of nature and the 
problem of representation.
Beginning with Naess’ ecosophy, we can secure a better grasp of the problems 
environmentalism faces when it  makes use of an organicistic and interrelated image of 
nature. Relationism attempts to posit the overcoming of the subject/object dichotomy as it 
is structured in the representation of nature, but eventually finds itself trapped in the same 
premises.
Naess’s problems are, nevertheless, more radical. Overcoming the subject/object and 
human/nature dualisms is not just a matter of integrating the two poles into a greater 
whole. The problems opened in relationism are intrinsic to the concept of nature as 
otherness to humanity, which underlies both managerial environmentalist approaches and 
ecological attempts to bridge the dualistic gap. Issues of continuity and difference, 
belonging and otherness emerge when the nature/humanity axis is articulated. The 
humanity/nature fracture is most tragic in the political tension between ecological 
naturalism and culturalist  critique. The difficulties of environmentalism emerge as 
equivocations caused by the a priori framework of nature as otherness to humanity.
Latour’s idea of the end of nature is a political-ecological solution to the problem of 
representation. The nature/culture framework is only one way  to represent the common 
world of humans and nonhumans. It  is possible to reopen the political work of composition 
of the common world, bringing the sciences (both humanities and hard sciences) to give 
scientific and political representation to phenomena such as climate change or species 
extinction.
5
A second research focus shifts from the political dimension and looks at subjectivity as 
the main difficulty  in the problem of representation. Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness 
[śūnyatā] proves to be a powerful insight into the tension between a radically  relative 
reality and the attachment of the subject’s view to a “nature of things.”
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ABSTRACT
Questo lavoro raccoglie fonti piuttosto eterogenee, che apparentemente dialogano in 
modo marginale. Latour rigetta bruscamente la posizione di Naess come prova della 
coerenza della propria ecologia politica; Naess scivola spesso in veloci riferimenti a 
Nāgārjuna e alla “vacuità di natura propria di tutti gli enti” per rinforzare il proprio 
relazionismo come visione alternativa della natura.
Tuttavia ci sono ragioni filosofiche e strutturali più profonde che giustificano questo 
inusuale accostamento. Queste ragioni ruotano intorno a due principali obiettivi di ricerca.
In primo luogo, tentiamo di offrire un’articolazione della portata e dei problemi che 
interessano un pensiero ecologico della relazione con la natura. I quesiti aperti dal 
relazionismo e le sue difficoltà si muovono nello spazio che si apre tra il concetto di natura 
come altro dall’uomo e il problema della rappresentazione. Una filosofia della relazione 
con la natura in un tutto organico tenta di riprendersi dalla rottura modernista della rottura 
tra soggetto e oggetto. In fondo, però, auspicare un cambio di visione del mondo in 
direzione ecosofica lascia il pensiero intrappolato nelle stesse strutture che caratterizzano 
la dicotomia uomo/natura.
I problemi dell’ecosofia di Naess sono strutturali, non solo del suo pensiero, ma di 
molto ambientalismo. Il superamento della frattura tra oggetto e soggetto non si consegue 
semplicemente integrando i due poli in un tutto più grande. I problemi aperti dal 
relazionismo di Naess sono intrinseci al concetto di natura come altro dell’uomo, anche in 
senso ambientale. Tale concetto è alla base di buona parte della produzione eco-filosofica, 
sia che si tratti di approcci manageriali, sia quando il tentativo va in direzione di un 
superamento della frattura dualistica. L’articolazione dell’asse uomo-natura 
nell’ambientalismo apre problemi di continuità e differenza, di appartenenza e alterità. La 
frattura uomo/natura si mostra in tutta la sua tragicità nella tensione politica tra un 
naturalismo ecologista e la critica culturale di una natura sempre “natura,” sempre 
rappresentata. Le difficoltà in cui incorrono la maggior parte dei movimenti ambientalisti 
sono quindi provocate dagli equivoci strutturali di una natura ogni volta pensata come altro 
dell’uomo.
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La “fine della natura” per Latour si presenta come una soluzione politico-ecologica al 
problema della rappresentazione. Lo schema natura/cultura è solo uno dei modi, per 
Latour, per rappresentare il mondo comune di umani e nonumani. È possibile riaprire il 
lavoro politico di composizione del mondo comune, portando le scienze (sia “dure,” che 
dello spirito) a dare rappresentazione scientifica e politica a fenomeni quali i cambiamenti 
climatici o l’estinzione delle specie.
Il secondo obiettivo di ricerca slitta invece dalla dimensione politica e passa a guardare 
la soggettività come il maggiore ostacolo nel problema della rappresentazione. Il concetto 
di vacuità [śūnyatā] in Nāgārjuna si dimostra uno strumento potente per lavorare sulla 
tensione tra una realtà radicalmente relativa e l’attaccamento del soggetto alla visione di 
una “natura delle cose.”
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ABSTRACT
Diese Arbeit verknüpft  recht heterogene Argumentationsansätze, die auf den ersten 
Blick nur geringfügig miteinander verbunden zu sein scheinen. Beispielsweise nutzt Latour 
seinen Ansatz, um Naess’ Probleme beiseite zu drängen, ohne sich genauer auf sie 
einzulassen. Ein anderes Beispiel ist, wie Naess vielfach auf Nāgārjunas Leerheit  der 
wahren Natur verweist, um seinen Relationismus zu illustrieren. 
Dennoch gibt es wichtigere strukturelle und philosophische Gründe, diese drei 
zusammenzubringen. Sie drehen sich um zwei wesentliche Forschungsinteressen.
Zunächst wollen wir den Relationismus in der Ökologie rekonstruieren, seine 
Reichweite und die Schwierigkeiten, mit denen er zu kämpfen hat. Diese reichen vom 
Problem des Naturbegriffs bis zum Problem der Repräsentation (und Vorstellung).
Ausgehend von Naess’ ecosophy, können wir die Probleme, vor die sich der 
Umweltphilosophiegedanke gestellt sieht, wenn er sich auf ein organizistisches oder 
interrelationales Naturbild stützt, besser verstehen. Der Relationismus versucht die 
Subjekt-Objekt-Dichotomie, wie sie in der Repräsentation der Natur eingearbeitet ist, zu 
überwinden, aber läuft möglicherweise in die Falle derselben Prämissen.
Naess’ Probleme sind gleichwohl radikaler. Den Subjekt/Objekt- wie den Mensch/
Natur-Dualismus überwindet man nicht einfach dadurch, dass man die beiden Pole in ein 
größeres Ganzes integriert. Die Probleme, die sich aus dem Relationismus ergeben, sind 
wesentlich mit dem Begriff der Natur als das gegenüber dem Menschen Andere verknüpft; 
mit diesem Naturbegriff arbeiten sowohl der betriebswirtschaftliche Umweltschützer wie 
die ökologischen Ansätze, um den Graben des Dualismus zu überwinden. Themen wie 
Kontinuität und Differenz, Zugehörigkeit und Andersheit tauchen auf, wenn die Natur/
Mensch-Achse artikuliert wird. Der Bruch zwischen Mensch und Natur ist  im politischen 
Spannungsfeld zwischen ökologischem Naturalismus und kulturalistischer Kritik 
besonders tragisch. Die Schwierigkeiten der Umweltphilosophiebewegung entwickeln sich 
aus Mehrdeutigkeiten, die a priori durch das Grundverständnis der Natur als Andersheit 
gegenüber dem Menschen bedingt sind.
Latour’s Idee eines Endzwecks der Natur löst das Problem der Repräsentation auf 
politisch-ökologischem Weg. Der Natur-Kultur-Rahmen ist nur eine Möglichkeit, die 
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gemeinsame Welt von Menschen und Nichtmenschen zu repräsentieren. Es ist  möglich, die 
politische Arbeit des Aufbaus der gemeinsamen Welt neu anzugehen, wobei die 
Wissenschaften (sowohl Geisteswissenschaften als auch „harte“ Wissenschaften) 
eingebracht werden, um Phänomene wie den Klimawandel oder das Artensterben 
wissenschaftlich und politisch zu repräsentieren. 
Ein zweiter Focus der Untersuchungen wendet sich von der politischen Dimension hin 
zur Subjektivität, der Hauptschwierigkeit  innerhalb des Problems der Repräsentation. 
Nāgārjuna’s Konzept der Leerheit [śūnyatā] gewährleistet  einen tiefen Einblick in die 
Spannung zwischen einer radikal relativen Realität und der Bindung der Sicht des Subjekts 
an eine „Natur der Dinge“.
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PART 1
EQUIVOCATIONS OF NATURE IN ENVIRONMENTALISM:
FROM NAESS’S RELATION WITH NATURE 
TO LATOUR’S END OF NATURE
15
16
CHAPTER 1 - ECOLOGICAL CRISIS AND RELATIONISM
1.1 - WE ARE NOT THE SAME IN THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS
«There are these two young fish swimming along 
and they happen to meet an older fish swimming 
the other way, who nods at them and says 
‘Morning, boys. How's the water?’ And the two 
young fish swim on for a bit, and then eventually 
one of them looks over at the other and goes 
‘What the hell is water?’»1
Radical or critical ecologies generally  advance two kinds of bedrock tenets. In the first, 
the ecological crisis raises serious doubts about the adequacy of some fundamental social 
and political structures (such as: technology, industry, growth, globalization, lifestyle, 
economy  and consumerism, relations of production, subjectivity and democratic 
institutions, issues of distributive justice).2 In the other, the ecological crisis is a crisis of 
the meaning of nature, of subjectivity and of the human-nature relationship: if we dig into 
the root causes of the ecological issues, we discover not  just a lack of prudent resource 
17
1 David F. Wallace, “2005 Kenyon Commencement Address” (speech at Kenyon College, 
Gambier, Ohio, USA, May 21, 2005) http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~drkelly/
DFWKenyonAddress2005.pdf.
2 There is no such thing as a clearly defined “field” of “radical ecology”. Several movements of 
thought have been broadly brought together by common debates and general goals of inquiry, 
despite great differences in accent and approach. See Andrew Biro, ed., Critical Ecologies: The 
Frankfurt School and Contemporary Environmental Crises (Toronto, Buffalo and London: 
University of Toronto Press Inc., 2011), 6. Biro lists some movements that can be considered as 
“radical” or “critical” ecologies: deep ecology, biocentrism, bioregionalism, eco-feminism, eco-
socialism, ecological economics, environmental justice, social ecology. These are opposed to 
“reform-minded” discourses: ecological modernization, environmental economics, green 
liberalism, market environmentalism, sustainable development. For a characterization of “radical 
ecologies” see for example: Charles S. Brown, “The Real and the Good: Phenomenology and the 
Possibility of an Axiological Rationality,” in Eco-Phenomenology: Back to the Earth Itself, ed. 
Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 4; Cf. 
David R. Keller, Environmental Ethics: The Big Questions (Malden, Oxford, Chichester: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2010), 221-336 for examples of alternatives to axiological environmental ethics. Cf. 
Murray Bookchin, “Social Ecology vs Deep Ecology,” in Environmental Ethics: What Really 
Matters, What Really Works, ed. David Schmidtz and Elizabeth Willott (New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002), 126-136; Robyn Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political 
Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992); 
Michael E. Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
management, but a certain understanding of human identity  and of natural objectivity that 
proves to be unsuitable and unsustainable both for humans and for nature.
From a critical point  of view, then, strategies like sustainable development, green 
liberalism and the faith in technological modernization to fix current and future 
environmental issues appear to polish the “business as usual” on a cosmetic level, 
ultimately expressing fear and political conservatism.
In 1973 Arne Naess introduces the depth theme in the ecological reflection.3  In this 
formulation, deep ecology articulates a very  simple idea: at a deeper level of inquiry, the 
ecological crises uncovers elements and connections that cannot just  be left at face value 
and taken for granted anymore. For example, a subject who perceives herself as 
independent and detached from the natural world is an illusion now put into crisis. 
Moreover, by avoiding deeper formulations of the problem, such as issues involving the 
political, social, and individual identity of subjects, who face environmental challenges 
(both culturally and in relation to the non-human world), environmental policies can only 
preserve the economic and political structures in which the crisis emerged. This train of 
thought is exemplified through the perpetuating of justice disparities, universalizing the 
western models of development and in the end only  caring for the “health and affluence of 
people in the developed countries.”4
The deep/shallow distinction becomes a sort of landmark in the variety  of 
ecophilosophical reflections, which still roughly position themselves inside a general 
alternative: on one part, some affirm that the ecological crisis opens a new cultural 
paradigm where given, modern, and western concepts of humanity  and nature and their 
modes and range of connections need to be reexamined; on the other part, others endorse a 
simple redirection of our present conceptual, ethical, theoretical and political tools in order 
to deal with new sensibilities and new problems.5
The so called “radical environmentalism” or “critical ecologies”, including deep 
ecology, then, share an initial prescription in which issues of ontology, ethics and politics 
fade into each other.
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3 Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary,” 
Inquiry 16 (1973): 95-100.
4 Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep,” 95.
5 Cf. Mario Sirimarco, Percorsi di filosofia della crisi ecologica (Rome: Edizioni Nuova 
Cultura, 2012), 8.
The “depth” theme in Naess is framed initially  in terms of a problem of relation. The 
choice is between a concept of environment serving the human historical quest as inert 
background, and the concept of nature as a wider whole to which we constitutively belong. 
What Naess calls “intrinsic relation” is not very different than what is to be found in other 
philosophies of relation, such as Whitehead’s process philosophy (one of Naess’ 
references), as well as in other philosophical ecologies, such as Bateson’s: in a nutshell, 
any creature that destroy its environment destroys itself.6 
Naess’ formulation of the ecological problem in terms of a philosophy of ecological 
relation is also critical of environmental ethics. When ecological concerns spilled into 
academic philosophy, the mainstream approach was one of ethics.7  Following the 
development of a worldwide ecological consciousness started in the 1960s and 70s in the 
United States, the philosophical question about ecology asked what is man’s responsibility 
towards nature or whether there is a need to formulate a specifically environmental ethic 
that includes nature in the moral community, historically  intra-humanity.8 This axiological 
approach can still be considered mainstream, at least in the English speaking world.9 
In terms of relation, however, we have to ask ourselves, before we look into the logical 
passages of our ethical systems, whether the moral subject  is left untouched by the 
ecological crisis. In other words, the crisis disrupts both our understanding of natural 
objects, and our posture as rational agents, shaking the comfort of a neutral position from 
which we release the judgements of value we attribute to nature (or to parts of it).
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6 Cf. Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 1938), 
132-133: “any physical object which by its influence deteriorates its environment, commits 
suicide;” Gregory Bateson, Steps to and Ecology of Mind (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1972), 501.
7 See a history of the topic in Holmes Rolston III and Andrew Light, eds., Environmental 
Ethics: An Anthology (Malden, Oxford and Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 15-37.
8 Some eminent examples are: The 1973 conference by: Richard (Routley) Sylvan, “Is there a 
need for a New, an Environmental, Ethic?” in Environmental Ethics, ed. Keller, 98-103; John 
Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (London: 
Duckworth, 1974); The biocentric ethics of respect for nature in: Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: 
A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
9 Cf. Brown, “The Real and the Good,” 9. See also the voice of Val Plumwood, one of the 
thinkers who tries to offer an alternative approach to the tradition of environmental “liberal/
rationalist moral theories.” Val Plumwood, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of 
Reason (London and New York: Routledge, 2002, Kindle edition), loc. 2863. It is important to note 
that Plumwood includes deep ecology in this model of ethics, while Naess declares to distance 
himself from it.
In a fairly  recent study commissioned by the United Nations Organization, the German 
philosopher Angelika Krebs drafted a useful “map” of the main environmental ethical 
approaches.10 At some point in the book she admits we need to keep in mind how “moral 
arguments change the world only with great difficulty.”11  In her reading, this is due to 
“immoral group egoist orientations [that] shape the controlling systems of our societies.”12 
It is not in question that many strong political interests and powers are blind to a moral 
interrogation on nature. Nevertheless, some approaches, e.g. Naess’ detachment from the 
western ethical tradition or ecofeminist critique, read a weakness exactly in the binding 
strength of rational foundational ethical theories. Viewing the task of ethics through the 
definition of a normativity  based on the universalization of a moral principle that does not 
question the abstract  moral subject and his interests, situatedness and historicity would 
establish moral duties which overlook social, emotional, ideological, power interest 
conditions in which they are supposed to be working. The weakness would not be 
represented by  egoist, irrational tendencies as opposed to rational well founded arguments, 
but by the abstractedness and forced universality of rationalistic moral arguments.
The model of a rational foundation of universal ethical principles, in contrast to power 
relations and other “lower” dimensions of bodies and souls maintains a transcendental idea 
of a universal, a-historical, a-linguistic subject. Moreover, it does not feel the need to 
discuss modern subjectivity as a part of the speculative elements of the ecological crisis.13 
In the attempt to pinpoint a universalizing ethical principle it  ultimately risks perpetuating 
rationalism or imposing the standard of special ideas from privileged classes and groups. 
We need to keep in mind how the cult of Reason as the “authentic human” character as 
opposed to the feminine and bodily aspects of human nature is one of the criticisms of 
ecological domination exposed by ecofeminism, another main current of critical ecology.14
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10 Angelika Krebs, Ethics of Nature: A Map (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999).
11 Krebs, Ethics of Nature, 32.
12 Krebs, Ethics of Nature, 32.
13 Max Oelschlaeger points out how most environmental ethics have ignored contemporary 
forms of critique of representation, language and power structures. Max Oelschlaeger, introduction 
to Postmodern Environmental Ethics, by Max Oelschlaeger, ed. (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1995), 1-20.
14 Val Plumwood, “Nature, Self, and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the 
Critique of Rationalism,” Hypatia 6, no.1 (1991): 3-27.
Naess offers a similar remark to Krebs’, but in quite an opposite tone. Moral arguments 
face difficulties in the attempt to achieve efficacy. Nevertheless, in Naess’ view, 
philosophy is accountable for this failure. Ethical arguments fail to account for something 
fundamental in our experience of nature, its meaning, emotional charge, sense of place, our 
situatedness, what we experience as valuable. The normativity of an ethical prescription 
has no power if we fail to inquire into the way different parties in environmental conflicts 
see nature.15  Complementary to the thread of constitutive relation, Naess advances the 
necessity to reopen the ontological question about nature. This is why he speaks about the 
primacy of environmental ontology over environmental ethics.16
Naess is primarily concerned with our ontological frameworks, our sense of reality, 
what is nature and with how we see the natural world. Indeed, opponents in environmental 
conflicts may share the same ethical prescriptions (e.g.: preserve the forest), but  eventually 
disagree on what they experience to be real (the forest as a collection of trees, or the forest 
as a complex interrelated ecosystem).17
Although Naess does not express himself in these terms, he is raising the issue of a 
hidden normative power in ontology. What is stronger, more powerful, more unavoidable 
than what is there, than how things objectively are? The Czech phenomenologist Erazim 
Kohák expresses this through a powerful comparison: we exploit and use violent treatment 
on animals because they are “just animals.” Likewise, African-American slaves were “just 
salves” before 1865 in the Southern United States of America (and they were actually 
treated like cattle, e.g. separating children from mothers for purchasing purposes). 
Comparably were the European Jewish “just Jewish” during the Third Reich.18 
We are not the same in the ecological crisis because the crisis calls us to revisit our 
understanding of the subject-object dichotomy. We cannot hold onto a cartesian subject 
21
15 See: Arne Naess, “The World of Concrete Contents,” Inquiry 28, no. 4 (1985): 423: 
“Confrontations between developers and conservers reveal differences in experiencing what is real. 
What a conservationist sees and experiences as reality, the developer typically does not see - and 
vice versa. [...] The difference between the antagonists is rather one of ontology than of ethics.” 
Emphasis in the original. See also Andrew Light, “Deep Socialism? An Interview with Arne 
Naess,” Capitalism, Nature, Socialism 8 (1997): 84: “I am for what I call a focus on environmental 
ontology, how you see the world, how you see it, how you can bring people to see things 
differently.” Emphasis in the original.
16 Naess, “Concrete Contents,” 423-425.
17 Ibid.
18 Erazim Kohák, The Green Halo: A Bird’s-Eye View of Ecological Ethics, (Chicago and La 
Salle: Open Courts, 2000, Kindle edition), locs. 528-1252.
that frontally gazes upon a world out there. We are related, entangled with nonhumans, 
situated, and our values lie in this relation complex. If we leave intact the moral subject, 
the rational human individual, we eventually  leave the question of the value of the 
nonhuman world to a mere subjective attribution, because we leave the subject’s 
counterpart intact out there: nature, made of mere brute, inert facts in search of a 
supplement to the soul.
Other ecocritical formulations point their finger towards more problems that 
environmental ethical approaches present, when the latter are detached from an inquiry 
into subjectivity  and agency (who are the subjects and what do they do). Val Plumwood, 
for example, criticizes ethical approaches that frame ethics as a matter of finding a 
universal ethical principle. Moral extensionism is a typical case of this. By locating a 
universal principle it  locates a feature moral patients must have in order to be included in 
the moral community, or, what is the same, have that moral community extended. Beings 
bear on themselves the burden of proof of being sufficiently similar to those we already 
consider worthy. It  is a universalization of morally relevant characters. Not very dissimilar 
from rationalism, it  maintains a master’s attitude. The same logic of exclusion based on 
pre-established moral features occurs. This attitude fails to concern itself with our 
relationship with the nonhuman world, or what the nonhuman world is in this relation.19
Against the idea of moral considerability  itself, others have recently brought within 
environmental philosophy the contemporary philosophical idea that epistemology  is a 
gesture, already framing its ethical possibilities.20 An epistemology that sees knowledge as 
the relation of a subject observing the object already  allows for a certain epistemological 
attitude, for example a frontal, manipulative one. It  implicitly makes use of a certain 
concept of the object and of the subject (what they do, what they can do, what range of 
relations does what they  do imply). American ecophilosopher Jim Cheney opposes a 
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Consideration as an Originary Practice”, Environmental Ethics 20, no. 3 (1998): 279-289.
different gesture, that of universal consideration. As an answer to the ecological crisis, it 
finds a way  to allow beings to emerge, based on a doubt about an a priori understanding of 
what they are.21
Giving up our human mastery and supremacy and reopening the terms of our 
relatedness with nature has to do with an act of humbleness and democracy: “not letting 
“the human word be all there is, be Being.”22 A concept of relation that is philosophically 
meaningful tackles the very concept of identity. It  is necessary  of a reflection that takes 
into consideration the nonhuman world and gives it a chance, even if this means dealing 
with the vulnerability into which nonhumans in crisis throw us.
This work initially retrieves Naess’ ecosophy, although it has been overanalysed and 
overcriticized over the forty  years that separate us from his first ecological paper. We can 
consider Naess’ work paradigmatic of the importance of a philosophy of relation in 
environmentalism. Naess’ recourse to relation is also paradigmatic of central tenets of 
many ecophilosophical movements, such as, the stress on the continuity of nature and 
humanity in lieu of a man/nature dualism, and the counterpart issue of humanity’s peculiar 
place in nature. 
Through a close critique of Naess’ ecosophy we will clear the necessity and the 
difficulties of relationism in a critical ecology. Just as Latour notes, Naess does feel the 
limitations of modern metaphysics in the understanding of the ecological crisis, even 
though his proposal has fundamental impasses.23  These impasses are worth exploring 
because they are rooted in deeper philosophical issues, issues sometimes Naess himself 
points out. For example, the ecological crisis and our relation to nature are entangled with 
the status of objectivity, subjectivity and with a hidden “metaphysics of nature.”
Following Bruno Latour, we will explore how the ecological crisis arrives calling us to 
reopen the problem of our identity  and relation to nature. It shows we have connections we 
have failed to take into account, or that have by now become vital to humans as 
individuals, species, as civilizations, as well as to the survival of human and nonhuman 
citizens of our common world. We are not the same, we are not who we thought we were. 
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21 Cheney, “Universal Consideration.”
22 See Enzo Paci, Tempo e relazione (Turin: Taylor, 1954), 103. My translation.
23 Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy, trans. Catherine 
Porter (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 256-257 n29.
A critical and political ecology  needs to reopen the status quo, instead of having a fixed a-
historical natural order out there invade human-only politics, hostile to human will.
The next question will then ask: what is the ecological crisis? In which sense does it 
shake the status quo ante bellum?
1.2 - WHAT IS THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS?
In which sense does the ecological crisis put in crisis our identity and our relations? 
Bruno Latour pointed out that both of these two dimensions cannot stay intact, while we 
read in the newspapers about humanity’s responsibility  in the mass extinction of several 
species, or that human activities and population are now a major geological force that 
threatens life on earth as we know it.24  As humans, as individuals, as civilizations: we 
discover we are connected to and responsible for the natural world more than we thought. 
The crisis character stems from the fact that it does not only  take place “out there” in 
nature. Which anthropos is responsible in the expression “anthropic origin” of the 
ecological crisis? The ecological crisis shows the impossibility of regarding humanity  as a 
static, a-historical idea, for example arbitrarily resolving on which technology to use or on 
which connections to entertain with the natural world. At the same time it casts doubts on 
the status of nature, and the idea that the crisis of ecological processes can be a mere 
biological or ecosystemic description. In other words, there are problems related to the 
concept of “nature” emerging directly as a result of the preoccupation about the ecological 
crisis.
1.2.1 - Naess’ Interpretation of the Ecological Crisis
Naess’ reference to the crisis is paradigmatic of much ecocriticism. In fact, what appear 
as two separate accounts or domains are in fact central to his interpretation. 
24
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On the one hand it is a crisis in the biological conditions that support life on earth. The 
gravity of the situation is framed in terms of environmental deterioration.25  The human 
abuse of the natural world in terms of ecosystem processes is to be held responsible: the 
growth of human population, pollution, resource depletion. 
On the other hand, the crisis character denotes a loss in value, in terms of beauty, 
integrity,26  and meaning. The crisis in meaning occurs through the man/nature split that 
allows an instrumental view of the natural world and the general triumph of instrumental 
rationality. Therefore, the devastation of the natural world is treated as a consequence or 
epiphenomenon of a “wrong” paradigm. The environment becomes the mere surroundings 
of the human world of subjectivity. Nature is regarded as a valueless objectified 
humanity’s other. Naess’ crisis is a crisis of the modern subject, who cannot keep 
representing himself as the Cartesian spectator or the rational moral subject, ignoring all 
his determinations in relation to nonhuman aspects of the world. 
1.2.2 - Modernity
Modernism’s charge of being the cause and horizon of the ecological crisis is an 
established prescription in critical ecological thinking.27 Modernity is criticized as the age 
of technology  and of dominion of nature. Epistemological and theoretical attitudes are 
attributed as root causes that spread to all other institutions of human civilizations and 
eventually impairing physical and geochemical phenomena.
Gregory Bateson puts it bluntly. The ecological crisis is primarily  a threat to man’s 
survival and amounts to three main root causes: technology, human population growth and 
“certain errors in the thinking and attitudes of Occidental culture. Our ‘values’ are 
wrong.”28  Vittorio Hösle’s “philosophy of the ecological crisis” also amounts to three 
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25 Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 23-24.
26 Ibid., 23-24.
27 Cf. Nicola Russo, Filosofia ed ecologia (Naples: Guida, 2001), 252.
28 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, 498.
intertwined areas of interest which render the range of the crisis: capitalist economy, 
modern technology and modern science.29
Critical theory ecological interpretations point to instrumental rationality  and the 
following instrumental conceptualization of the nonhuman world as the root of the abuse 
of man on his worldly  and material conditions.30 Referencing Heidegger’s technological 
concept of nature has become commonplace among ecocritics, and has by now been 
established as one of the most lucid and useful accounts. In his account nature is disclosed 
in modern technology as a standing reserve (Gestell), as inert matter that serves merely  as 
a resource to a differentiated human that  poses itself as the sole subject. In order to disclose 
nature in terms of stored energy and as a mere resource, the technological challenge for 
humans becomes the epochal culmination of a long age of western metaphysics of 
presence, where being is disclosed as constant availability and the world is conquered in a 
picture, a view or representation (Vorstellung) of an object clearly standing in front of a 
spectator subject.31 
Other critiques of modernity have been recalled by ecocritics, bringing to light more 
shades of meaning and different springboards for discussion. Whitehead’s process 
philosophy is one of Naess’ references. It presents itself as a project of rewriting the 
modern understanding of reality in terms of a process and as an organism. Whitehead’s 
“provisional and conditioned realism” contrasts the naive realism of the “fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness” embodied in the simple location of matter and the substance-
quality pattern that begins with the advent of modernity  and the scientific thinking 
characteristic thereof since Renaissance times.	  32  Another ecocritic who offers a new 
perspective of modernity is Gregory Bateson when he places within the Industrial 
Revolution the landmark of the modern treatment of nature and the “wrong ideas” of the 
western civi l izat ion about the nature of man and i ts relat ion to the 
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environment.33  Correspondingly, Latour pinpoints the enlightenment project and its 
fundamental task of liberating humanity from the monsters of superstition, fetishes and 
belief. “The unfortunate solution inherited from the philosophy of Immanuel 
Kant”34  turned the bifurcation between humans and nature into an uncritical belief of the 
same tenor.
By now, several classic accounts of modernism share fundamental characteristics that 
are also recognized within the roots of our ongoing ecological problems. The split theme 
between humanity and nature is accounted for in terms of epistemology of dominion, that 
sees nature reified as knowable in terms of prediction, control and exploitation.35 
The so-called epistemology  of dominion is based on a designative theory of knowledge 
where the spectator subject is split from the world out there and mirrors reality  through the 
means of vision. The frontal outlook on the world is translated into representation, 
veridical accounts that mirror reality. Language, especially when scientific, is not regarded 
as constitutive of nature, but as neutrally  and objectively representative.36  This 
epistemological aspect of modernism is a consequence and function of a deeper 
metaphysical alienation between humanity  and nature: spirit, meaning, value, history, 
rationality, interpretation, feelings, opinions on one side, and the material world on the 
other. The unequal distribution of qualities allows the other-than-human to become less-
than-human, a mechanism that has been criticized both by social liberation movements and 
in the treatment of nonhumans. At the same time, the subjective character of the qualities 
attributed to humans in contrast to the objectivity of the “real” world, allows for the 
material representations of nature to mortify feelings and values other than instrumental for 
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the natural world. The split is indeed reinforced through an authoritarian usage of scientific 
objectivity and rationality and its privileged access to “what is real.”37  The crisis of the 
modern subject and his split from nature is, then, sometimes denounced in terms of a cult 
of reason: not reason itself, but a modern, historical and reductive concept of reason within 
phenomenological and feminist accounts of ecology.38  These are some of the elements 
brought up  by radical ecologists in the attempt to explain the still mainstream instrumental 
view of nature and anthropocentric exploitation in connection to modernist naturalism.39
1.2.3 - Dualism
Besides the critical horizon of modernism, Naess’ interpretation of the ecological crisis 
is also paradigmatic because it appears to struggle with the same dualism it  denounces. The 
critique of the human/nature fracture which comes to evidence in the crisis is described 
always in binary terms. It is a crisis of the biological conditions of life and, at the same 
time, a crisis of culture and subjectivity. Ecophilosophical texts usually  bring up the union 
of two analyses, of two intermingled spaces.40 
These spaces also overlap the two scientific and humanistic cultures, that is to say, the 
fields of inquiry  that offer the framework for the analysis. The crisis of natural systems as 
they  are studied by  ecology, biology or atmospheric physics is mentioned alongside more 
classical philosophical tools that  address a crisis of man. The ecological crisis appears to 
be something going on both there “by them” in nature, and here “by us” in society and 
culture. 
Different accents and analyses can be patently found in a wide panorama of radical 
ecologies. Nonetheless, dualism as both an object of critique and as an a priori 
presupposition seems to recur. It still resonates as a hard to eradicate alternative even 
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39 Cf. Brown, “The Real and the Good,” 4.
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within active attempts to overcome it. One attempt is made in phenomenological terms, 
when Brown, for example, reminds us that  nature is always the lived, inhabited world. His 
ecological crisis, then, appears as a crisis of meaning of nature combining ecological 
[nature], social, and psychological aspects [human beings].41 A similar endeavour is made 
by Integral Ecology, a sui generis work that genuinely  seeks to combine disparate kinds of 
ecological narrations and inquiries.42 The authors frame ecological crises through a mixture 
of a fourfold quadrant of “broken consciousness, unsustainable behaviors, dysfunctional 
cultures, and broken systems.”43  By doing so, they mean to offer a richer and more 
complex image of reality, with the intent to avoid “a nature-versus-culture stance, by 
recognizing that every occasion has a cultural dimension [...] and a natural dimension.”44
Willing or not, the solutions to the human/nature split and ecological crisis appears, 
then, to sit within a framework that recognizes a double contamination: humanity is 
dependent on natural processes and nature always has a cultural inflection.
1.2.4 - Scientific Frameworks
Among recent research on the ecological crisis, two ideas can be considered of 
particular significance for philosophical reflection in framing the contemporary ecological 
crisis. 
One is represented by the notion of limit or boundary. The second idea is related to the 
creation of global frameworks. 
The idea of limit has been around since the famous 1972 Limits to Growth report  and is 
now reinforced by the Planetary Boundaries framework suggested in 2009.45
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The Limits to growth introduced the idea that the planet is finite and has exceeded its 
carrying capacity. The project consisted in the creation of a software by a team of system 
scientists that combines data of growth in five variables (world population, 
industrialization, pollution, food production, and resource depletion) and creates long-term 
scenarios. The software “World 3” is still used and continuously reassessed in time. It 
clearly  shows that the planet is in “overshoot,” which means that some limits have been 
exceeded by  a rapid and exaggerated growth in some processes. As a consequence, stress is 
induced that slows down aspects of the growth. The overshoot is due to three aspects: a 
rapid growth of some variable, the presence of a limit or barrier beyond which bringing the 
system is not safe, and a “delay or mistake in the perceptions and the responses that try to 
keep the system within its limits.”46 
The Planetary Boundaries, instead, is a recent framework that pinpoints nine global 
processes in the biosphere and defines their thresholds. Most of these boundaries have 
gained a watchword in the mass media: climate change, biodiversity loss, stratospheric 
ozone depletion, land use, freshwater use, chemical pollution, while others can be more 
obscure to non specialists (ocean acidification, biogeochemical flows of nitrogen and 
phosphorus, atmospheric aerosol loading).47  These limits are meant to design “a safe 
operating space for humanity.”48  The framework is constantly  being reworked and 
criticized within the community of researchers who work on the concept, but it received its 
political imprimatur through the United Nations endorsement in 2012. Three of the nine 
boundaries proposed by the authors have already been transgressed: climate change, the 
rate of biodiversity loss and changes to the global nitrogen cycle. Others are critical.
The concept of limit as a tool “to monitor humanity’s impact on the environment” has 
been long read as a limit of nature onto human activities.49 It is easy to read the boundaries 
as the description of timeless natural cycles which have been disturbed by selfish and 
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greedy  “human aliens.”50 Nevertheless, if we look closer to these frameworks, the limits do 
not impose nature balances onto human decisions, but call into question our very idea of 
humanity. The uncertain and dynamic nature of the threshold51  is due not only  to the 
complexity of the system of processes they take into consideration, but also to the fact that 
human activities and knowledge participate in the processes themselves.
The boundaries are indeed planetary, they define a system in which humanity is 
situated, to which it belongs. They describe processes where human agency, nonhuman 
agency, and our knowledge of both interact  and define each other. The limits, then, are 
imposed on an idea of separated human agency and its technocratic “prometheanism,” as 
opposed to a natural inert and passive background. Both humans and the natural world 
assume a historical and relational character in which the sphere of humans and that of 
nature are not easily distinguished.
For instance, the indicators Donella Meadows provides as signs of the planet overshoot 
are mixed in character and impossible to fit into a nature/humanity pattern. Better said, 
trying to fit them into a man/nature abstract pattern does not grant a better explanatory 
function. “The signs are everywhere around us,” she writes: the sea level rising and the 
arctic ice decreasing, the increasing gap between rich and poor, the depletion of fisheries’ 
capacity, the degradation of agricultural land, the fall of per capita GDP.52 Humanity with 
all its dimensions, economy, institutions, biology, food, basic needs and rights, markets, 
agriculture, is taken and thrown into the biosphere, and from there it has to reframe its 
place and actions once again, as well as its representation and meaning of the nonhumans.
This is even clearer if we consider some global frameworks that have been offered for 
the comprehension of our current ecological crisis. One is Gaia and the other is the recent 
concept of Anthropocene.
The global dimension of the contemporary  frameworks which offer a picture of the 
ongoing ecological crisis processes can be considered powerful feedback of necessity, now 
more than ever, to reformulate the universal collectors of humanity  and nature. The “Gaia 
hypothesis” frames the biosphere as a self-regulated global collection of interacting 
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processes.53 As Bruno Latour points out, philosophically speaking, Lovelock’s Gaia is not 
the same as “nature.” Gaia does not appear as a natural order transcendent of humanity, nor 
as a passive a-historical mechanist materiality. Gaia is not an external-but-human-affected 
domain of reality. Gaia has history, it  is changing. Gaia takes “revenge.”54  “Her” 
heterogeneous phenomena need to be explored through mixed, heterogeneous sciences. In 
Latour’s understanding, Gaia is conceived as agent, while nature is not, without being 
ontologically unified, while nature is. “She is no more unified an agency than is the human 
race that is supposed to occupy  the other side of the bridge.”55  Gaia is far from being an 
ontologically unified superorganism opposed to humanity, showing, instead, a 
redistribution of agency in different processes that involve a reconsideration of the 
interactions both on the side of nature and of humans.
Anthropocene is maybe the most powerful image advanced in the contemporary 
ecological consciousness. The term was suggested by the Dutch Nobel prize atmospheric 
chemist Paul Crutzen in the year 2000. The basic idea is that, since the industrial 
revolution, humanity  has gradually  become the driving geological and ecological force. 
Consequently, the term Anthropocene asserts two points: that the Earth is moving out of its 
current geological age Holocene; and that human activity  is largely  responsible for this 
exit.56 
It is a crucial point that the Anthropocene is not a mere symbolic narration. In 2009 a 
group of researchers assembled the “Anthropocene Working Group” as part of the 
“Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy Commission” of the Geological Society of 
London. The group is collecting scientific evidence and making a case for the 
formalization of the term as an officially distinct geological era. The case is expected to be 
formally presented for discussion in 2016. If it is accepted, the Anthropocene will be real, 
and humanity will deserve its “golden spike,” the bronze disc that is, very literally and 
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materially, driven through rock layers to conventionally define the beginning of a 
geological era in rock stratigraphy.57
The authors of the case suggest that the geological era of Anthropocene can be divided 
in three phases: 1) its logical beginning in the conventionally  pinpointed year 1800, with 
the beginning of the industrial revolution; 2) the so called “Great Acceleration” with post-
World War II industrialization, techno-scientific development, nuclear arms, population 
explosion, and economic growth; and finally  3) the 21st century  development of a global 
ecological consciousness and the consequent creation of institutions and countermeasures. 
Not only material processes of production and consumption, then, but also a more complex 
range of interactions, that include human rationality, consciousness and paradigms, work 
together with the natural world.
The planetary boundaries in this context  appear, then, not so much as fixed limits of 
nature, but as an assumption of responsibility on the side of humanity in order to monitor 
our impact and the evolution of the situation in our common world.
The Anthropocene directly challenges the place of humanity in the natural world. This 
is how the authors explain it: “In fact, the belief systems and assumptions that underpin 
neo-classical economic thinking, which in turn has been a major driver of the Great 
Acceleration, are directly challenged by the concept of the Anthropocene.”58 Therefore, the 
meaning of humanity  in nature needs to be reviewed based on the fact that its agency now 
includes the capacity  to “adversely affect the broad range of ecosystem services that 
support human (and other) life and could eventually lead to a ‘crisis in the biosphere.’”59 
33
57 Andrew C. Revkin, "Does the Anthropocene, the Age of Humans, Deserve a Golden Spike?" 
The New York Times, 16 October, 2014. http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/does-the-
anthropocene-the-age-of-humans-deserve-a-golden-spike/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. The 
Global Stratigraphic Section and Point (GSSP), colloquially known as a “golden spike,” is an 
internationally agreed upon system, marking the lower boundary of a geological stage within rock 
layers. The golden spike can be due to the surfacing of fossil findings or geochemical discontinuity, 
revealing events that are read as the passage between one geological era and another. Cf. “What is 
the 'Anthropocene'? - current definition and status,” Subcommission on Quaternary Stratigraphy, 
Working Group on the “Anthropocene,” last modified 13th March, 2015, http://
quaternary.stratigraphy.org/workinggroups/anthropocene/.
58 Steffen, “The Anthropocene,” 862.
59 Ibid., 843.
From now on, the number of McDonald’s restaurants worldwide is an indicator in the 
record of earth’s geological history.60
“Scientific frameworks” of the ecological crisis should not create the expectation on 
“scientists” to deliver an objective account  of processes “out there” in the atmosphere and 
in the oceans. We should not think of ourselves as waiting from inside our societies to have 
a certain scientific description of natural processes so that we can take the tormented 
decision of making sacrifices for nature if absolutely  necessary. What is shown by the 
mentioned scientific frameworks is entirely  different. They are frameworks through which 
to make sense of our lived world. They  are narrations which push us to rethink our 
historical situation and world. Moreover, within these frameworks, humans and 
nonhumans cannot be disentangled. In cases such as climate change and the Anthropocene, 
it is by now evident that even humanity’s delay in making any decision until experts offer 
incontrovertible proof is already an action inside the system of biospheric processes.61
1.2.5 - Overcoming dualism?
The man/nature dualism does not offer much support in understanding events like the 
ones reported in the Anthropocene studies. The philosophical couple appears, indeed, to be 
a current  abstraction of our civilization in need of a critique, as Whitehead puts 
philosophy’s more progressive task.62 
As mentioned earlier, the critique to the human/nature divide is typical of the critical 
ecophilosophical accounts of the roots of the ecological crisis. Nevertheless, this dualism 
appears to remain as an horizon, an a priori opposition. A crisis of man (of reason, of 
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meaning, of culture, according to different critical accounts) occurs in addition or together 
with a crisis in the biosphere. The gap between humans and nature denounced by 
ecocritical readings of the ecological crisis appears to be reaffirmed and presupposed in the 
very act of bridging it. 
Naess raises the problem of relation in response to this denunciation of dualism. We 
shall see whether, and in which sense, and with which limitations a philosophy of human-
nature relation can actually present the problem as unified. This inquiry needs to take into 
account the fact that ecophilosophy problems are entangled with the wider contemporary 
philosophical issue of modernity.
Furthermore, through the political ecology suggested by  Bruno Latour, we will explore 
how relationism has to deal with an abstract, philosophical account of nature that brings 
together, as one greater question, both ecological issues of green nature and the 
metaphysical issue of “the nature of things.”
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CHAPTER 2 - ARNE NAESS’ RELATIONAL THINKING
2.1 - NAESS’ ECOSOPHY
Arne Naess notoriously coined the term “ecosophy,” ecological wisdom, for his 
proposal. The term conveys a project to face the current ecological crisis not only strictly 
as an ethical question, but as more of a general framework reflection. Therefore, in Naess’ 
terms, an “ecosophy” is a way  of thinking philosophically  where action and value spring 
out of the way we rework and see our “life conditions in the ecosphere.” In other words, 
the way we see nature, the meaning we give to ecological issues and the way these issues 
change the human-culture-nature relationship are entangled elements of a general 
ecological wisdom that we are called to develop by an undeniable ecological crisis.63
Naess’ ecosophy is important in its formulation of our relatedness with the natural world 
insofar as it is representative of a central issue of continuity between human beings and 
nature, as well as of the interrelatedness theme, also a central topic in ecological thinking. 
Naess’ view also unearths important consequences for the criticisms related to the concept 
of nature and how the latter entails ambiguities and hindrances in the explication of 
relationism in ecology.64
2.1.1 - In Relation with Nature
The first notion ecology brings into question is a representation of individuals as 
independent within an atomistic community, be it social or biotic. “Everything is 
connected to everything else” is the first law of ecology according to ecologist Barry 
Commoner.65  Therefore, the first thing ecology shows is that, in principle, no being is 
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64 Naess’ proposal has had a number of commentators, followers and critics over the years. We 
will give an exposition and interpretation of the philosophical more meaningful critical knots of his 
ecosophy associated to the way he sees the problem of relation in the ecological context. We will 
limit the discourse to Naess, and not discuss deep ecology. Most commentators overlap the two, but  
deep ecology is a wide umbrella with heterogeneous contributions, including many lacking 
philosophical background.
65 Barry Commoner, The Closing Circle (Toronto - New York - London: Bantam, 1971), 29.
separated from its environment, and nothing, in the “circle” it participates in, is 
dispensable. The ecological crisis is the result  of humanity  denying its network of vital 
connections.
Naess interprets ecological relations in terms of a “relational total-field image.”66  An 
interrelated field extending to the whole of reality is opposed to an idea of humanism that 
sees man simply placed in the environment through external relations, replaceable or 
dispensable in principle. The relatedness brought up by ecology  is that  of an intrinsic, 
constitutive relation. The identity  of the relata, the beings that enter the relation, as well as 
the concept of identity itself are called into question. 
A limpid example of this level of relation can be found in the philosophical 
investigation of metabolism offered by Hans Jonas in his The Phenomenon of Life. In the 
metabolic process the material identity of the organism is continuously replaced by means 
of its relation to its material environment. It is not just a mechanical metabolization 
because the organism is an active centre, a “formal identity” that acts in the effort  of self 
preservation on a temporal horizon. The material and formal identity stand in a dialectical 
relation that qualifies the identity of the organism only in relation to its otherness. Self-
identity  isolated from this constant “challenge of selfhood”67  is nothing more than a 
tautology, the “merely logical attribute of a dead being.”68
The meaning of relation with nature is obviously  not limited to a biological or 
ecosystemic position. According to Naess, the concept of environment invests too much 
emphasis on the human difference and endorses an ontological unification of nature under 
the category  of the object. This unification abstracts itself from the setting of our concrete 
relations. “Environment,” indeed, can convey the image of a background to the unfolding 
of human history. Therefore, the “environment” as something humans are placed in is, for 
Naess, laden with both an ontological and an ethical relevance that need to be made 
explicit. 
Naess deploys elements from various critiques of modernism and its subject/object 
dichotomy in order to read the fundamental structures of the man/nature separation. In 
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67 Hans Jonas, The Phenomenon of Life. Toward a Philosophical Biology (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2001), 83.
68 Hans Jonas, Organismo e libertà: verso una biologia filosofica, trans. Paolo Becchi (Turin: 
Einaudi, 1999), 113. My translation.
Naess’ writing, the concept of environment symbolizes a surrounding dimension 
transcended by  the anthropos on behalf of his spirit, freedom, reason, consciousness, mind 
or subjectivity, depending on the accent of the critique. A reified nature, automatic and 
objectified, deprived of every element ascribed to subjects, is left out as inert matter with 
its mathematical qualities. Such an ontological crystallization cannot but entail a practical 
relation of boundless, legitimate domination and manipulation.
The historical invention of an objectified nature whose concept emerges as a 
counterpart of human subjectivity is, then, the criticized character of the modern 
worldview relevant for rethinking ecology. This general view often overlaps the common 
idea of “scientific worldview.” The reference is to modern science, that has made the most 
from this material understanding of the world. Nevertheless, Naess brings up how, even in 
the way we experience nature and in the way value conflicts are settled regarding the 
natural environment, the “scientific” and “objective” constantly occur as authoritarian 
arguments to shut down discussions in favor a materialistic perspective (in terms of 
economic goods, this time). The objectivity of nature in terms of material structures and 
measurable quantities becomes simply a social bogeyman (that hardly has anything to do 
with what science really  does or the way it perceives itself), utilized to purify attached 
subjective “feelings” of place, belonging, value, identification, or care from nonhuman 
dimensions. What presents itself as a neutral and objective worldview is instead a powerful 
ethical tool.69
2.1.2 - Biospheric Equality vs Anthropocentrism
The environment taken in these terms is the ecological equivalent of objectified nature. 
It connects the ecological critique of the man/nature separation with the kin philosophical 
critique of the subject/object dualism. A dualism which attributes the qualities associated 
with freedom, feeling, intentionality or agency  only  to the human/subject side is the basis 
of anthropocentrism. Only humans possess the features that grant them the right to defend 
their interests as superior. The ethical aspect of the dualistic setting becomes obvious in the 
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exploitation and ecological degradation of the natural world that follow the view of it  as 
the inferior and passive side of the setting.
Bearing in mind the anthropocentric defense of exclusive human interests, Naess, 
instead, suggests an idea of “biospheric egalitarianism in principle.” This states that all 
beings are to be regarded as in principle having the same “right to live and blossom.”70 The 
restriction of this right to humans is unjustified.71 This kind of egalitarianism includes a 
review of humanism and the centrality, indeed, of man in nature. The principle of 
biospheric egalitarianism has allowed commentators to pigeonhole Naess as a figure of 
“ecocentrism” or “biocentrism.” Much ecophilosophical scholarship has, in fact, 
interpreted the problem of the ethical position of humans in nature through an axis that 
goes from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism.72  To be fair, Naess does not consider this 
terminology  important and we will see how the position of the problem in these terms is 
problematic and reveals once again some fundamental ambiguities in the concept of nature.
What the ecological crisis does, then, is to reveal the crisis of the modern subject and 
reopen the understanding of the place of humans in nature that also need to be brought into 
political discussion and decision making structures. The image of the environment for 
Naess corresponds to a background onto which human actors alone are placed. It 
reproduces the human/nature dualism and automatically  puts nature in an inferior position. 
His aim is to catalyze a worldview shift, offering an image of humans as intrinsically 
related to nature, speaking of nature instead of environment as a greater whole to which we 
belong.73
2.1.3 - A Gestalt Shift of our Worldviews
Nature as a worldly  other, external to humanity, represented through the detached 
knowledge of a spectator subject is at the root of our too far gone exploitation of the world 
we live in. Fundamentally, what Naess criticizes is the ideological utilization of an image 
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71 Naess avoids to make use of right theories for nature. His use of the concept of “right” is not 
technical. See, A. Naess, “Self-Realization in Mixed Communities of Humans, Bears, Sheep, and 
Wolves,” Inquiry 22 (1979): 231-41.
72 See for example Giovanni Salio, “Ecologia profonda ed ecosofia,” introduction to Arne 
Naess, Ecosofia, trans. Elena Recchia, (Como: red, 1994), 10; Krebs, Ethics of Nature.
73 Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, 36
of nature in terms of material substratum in the shaping of our sense of reality. Such an 
image corresponds to the abstract  structures of primary qualities of natural bodies singled 
out by modern science,74 which became the fundamental abstraction of our civilization. In 
opposition to this “Galileian ontology,”75  Naess attempts to bring up alternative images 
through “phenomenological descriptions” of nature.76 
Environmental conflicts and decision making processes in regard to the natural world 
are, in Naess’ view, driven by  fundamental beliefs in the state of the world. He sees a 
continuous contraposition between “objective descriptions” of nature (in terms of physical 
science, for example) and “subjective descriptions” brought up by people who want their 
legitimate feelings of care and attachment to be taken into consideration. In this way, the 
setting of the problem is fundamentally flawed by the subject/object dualism and both 
positions end up reinforcing each other, each highlighting a selection of relations we 
encounter in experience of nature, and leaving others out to the other counter-dimension.
Contrarily, Naess argues that our experience accounts for subjects’ feelings and power 
interests as already included in experience itself, which is important for an ecological 
understanding of nature.77 He makes use of the phenomenological notion of Lebenswelt for 
which the world is always our lived world, the world we inhabit. Our lived world includes 
for Naess our natural world and our natural dimensions. Our experience of it has a holistic 
character of belonging. Its primary material and physical qualities are just one possible 
description of its abstract  structures, while our concrete experience includes a far richer 
account of relations.
With a critique adopted from Whitehead, Naess traces back the problem of our image of 
nature to a problem of knowledge and retrieves Whitehead’s attack on the modern 
substance-qualities pattern.78 Naess suggests that we should look to the concrete contents 
of our experience of the world as demonstrative of an entanglement of the different 
characters we ascribe to primary, secondary and even more complex qualities that Naess 
calls “tertiary” (value, emotional tone, meaning). Even further than naturalizing the 
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76 Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, 50.
77 Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future, loc 1931.
78 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World.
qualities that are traditionally attributed to the structure of the subject’s mind, Naess 
understands the object in terms of Gestalt.79  Just as in the homonymous psychological 
theory  of perception, the object cannot be conceived along a separate outline but its 
concrete status is defined by the relations it entertains with its surroundings. The image of 
the Gestalt describes for Naess the ontological status of the object. Every object is, then, a 
gestalt totality  that can never be value-neutral or meaning-neutral but is always 
meaningfully contextualized.
The consequence of Naess’ approach to perception, experience and the ontology  of our 
natural world is the impossibility of tracing a clean and definitive cut between what is 
human or subjective and what is nonhuman and objective. Again similarly  to Whitehead, it 
is not just about perception and phenomena, but about adopting an attitude of “provisional 
realism.”80 If the world is conceived in terms of “gestalts,” it is possible to go back to our 
experience of nature over and over again, in order to suspend our hidden ontologies and 
dualistic view, and find richer, more concrete accounts of nature. More varied accounts of 
nature cannot be silenced by  the authoritarian use of “objectivity” and need to be brought 
into democratic decision making processes.
2.1.4 - The Ethics of Relation
According to Naess’ view, the value we attribute to nature is included to our formulation 
of reality. Nature has value and meaning in our experienced world. There is no distinction 
between facts and values. There is no assessment of neutral objective facts followed by a 
subsequent projection of subjective values. A primacy of “environmental ontology” over 
ethics means exactly this, that ontology has a normative weight. Recognizing this 
significance by making our hidden ontologies explicit  and suspending our worldview is a 
process of recognition of a wider range of constitutive relations we are in. In the ecological 
crisis this connotes an ethical gesture.
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Therefore, Naess’ view of ethics that accompanies his relational account of nature is 
very different than the ethics of duties and obedience to imperatives. It can be described as 
an ethic of identification. What the ecological crisis brings up is, once again, the idea that 
our empirical and psychological self is not fixed. Naess refers to William James’ idea of 
the material self component of our empirical self, and the multiple dimensions, objects and 
relations that make up its identification.81 Naess suggests the idea of an “ecological self,”82 
which expands through a process of identification along the lines of the relations it 
discovers. Identification is not merely  psychological, but it is also the process of the 
emergence of our identity  through our relations. The ecological self is defined through 
relations with human and nonhuman others. Acknowledging these relations develops 
ethical attitudes of care and letting things be. Here Naess redeploys the Kantian term 
“beautiful action” where duty and intention overlap, and the action springs out 
spontaneously  from the way  we see things.83  The ethical aspect of identification, then, 
interests both sides of the self and the other.84 It is an expansion of our self-comprehension, 
since we are our relations. It is also the opening of possibilities for the other, without a 
reduction of the other to the predefined characteristics we attribute to it. Far from offering 
a fixed set of norms, the ethical dimension of the relation is a practical attitude, a gesture of 
openness towards human and nonhuman others.
Identification in Naess is counterposed to alienation. Alienation in this context is 
regarded as a view of the other that occurs with anthropocentrism: the other is a great 
Other, an ontological other. The natural other is defined in opposition to our humanity. By 
being the nonhuman deprived of any continuity  with the human world, and being stripped 
of all the qualities that define the human norm, the other is also placed in a state of 
inferiority. While alienation is an estrangement that comes from reification of the other, 
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84 Diehm, “Arne Naess and the Task of Gestalt Ontology.”
identification refuses this objectification and instead instills a sense of kinship, reopening a 
range of existential possibilities for nonhumans. 
From this view of relation, Naess extracts one norm: self-realization. An expansion of 
our self as more connected, more related and more aware of our natural world. This is the 
realization of everyone’s own potential, the realization of every being’s conatus in suo esse 
perseverare.85  This is where Spinoza emerges as one of the main references in Naess’ 
philosophy. Self realization is for everyone in its own way, a realization of everyone’ own 
inter-esse. The interest of each being is in its inter-esse, the place of relation which is 
realized necessarily through a continuos opening to otherness.
Self-realization makes sense of ecosophy as a form of wisdom, a question about being 
in the world and in some sense a spiritual task of the individual. But in reference to nature, 
it is the highest expression of letting all beings “live and flourish,” the egalitarian attitude 
Naess considers the basis of our ethics. Instead of considering ethics as granting value to 
the human individual and community, and only  afterwards interrogating the natural world 
in order to find beings that qualify for a moral consideration, Naess pulls apart the grounds 
for this discontinuity in the first place. Every  being is a center of interest, has a conatus, its 
own telos in its own non-anthropomorphic way. This is why the way we see the natural 
world has an ethical and political weight.
In a “relational total-field,” the realization of the potential of one cannot happen 
separately  or at the expense of the realization of others. In this way, ecological topics such 
as biodiversity and complexity86 stop being mere value-free “scientific” description and 
offer some material for the politics of nature. Instead of seeing human’s community as 
society and the natural world outside of it, we always live in “mixed communities.”87 
Therefore, environmentalists who see their lived world in these terms, who see value in 
biodiversity, for example, who feel that our world would not be the same if it were to be 
heavily reduced, who are not willing to accept these changes lightly  because the quality  of 
their life also depends on it, environmentalist who share this worldview should legitimately 
participate in the common decisions that regard the politics of nature because their view is 
also political. The resolution of environmental conflicts, for example the coexistence of 
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conflicting species in one ecosystem, is the result of a communitarian and democratic 
effort where not only experts, but also and especially laymen, should partake.88
2.2 - A CRITIQUE OF NAESS’S RELATIONISM
Per fare un tavolo ci vuole il legno / per fare il 
legno ci vuole l’albero / per fare l’albero ci vuole 
il seme / per fare il seme ci vuole il frutto / per 
fare il frutto ci vuole un fiore. 
Per fare un tavolo ci vuole un fiore.89
You need wood to make a table / you need a tree 
to make wood / you need a seed to make a tree / 
you need a fruit to make a seed / you need a 
flower to make a fruit. 
You need a flower to make a table.90
The concepts: human, nature, and relation are intertwined in Naess’ ecosophy in an 
ambiguous way that is worth disentangling. Naess’ goals are the reformulation of a 
continuity  between nature and humans, and the reopening of an account of our constitutive 
conditions of existence in the biosphere. These are also paradigmatic tasks of most 
ecological thinking.91 Naess’ work denounces the limitations of the metaphysics of object 
and subject that underlie our modern view of reality  in respect to the possibility of 
formulating an ecological worldview, and tries to rework their positions through a 
relational account of both. Nevertheless, several ambiguities emerge in his approach. 
The task of disentangling the concept of human, that of nature and an account of 
relatedness in Naess’ proposal will show what are Naess’ limitations, but most importantly, 
which of these limitations affect  Naess’ work inasmuch as they are common and intrinsic 
difficulties related to most ecological philosophy and movement positions.
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2.2.1 - Value is in the Relation
In Naess’ ecosophical view we have to hold natural beings as valuable for their own 
sake. This is due to a reading of the ecological crisis as a call to shift  to an ecological 
framework in the understanding of our being in the world. Wisdom in the ecological crisis 
means, then, to recognize the relational matrix that makes the other part of me, and me part 
of the other: a relational twine that potentially extends from more basic and closer relations 
to the whole. We cannot keep  thinking of ourselves as if our collective constitution was 
only the social, urbanized one, overseeing its biospheric and “natural” dimensions.
In a nutshell, the value of nature emerges in our relation to the natural world, and we are 
interrelated with potentially everything that surrounds us in our lived world.
The traditional concept of intrinsic value, as opposed to instrumental is used by Naess 
as a synonym of objective value. Value that is not  subjectively, arbitrarily and 
relativistically projected onto a valueless object, but it  is part, instead, of our relation to 
reality, within the way we experience “objectivity.” Intrinsic value is simply the 
recognition of the ethical meaning of our relations to the other. Naess also resorts to the 
second formulation of the Kantian categorial imperative, according to which humans 
should never be treated merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an 
end. The difference from Kant lies in the critique Naess offers to the unjustifiable 
restriction of the norm only to human beings.92
There is a problem in considering intrinsic value as the basis of a positive ethical norm 
in regard to some (or all!) categories of living beings. This notion would recall the 
traditional (medieval) usage of value accorded to beings inasmuch as they are God’s 
creatures.93  Even though some kinship can be found to the idea of reverence and 
sacredness in Naess, as much as in other ecological voices such as American pioneers of 
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ecological thinking Aldo Leopold or David Thoreau,94 this is to be understood in terms of 
acceptance and openness to the other. Intrinsic value in this usage is equal to saying a 
statement of humbleness and responsibility for the place we occupy  in a world greater than 
us: a weakening of our own restricted interests and overwhelming point of view in a world 
of difference and interest conflicts. In other words, we cannot, in principle, take our 
relation to the world lightly, but always consider the ethical weight our position in reality 
bears.95 
This reading is close to the norm-free egalitarian attitude Cheney and others call 
“universal consideration,” an ethical-epistemological gesture as opposed to moral theories 
that list characters of qualification for moral considerability.96  Such a gesture is 
fundamental to relinquish anthropocentric hybris and authoritarian attitudes of domination 
in our treatment of nature, even when these present themselves as an “ethical” form of care 
for our natural “moral patients,” exemplified by  managerial or stewardship images of man 
as the benevolent guardian of nature.
The reading of intrinsic value as an ethics of epistemology is a fundamental aspect of 
reopening the ontological question Naess called “environmental ontology.” Indeed, 
problems with intrinsic value occur when it  is coupled with substantialist ideas of nature: 
something has intrinsic value because it is God’s creature, or just because it  is “natural,” 
beyond humans, as opposed to artificial. This is the authoritarian risk that has been 
criticized against deep  ecology renderings of intrinsic value: a natural order to which we 
belong that dictates political and ethical forms of obligation, for example using scientific 
ecology to justify  policies that demand individual rights to conform to the organic 
community.97
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It would appear this is not a risk in Naess’ philosophy, since the starting point in his task 
of reworking our image of the natural world lies precisely in the critique of naturalism in 
terms of a substantialist idea of natural objects as things in themselves, out there in the 
external world of the laws of nature. Even so, this is a major locus of ambiguity for Naess’ 
understanding of nature and its value. We can, in fact, derive from Naess’ work a constant 
reference to natural objects, as if Naess knew a priori that a forest or a single plant 
organism deserved to be assigned intrinsic value, while a nuclear plant does not. The kind 
of relationism he advocates is eventually established between human subjects and 
“natural” objects. According to Naess, the latter need to be seen not only in terms of 
primary qualities, but as something more (secondary and tertiary qualities). However, 
Naess’ ecosophy seems to already know what nature is, in terms of wilderness or “free 
nature.” The “green nature” to which we belong has already a natural clear outline.
But did not nature emerge in experience? Did it not benefit of a relational status, 
emerging always already within cultural, historical, emotional, meaningful determinations? 
This ambiguity in Naess’ relation and understanding of value in it afflicts both the 
“human” and the “natural” poles of the human-nature relation. 
On the “human side,” value conceived of as the quality for a positive moral norm 
residing in the greater order of nature has produced monsters we cannot risk again.98 
Forgetting that language and culture to some extent “construe” nature that is never given as 
a universal transcendent order risks to turn ecology into “eco-fascist” positions.99
Moreover, there are further “internal” difficulties that should be addressed. It  is quite 
easy to imagine how to confer intrinsic value to our loved ones, to endangered great 
mammal species, or to the more general ideal of protection of nonhuman life. Naess refers 
to a kind of identification that inspires resemblance of human agency  in other species, an 
emotional anthropomorphism that Naess calls “felt nearness”.100  Even though it is a 
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common experience of identification, it leaves space for ambiguity. It would be, for 
example, completely  meaningless for our ecological concerns to bring us to conclude that 
we hold a moral obligation to the Variola virus, which the World Health Organization has 
worked hard to eradicate completely (and successfully).101 Regardless if it was an ancient 
natural being, it happened to reap human victims for three thousand years. 
If we want to take a relational-ecological account of our being in the world seriously, 
we have to revisit the way we understand value in connection to the reopening of the 
ontological question about  the natural world. This emergence of value cannot be put in 
terms of positive immediate normative rules that qualify moral behavior. “Universal 
consideration,” for instance, is an ethical gesture within an epistemological practice. It  is a 
way of saying that, without a certain openness towards a possible unexpected other, we 
will never let this other emerge, we will never know it, it will never reopen our previous 
ontological convictions.102 Another way of making sense of the way  Naess’ intrinsic value 
can be more consistently and fruitfully  understood by tracing the correspondence between 
his way of addressing value as a concrete content of experience and Whitehead’s value of 
“actual occasions,” things as concrete events apprehended in experience.103 “Value is the 
intrinsic reality  of an event,”104 writes Whitehead. The reality  of an event is relational and 
processual,105 so its value is apprehended in the “real togetherness” of entities by means of 
their intrinsic relatedness.106
The relational constitution of real events is not just in what makes them events in 
nature. The place of each event in relation to others is not just  its material (or ecological) 
relations, which would still make up a naturalistic abstraction of the actual occasion. A 
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104 Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, 114.
105 Ibid., 147: “the event is what it is, by reason of the unification in itself of a multiplicity of 
relationships.”
106 Ibid., 126: “grasping of diverse entities into a value, by reason of their real togetherness in 
that pattern.”
“natural event” is “only  an abstraction from a complete actual occasion.”107 The complete 
actual occasion, in experience and the world, is a complex of things that includes our acts 
of perception, “memory, anticipation, imagination and thought.”108 
Indeed, events, the emergence of something into reality, include in their unity the 
experience of value: “the element of value, of being valuable, of having value, of being an 
end in itself, of being something which is for its own sake, must not be omitted in any 
account of an event as the most concrete actual something. “Value” is the word I use for 
the intrinsic reality of an event.”109
What exists within our world has its own weight, its own opacity, its own resistance, its 
own collective impact we have to take into account since no entity is self-sufficient, but 
finds its place within a larger whole. Value in ethical terms is, then, to be negotiated within 
this relational weight: something emerges and weighs on the world, it threads its way into 
the world, it requires acknowledgement, it needs to be taken into account, to be evaluated 
in order to understand what it is, what are its interactions, how are we to treat it. There is a 
collective dimension to it, that  in Whitehead emerges not directly  as political, but still, for 
example, in the effort  of reworking the outcomes of the entire collective history of western 
modern science through the lenses of an alternative “provisional realism”110 freed from the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness.111 
If we now look back at the Variola virus, it  had a great value indeed: its emergence as 
the entity that  carries the ability to be extremely deadly to humans. It follows that  value in 
a relational reality, where everything is interconnected at some level, cannot be understood 
as a positive normativity, but as the relational weight an entity takes on when it emerges in 
relation to us.112  The value and meaning of nature are experienced through political, 
material and labour determinations, as well as within technological conditions and cultural 
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111 Ibid., 72.
112 We will develop this acceptance of the concept of value in Chapter 4 of this work concerning 
Latour’s relationism and political ecology.
traditions. Within these dimensions they  are renegotiated when others (in our case 
nonhumans) emerge, or when our values become dysfunctional, such as the modernist 
values that aided in bringing us straight into the ecological crisis. The dominant modernist 
ideal of nature as a material and mechanical resource for humans is historically 
determined. Once this historical element is secured, it becomes possible for Naess, as well 
as for much of philosophical environmentalism, to answer the ecological crisis through a 
different consideration of nature itself. The reduction of the natural world to its measurable 
quantities, as well as the seclusion of humanity within the exclusive world of culture, can 
be reviewed within Naess’ plea by  reconsidering our experience of nature and the wider 
richness of relations emerging in it. 
Nevertheless, there are two possibly insurmountable difficulties in Naess’ account. On 
the one hand, the collective-political dimension of value and meaning is only important to 
Naess as a second order of relation, a negotiation that happens after the individual’s 
experience of value, instead of also contributing to its very constitution. On the other hand, 
nature emerging through experience appears to be, for Naess, a means to rehabilitate 
ulterior meaning and value, without the risk of losing an a priori grasp  on nature’s reality 
as a sector of the world. In other words, there is no risk, in Naess, of admitting the 
inadmissibility of sharp and universal boundaries of “green” nature out there.
The “nature side” of the relation is, indeed, the real elephant in the room. Are we not 
interrelated with everything that  surrounds us in our world, including concrete sidewalks 
and electric plants? Are we not related to our non-wild environments? How does this value 
and meaning laden nature look? How is it “natural”? Isn’t the urban environment, no 
matter how despoiled, still our environment? Are we not in relation with our cultivated 
products? What about forests? Sure, they are “green,” but most  of them are not virgin: they 
grew back after they were exploited for warfare and industrial purposes. And what about 
places that lack wilderness, wide spaces with low anthropic density? What about Italy, 
where it is hard to conceive of any wilderness outside, maybe, mountain tops?
Even though Naess makes a serious effort to stress the humanity-nature ecological 
continuity, his concept of nature appears to always rely  on the same man/nature or 
artificial/natural dualism he is resolved to overcome, while the only clear dimension of 
continuity  appears to be a cosmological wholeness. Maybe the relation Naess tries to 
delineate is still too abstract, too “horizontal.” Subject and object still appear juxtaposed in 
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it, exchanging properties without concretely  taking in the transformative dimensions that 
constitute the human beings relation to nature.
2.2.2 - Difference, Society and Authoritarianism: “Historical” Critiques
Deep ecology  has been caught for thirty years in what is by  now an historical debate 
within radical political ecology, in particular in contention with aspects of social ecology 
and ecofeminist theories.113  As many have repeated,114  “deep ecology” is a general 
umbrella term collecting several movements of differing types in Europe and in the 
English speaking world. These movements are both academic and social, and not always 
philosophical. They sometimes include spiritual and religious accents, and, most 
importantly, are not  formally  institutionalized (for example, the degrowth movement can 
be considered a deep ecological one, although it was never labelled this way).115 A general 
collection of principles that describe the deep ecological view on the ecological crisis, on 
the humans-nature relationship, and on the kind of action and change that should be 
advocated has been proposed as a reference “platform” by Arne Naess and George 
Sessions since 1984.116 Therefore, the criticisms raised in the political ecology debate are 
not always pertinent to Naess’ philosophical proposal. Nevertheless, some historical 
criticisms of deep ecology  are worth mentioning because they identify crucial dimensions 
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Basic Principles of Deep Ecology”, The Trumpeter, vol. 3, n. 4, 1986, p. 14. These are the beliefs 
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that are not only overlooked by Naess, but that  should be taken into account as cardinal 
knots for a political ecology based on a relational understanding of reality.117 
The American anarchist Murray  Bookchin (and his social ecology) notoriously  attacked 
the scarcity  of critical inquiry deep ecology has shown in regard to the social, hierarchical 
and labour conditions at the root of the ecological crisis. In his reading, both humanity and 
nature are taken by  Naess as vague, abstract counter-entities. Subjectivity  in its historical 
configuration within western capitalist  societies would also be overlooked in favor of the 
search for a spiritualistic dimension of selfhood.118  Social ecology points out that nature 
emerges through the mediation of human labour and modes of production, consequently, 
mistreatments of nature are entrenched in capitalistic hierarchical structures and 
authoritarian social relations. The deep ecological spiritual widening of individual selves 
and their identification with a worshipped nature are not only useless in the task of fighting 
against ecological destruction, but, even more importantly, they ignore and reproduce 
authoritarian risks typical of “churches” and “dictatorships”119 by  imposing the requisite of 
an ecological shift of consciousness for everyone.
Bookchin naturalizes humans and their social organizations as the result of natural 
history so that humans, society, and their products are fully  natural. The ecological crisis is, 
then, a crisis of society and labour relations, and it  needs to be addressed within these 
spheres. 
In response deep ecologists stressed similarities between the two approaches, in 
particular the common effort  of retrieving a holistic integration of humans in nature.120 
Nevertheless, social ecology strikes at a vulnerable point  within deep  ecology, and one that 
is quite evident in Naess’ construct: subjectivity  and objectivity  are addressed only  through 
an abstract  ontological and metaphysical problematization. They  maintain only a loose and 
extrinsic connection to difference, injustice and social authoritarian structures, even though 
Naess constantly expresses preoccupations in regard to classism, and fascist and 
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118 Bookchin “Social Ecology vs Deep Ecology.”
119 Ibid.
120 See Zimmerman, Contesting Earth’s Future; Clark, “What is social ecology,” The Trumpeter 
5, no. 2 (1988): 72-75.
authoritarian risks related to the worsening of the ecological conditions and the possibility 
of resource wars.121 
Social ecology has the merit of bringing Naess’ abstract selfhood and nature concepts 
back to its unavoidable historical and social genealogical connections. Notwithstanding, 
the problem of ontological character hidden and pre-assumed in our view of nature, as it is 
denounced by  Naess, is not opposed to the integration of social and historical constitutive 
relations in the analysis of how nature and humans determine each other in the ecological 
crisis context. If anything, social ecology  resolves nature in society.122 In this way, we risk 
a reiteration of the problem of nature, seen as a mere material substratum to human 
activities, and assist  in the reexamination of its otherness in terms of its limitations in 
arbitrary human use, as well as the reassessment of the place of nonhumans in our world.
Further worries about covert authoritarian sides of Naess’ concept of ecological self 
come from ecofeminist reflection.
Jim Cheney accuses deep  ecology of adopting an abstract idea of interconnectedness. 
Instead of creating the conditions for a concrete relatedness between humans and 
nonhumans, the kind of cosmological interrelation deep ecology advocates simply 
reaffirms the alienation or separation of humanity from nature and humans’ yearning for 
wholeness.123 The risk implied in this critique, and it  can be considered pertinent to Naess’ 
relational thinking, is embedded in the cosmological-metaphysical dimension of relation in 
the form of an internalized vision of reality, a cosmological totality that can endow us with 
meaning and guidance based on our place in it. The relationship  between individuals and 
wholeness risks finding its primary  solution in the wholeness dimension. Moreover, the 
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123 Jim Cheney, “The Neo-Stoicism of Radical Environmentalism.” Environmental ethics 11, no. 
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discontinuity  between subject and object is not recomposed in a new collective dimension, 
but inside the subject and his own vision instead.
Some have suggested a disturbing echo between the idea of identification with totality 
and totalitarian forms of thinking in which individuals are homologated to a greater order 
forcing on them unified meaning, value and action guidance.124
To be fair, Naess always strongly  contested the idea that deep ecology requires the 
acceptance of a particular metaphysics.125  On the contrary, ontology, for Naess, is a 
necessary  fundamental area of inquiry  for becoming aware of the chances we open to the 
consideration of the natural world. Moreover, the issue of equality in the biosphere is 
always related, in Naess’s thinking, with the issues of anti-classism, peace movements, and 
environmental justice. With his appeal to “environmental ontology”, he aims to highlight 
the ontological limitations of the dichotomy between a subject-human and an object-
nature, a discontinuity which creates the unrelated premises for instrumental treatments of 
others, and which makes it de facto impossible to ascribe dignity and objective legitimacy 
to different modes of relation outside those of utilization or arbitrary projection of value. 
Nevertheless, there is an important point of tension between denouncing the dominion 
implied in an ontological theory of Being, its normative weight that tells us “this is what 
there is, this is how things are in nature,” and offering a positive relational ontological 
theory, opposite and equal to the dualistic one. 
Naess is pointing his finger at the historical and non-universal character of the 
fundamental modernist ontology, hoping to free different dimensions of the constitutive 
relations between humans and nature. Despite everything, he offers an alternative 
worldview drawing from process philosophy and Spinoza’s idea of substance. His 
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“environmental ontology” reopens the previously  mentioned point of tension with his 
insistence on experience as the place where we discover more attributes of nature.
Keeping all of this in mind, the “biospheric egalitarianism” Naess suggests certainly 
risks to remain an abstract equality that does not articulate itself through a concrete politics 
of difference. Otherness, both cultural and “natural” appears to be articulated within the 
philosopher’s vision, within the philosopher’s intuition and language. Even though a vision 
of equality  is presented, the emergence of otherness is colonized by a totalizing vision 
outside of negotiation. As Cheney  writes, “vision is substituted for voice:”126 the vision is 
superimposed on different voices, it prevents listening to a non-predictable, non-absorbable 
otherness. 
Similarly, Val Plumwood denounces Naess’ idea of an “ecological self” as a structure of 
ultimate universalization of individual interests and egoism.127  The same universalizing 
structure can be read in the idea of ethics that Naess tries to reject: the universalization of a 
duty towards morally considerable individuals as a substitute for reworking ethics in the 
concrete relations that make up self-experience and identity.128 
We can agree on the fact that  some dimensions of relation are not articulated in Naess’ 
proposal, leaving open some risks. This is the result of an idea of politics, which is a sort of 
epiphenomenon, a second order dimension compared to the development of a personal 
sense of reality. Political negotiation, cultural and linguistic facets are, instead, also 
constitutive relations, at the same level as biological and experiential dimensions of the 
self. Ultimately, the problem with Naess’ relationism is linked to his idea of relation, but 
more importantly, to the idea of the human self and of nature, which he partially maintains 
despite aspiring to a relational reframing of both. 
2.2.3 - What Nature?
The concept of nature is, in Naess, the focal point of a severe ambiguity  in his proposal. 
This ambiguity  does not necessarily  represent a hindrance. Actually, the ambiguity in 
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Naess’ idea of nature is a sign that most critiques of deep ecology, as presenting a solid 
natural-metaphysical order, do not properly apply  to Naess. Moreover, precisely  these 
ambiguities, which reveal difficulties in the concept of nature, are not just Naess’, but are 
shared by most environmentalist  writers. Relationism is called on in order to rework these 
difficulties.
Naess draws upon a variety of differing concepts in order to frame the problem of 
nature. On the one hand, nature is our lived world, laden with meaning and values, and our 
relation to it  runs through the characters of our experience and consciousness. Nature, in 
this sense, formally  emerges as a meaningful wholeness through human ways of being in 
the world.129 The first element in Naess’ concept of nature is directed against a naturalism 
associated with the idea of nature as a mechanistic and material substratum: primary 
qualities as what is real and non-artificial.
On the other hand, nature is an external interrelated whole in which human biological 
continuity, or animality, seems to solve the problem of human difference within the 
ecological relations of the ecosystem. Nature is an organic complex whose teleology is 
independent from the human world.
At other times, Nature recurs as a holistic, cosmological dimension to which humans 
belong, something similar to Spinoza’s deus sive natura.130
To make matters more complicated, sometimes Naess uses the term “nature” in lieu of 
“reality”, or as a solution to the ontological problem of being: “Rather than talking about 
reality  or the world, ecophilosophical thinking proceeds in terms of nature, and humanity’s 
relation to nature.”131 Other parts of Naess’s work present nature in terms of living beings, 
although not strictly in a biological sense:
Instead of ‘biosphere’ we might use the term ‘ecosphere’ in order to stress that we of 
course do not limit our concern for the life forms in a biologically  narrow sense. The 
term ‘life’ is used here in a comprehensive non-technical way to refer also to things 
biologists may classify as non-living: rivers (watersheds), landscapes, cultures, 
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130 Naess, “Spinoza and Ecology,” 46: “the nature conceived by field ecologists is not the 
passive, dead, value-neutral nature of mechanistic science, but akin to the Deus sive Natura of 
Spinoza. All-inclusive, creative, [...] alive in the broad sense of panpsychism, but also manifesting 
a structure, the so-called laws of nature.”
131 Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, 35.
ecosystems, ‘the living earth’. Slogans such as ‘let the river live’ illustrate this broader 
usage so common in many cultures.132
Difficulties appear to multiply in Naess’s attempt to use “nature” in order to get rid of 
the “environment.” In fact, the sense of externality conveyed by the word “environment,” 
conceived as the habitat or the surrounding conditions of human life, is not openly shared 
by the term “nature.” Nonetheless, this does not mean we know what we are talking about 
when we use the term “nature:” something in which we belong and, at the same time, 
humanity’s other. But what does it mean when discussing the concept, ‘environment’? 
Naess questions the concept of environment because it entails a human-nature 
discontinuity, as well as a hierarchic character: environment as an inferior dimension, 
defined around man. Therefore, the polemic Naess raises against the concept  of 
environment rather than a problem of nature, poses a problem of otherness, of non-
reducibility of nonhumans, as well as a problem of continuity and belonging.
Indeed, the contrast in tone and style of philosophical address is striking when Naess’ 
attention turns from the great “nature collectors,” such as mountains, forests, and 
landscapes to singular nonhumans, such as wolves, bears, and sheep with whom we should 
negotiate a cohabitation in “mixed communities.”133 
In regard to the different sources of “nature” Naess brings up, the ambiguities point to 
some central philosophical knots.
Firstly, Naess’ idea of nature appears to swing between continuity and difference, 
between belonging and identification on one side, and the intrinsic value of nonhumans, 
that should be left alone as much as possible, on the other. The picture appears to re-
compose itself only within a greater whole of cosmological or “divine” flavor.
Secondly, if we take relation seriously, clean boundaries between humans and nature 
fade. Even though, as Whitehead notes, events persist as unities in process. From the 
ontological point of view, the relata are never substantial entities. Nonetheless, Naess 
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appears inclined towards a “naturalization of the spirit,”134  a naturalization of the 
secondary  and tertiary qualities that are traditionally secluded within the subject, but he 
does not face the risk of losing nature only to find out that within different experience 
structures “nature” might have no defined reality outside its cultural and historical 
representations.
Finally, one of the most serious critiques of Naess’ “nature” is that it does not depart 
from a foundationalist naturalism, even though it is not  the naturalism of mathematical-
physical qualities. This is to say that within Naess’ work, nature’s organism transcends and 
is ontologically  prior to the human world, language, cultures, society, traditions and 
thought structures.135
While these critiques highlight the main problems for several deep  ecologists, Naess 
points his finger at  representationalism as the origin of our misunderstanding of nature. 
And even though he might be pointing in the right direction, the ambiguity remains 
because a change of worldview is advocated as the solution to negligent environmental 
attitudes. As Morton noted, both the concept of Weltanschauung and the idea that “an idea 
can change the world” are residues of a particular Romantic idea of nature,136  which is 
characterized precisely  by the concept of “nature as origin.”137  For this reason, Vogel 
retrieves the concept of environment replacing that of nature. Environment is conceived of 
as the setting where practical relations between humans and nature occur, instead of 
resorting to a transcendent alienated nature.138  If Naess’ critique of the environment is 
directed against the transcendence of humanism to the detriment of nature, the 
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transcendence of “nature as origin” risks to be even stronger: a natural order that does not 
leave any space for freedom and difference.
Considering the contrasting manifestations of “nature” in Naess’ idea of the human-
nature relationship, we can state that the ecocentric-anthropocentric terminology does not 
clarify much. Whereas, the mere centrality of the concept of Lebenswelt for the definition 
of ecological relations and the stress on the structures of experience are themselves 
sufficient to shake the definition of “ecocentric” for Naess’ thinking.139
The anthropocentric-ecocentric distinction is based on the natural/artificial axis, that is 
to say, of an idea of nature as other than human. This idea is in itself problematic.140 
Moreover, the terms “anthropocentrism” and “ecocentrism” only make sense within the 
kind of ethical theory with which Naess dialogues and from which he takes his distance at 
the same time. The terms do not inquire much into what these anthropos and oikos are, but 
take them as a unified and essentialist idea of humanity and nature, as if the interests of the 
two categories could be unified and defended as one.
2.2.4 - What Anthropos?
Naess’s preoccupation with anthropocentrism can certainly be clarified as the second 
large ambiguity in his ecosophy. First of all, anthropocentrism appears as criticized in its 
strong form, as opposed to “biospherical egalitarianism.” The latter homages “the equal 
right to live and blossom” both to human and nonhuman life. “Its restriction to humans is 
an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality  of humans 
themselves.”141  Egalitarianism is also the foundation of intrinsic value of nature as 
opposed to instrumental value, where nature is treated as means for humans’ ends. Based 
on this, Naess’s ecosophy has been pinned on the far ecocentric end of the 
anthropocentrism-ecocentrism axis of environmental philosophy. 
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Things are way more complicated than that, however, and Naess is often too cheaply 
and easily  thrown into the anti-anthropocentric polemic. Within the very same formulation 
the first ambiguity emerges, “[the] quality [of human life] depends in part upon the deep 
pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership  with other forms of life.”142 
First of all, fighting anthropocentrism does not mean acknowledging nature’s interests 
while denying human interests. Furthermore, Naess remarks on the impossibility of 
escaping the anthropic situatedness of the whole environmental discourse: 
“‘Homocentrism’ and ‘anthropocentrism’ which so often have been used in a derogatory 
way, should be qualified by an adjective, ‘narrow homocentrism’ etc. Gradually the 
prospect of protecting the planet as a whole and for its own sake is seen as one of the 
greatest challenges ever. And it certainly is a specifically human task.”143  Additionally, 
Naess’s reliance on phenomenology and on the concept of nature in terms of value- and 
meaning-laden Lebenswelt144  moves ecosophy  closer to a certain type of 
“anthropomorphism” or “perspectival anthropocentrism” in environmental philosophy.145
Naess holds onto Protagoras’s homo mensura, proclaiming that man holds a measuring 
rod, but this does not offer any  final verdict about what humankind measures, which can be 
discovered “to be greater than himself and his survival.”146 The obvious is stated here, that 
anthropocentrism is in some sense inescapable, as a concrete human situatedness.147 If this 
states the inevitable presence of human interests, it does not entail their exclusivity.
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Another element, which if left alone could be taken as obfuscated, but with proper 
clarification could be a springboard pregnant with insightful possibility, is Naess’ resort to 
a form of anthropomorphism, which is implied in the idea of identification. In order to 
settle value and interest conflicts in relation to natural entities, Naess suggests two possible 
guiding principles. The first is vital needs, and the second is felt nearness.148 According to 
these, our psychological identification with others is not based on a speciesism, on the 
needs of humans as a species, but, instead, we identify with the suffering and needs of 
those we feel to be close, for example, the desperate struggle of an insect against death.
Here again, when we introduce the concept of intrinsic relatedness, an ambiguity in the 
status of the relata is brought up. This occurs within the theme of anthropocentrism in 
reference to both this human moral subject and the natural moral object. There are two 
things at work here; nature is otherness that  deserves to be respected in its difference, 
evident, for example, in Naess’ insistence on the maximization of biodiversity without 
imposing anthropocentric interests. While at the same time, the alter is absorbed and 
harmonized by identifying it within the relatedness of the “ecological self”.
If Naess is a symbol of “ecocentrism,” how can we possibly imagine eliminating the 
anthropos from an idea such as the “ecological self”? By naturalizing humans? But are not 
the qualities of subjectivity (emotions, value, meaning, self-consciousness, not to mention 
Naess’ ideal of wisdom and spiritual realization and maturity) precisely the qualities, 
traditionally, at the basis of human discontinuity  with nature? Are they not the qualities that 
allow for identification? Moreover, a naturalization of the anthropos maintains the problem 
of our treatment of nature plainly  intact. If humans are part of nature without residue, then 
so too are their actions and products, making them innocent in regard to any mistreatment. 
Naess, just like most ecologists stress the immanence of humans in their natural 
connections,149  but gets stuck on the problem of transcendence and immanence of the 
anthropos. This is expressed through the tension in ecological philosophy between 
showing continuity  and maintaining a human difference that allows the possibility of the 
ethical question itself.
Several elements in Naess’s writing help  to unpack the problem of anthropocentrism 
both in terms of anthropocentrism of value and of the anthropocentric perspective of 
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representation. When keeping the importance of relations in mind, anthropocentrism does 
not make much sense. Anthropocentrism is a problem if the moral subject is not called into 
question and the setting of the problem remains separately ethical, while maintaining an 
essentialist and a priori vision on the anthropos, as an abstract humanity collector. In 
connection to this, does Naess’ refusal of a distinction between facts and values make 
sense? Through a constitutive relational perspective on humans and nonhumans, the 
individual does not remain identical to himself. Therefore, any discussion about the 
normative priority of human or natural interests is in no way fruitful, philosophically  or 
otherwise. 
In their presentation of the Anthropocene, the researchers supporting the case for its 
formalization emphasize that climate change was the main factor, which brought the idea 
of the Anthropocene into focus, and into the scientific community, because it shows the 
undeniable impact of humans on the support systems to “human (and other) life.”150  The 
distinction between human and nonhuman vital (and not merely survival) interests is 
simultaneously  affirmed and denied. From the point of view of the article, it is an 
unimportant point whether climate change is worrisome for humans’ sake or for nature’s 
sake. The alternative never existed in the first place since we depend on each other. 
Nonhuman life depends on human activities and ways of thinking, while human life 
depends on nonhuman processes. The so-called “strong anthropocentrism,” the position of 
privilege assigned to human individuals’ and societies’ interests as stubbornly independent 
form the natural world, is easily self-defeating. Nevertheless, with the exclusion of it, 
putting the argument in terms of anti-anthropocentrism is misleading, unless we take it as 
the sign of the necessity to reopen the problem of what anthropos is put in the center (or 
taken away from it).
The solution to the ecological crises does not lie in ecocentrism, in the defense of nature 
for its own sake against the interest  of humans, but in trying to think about the issue in 
different, mixed, non-binary  terms. Climate change interests humans and nonhumans for a 
variety of mixed “moral” reasons because it interests everything it is in relation to: 
humans, nonhumans, organic and nonorganic beings, Earth in its complex, humans and 
their civilizations, etc. The dimensions of the relation define the areas in which a decision 
63
150 Steffen, “The Anthropocene,” 842-843.
needs to be made independently of a pre-appointed, universal, and moral status to obscure 
and abstract unrelated and substantialist categories of humans and nature.
Once again, by  looking at Naess’ ambiguity of the role of humans in his “ecocentric” 
thinking, it is clear the human side of the relation needs to be re-examined, together with 
the unfolding of unexpected acceptations of nature. While addressing how Naess’ proposal 
as “ecocentric” is misleading, we can look, once again, to the ecofeminist critique of 
anthropocentrism. Val Plumwood’s analysis of the structures of anthropocentrism makes 
clear in which sense anthropocentrism needs to be criticized, inasmuch as it presents an a-
critical and false universal idea of humanity based on which otherness is defined as 
inferior.
Similarly  to Naess, Plumwood criticizes anthropocentric attitudes as a form of 
“ecological denial” she defines as “a weakened sense of the reality of our embeddedness in 
nature.”151 The moral human superiority and mastery that is associated to it is a function of 
the man-nature split. While Naess addresses the general subject-object dichotomy as 
responsible, Plumwood takes a further step and delves into the historical setting of values 
associated to a rationalist  definition of humanity. By taking rationality as the exclusive 
feature of human identity, reason-centredness and human-centredness have established 
several forms of exclusion, while making others inferior. For this reason, not  only 
feminism and ecology fight similar structures of “ethical and epistemic exclusion,” 
associated, for example, by a historical link between “nature” and women as reproductive 
bodies and supposedly  greater (instinctual) emotionality. The problem of the treatment of 
nature can be analyzed through recurring anatomies of “centrisms” carried out by 
liberation movements against hegemonic structures such as androcentrism, ethnocentrism 
and eurocentrism (racism). The centric structure presents, in Plumwood’s study, the 
following characteristics:
• a primary-secondary pattern in which marginalized others are defined as 
secondary around the primary One 
• an ontological break or radical discontinuity that incorporates local power 
relations
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• both the exclusion and the simultaneous incorporation of the representations 
outlined by dominating frameworks
• a radical exclusion: anthropocentrism treats nature as radically other
• homogenization and stereotyping play  a role in disowning difference and a wide 
range of qualities: nature and animals are unified vs humans in their lack of 
consciousness or cultural manifestations
• denial and “backgrounding:” the other is considered inessential and peripheral
• incorporation: assimilation in a dominant representation without negotiation 
• instrumentalism: downgraded value and agency possibilities for those excluded152
Within the a priori unification and exclusion described by Plumwood concerning the 
human-nature split, ultimately  derived from the universalization of local, historical, and 
partial perspectives (and their specific will to power), any  attempt to represent nature 
through a different epistemology is charged with being anthropomorphic.153  When we 
refute the idea of nature as material facts that have no value, and instead bring up that 
nonhumans are not mere objects, it  appears that we speak of nature in humanistic or 
mentalistic terms (agency, communication, intentionality, telos, etc.).
A first objection to this charge is, once again, related to a constitutive human 
situatedness that expresses itself, for example, in the anthropomorphic character of 
language. Therefore, when we speak of nonhumans, be them “superior” animals, organic 
or inorganic beings, their representation is translated into human language terms. But most 
importantly, the charge of anthropomorphism assumes that any  attribution of subjectivity 
to nonhumans needs to be anthropomorphic, such as some softened version of established 
human characteristics such as consciousness, sentience and so on. This way of re-valuing 
nature presupposes the same radical discontinuity  that it tries to criticize. Moreover, it 
presupposes that human subjectivity is something universal and unequivocally defined 
(and definable).
Even though many  ecofeminists criticize deep ecology for not developing an adequate 
analysis of the historical and political power structures of anthropocentrism, their critique 
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confirms Naess’ denunciation: the problem of anthropocentric treatments of nature stands 
in the crossroads where facts and values, representation and ethical possibilities emerge.
2.2.5 - What Relation?
Based on the critique so far unfolded, we need to admit that Naess’ concept  of relation 
leaves several dimensions of relatedness incomplete and underdeveloped. 
Naess addresses the “horizontal”154  dimensions of the relations that  show the 
interconnectedness of entities in the world well. He is, indeed, interested in overcoming the 
ontological gap between subject and object, refuting an anthropocentric privilege in favor 
of an egalitarian opening, and integrating biological-ecosystemic constitutive dimensions 
into human identity. Despite all of that, Naess’ account leaves out crucial “vertical” 
dimensions of the relations that make up both humans and nature, in particular the 
dimensions of human mediation and transformation in the emergence of nature. Even 
though Naess makes use of the concept Lebenswelt, he does not take the risk of exploring 
the possibility  that a universal definition of nature circumscribing an obvious sector of 
reality slips in its historical and local forms of emergence.
The mediation of human labour in the way  nature emerges is one of Naess’ 
shortcomings.155 Technology is another one. In Naess’ account, indeed, technology appears 
as a neutral tool at humanity’s disposal that  can, therefore, be downgraded to a “soft” 
version as preferred.156  In opposition to the myth of a “neutral tool,” we should, at least, 
take into consideration Heidegger’s warning that the essence of technology is to be 
understood the other way around, not as an arbitrary view of the world, but as a “destiny.” 
Technology provokes man into making nature emerge as a “standing reserve” subtracting a 
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foundational centrality from humans, who are substantially impotent in front of the ways 
Being discloses itself.157 
What Plumwood calls the “enabling” conditions of subjectivity 158 such as embodiment 
are also not explored by Naess, even though he directs a strong focus onto the ecological 
situatedness of humans as a condition of their existence. This is further evidence of how 
difficult thinking outside the human-nature dichotomy is.
Language is another omission from Naess’ philosophy. The idea that an object is always 
a concentration of relations established within a discourse is, actually, addressed in Naess. 
Exemplar of this is his idea of the object as a Gestalt, that designates “objects” themselves 
as totalities, as fields of relations. The topic is a central one for Naess’ understanding of 
natural objects, in particular in how the designation of descriptive elements already  implies 
evaluation within its complexity, as opposed to the abstract, material, unrelated, and neutral 
structures that are selected and isolated from their network. This is exemplified by Naess in 
passages similar to the one below:
The tertiary qualities of things have an ontological status which is best expressed by 
complex relations. [...] In symbolic logic, a tree’s sombreness S is represented by a 
relational symbol S(A,B,C,D,...), where A could be a location on a map, B location of 
observer, C emotional status of person, D linguistic competence of the describer. There 
are formidable number of variables compared to technical height, H(P,Q), where P gives 
the number of units of height, and Q the type of unit. Subjectivism need not to arise in 
either S or H, if you are able to specify the exact context in which the quality occurs.159
Even though Naess attempts to articulate our pre-reflective experience of nature, and 
offer a richer description of it160 in comparison to the reductionist, materialistic objectivity 
of natural facts and bodies, his designations still appear as external relations between 
preexisting elements. Some of these elements, such as emotion and value, find their place 
in the subject; others, such as the geographical position, find their place in the world. 
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Naess correctly  calls into question the language dimension, but he does not find a way out 
of the dualism of subject/object (or human/nature) that he struggles to overcome. 
This is the reason why Cheney can accuse deep ecology of offering a vision of the 
world that “has left the realm of language altogether.”161  Naess does not miss posing the 
right questions, but, he attempts to offer an answer by reworking combinations of the two 
usual pieces, the subject and the object. We will see later in this work how Bruno Latour’s 
political ecology  goes through the effort of bringing in collective political, scientific and 
linguistic practices in order to render the constitutive and intrinsic dimension of language 
into our knowledge of the natural world. 
Latour, actually, adopts a strategy not dissimilar to Naess’ and borrowed from 
Whitehead: one of the ways he does this is by  avoiding the term “object” altogether, and 
refers, instead, to “propositions.” This predication of entities establishes constitutive 
relations (instead of A=A, it  predicates A=B,C,D). It  can be a well (or poorly) articulated 
proposition according to the quality and richness of the list of connections it draws 
together. Propositions, for Latour, define objectivity in a very  different way  than 
statements, sentences that needs to be epistemologically true or false in the struggle to 
establish an impossible correspondence between “words” and “things.” What is more, 
articulation of propositions happens in the sciences, within their collective protocols and 
scholarship, in the way they make worlds emerge, and it  can be in no way limited within 
the subject’s perception.162
2.2.6 - The Pitfall of Representation
It appears that Naess’ account of relation is not as concrete as he advocates. This 
difficulty can certainly be pinned on omissions in his account of relatedness, but there are 
also more internal reasons for it.
The relation between humans and nature that concerns ecology movements presents 
internal paradoxes caught between continuity and difference, transcendence and 
immanence: nature emerges conditioned by cultural, experiential, historical, linguistic, 
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theoretical and practical dimensions of humanity;163 at the same time the ecological crisis 
reminds us of nature as a conditioning limitation to humanities space and humans’ worldly 
condition of existence. On the one hand, nature is humanity’s other. On the other hand, 
humanity belongs to nature and the denial of this belonging is ecologically  catastrophic. In 
this sense, it is important to note that these difficulties are intrinsic to the different 
acceptations nature can take, and, in this sense, they  are common ambiguities in most 
environmentalist writings.
Furthermore, Naess’ peculiar difficulties are due to the lenses through which he looks at 
relation: precisely those of a relational worldview. A shift in paradigm or representation in 
relational terms is advocated, without recognizing that the structure of representation itself 
is responsible for the objectification he criticizes in the first place. In fact, Naess’ idea of 
environmental ontology swings along another ambiguous oscillation: sometimes ontology 
is a question of reopening a necessary field of exploration in the face of ecological 
conditions of existence. At other times, Naess actively looks for a plurality of ontological 
systems, classical theories of Being, that can provide a positive relational support to his 
ecosophical thinking. The most dramatic point of tension emerges here: Naess resorts to a 
relational representation of the world (worldview) as an attempt to put into question the 
structure of a frontal subject-object dualism. However, this is the essence of representation 
itself.164 
Naess raises the right question by criticizing the modern representation of nature, but 
fails to articulate a critique of representation itself, or recognize that representation, as 
Heidegger acknowledged, is the effect of modernity. A critique of representation needs to 
be an integral part of a philosophy  of relation. This must include a way of weakening the 
pretensions of representation to mirror reality  and create a suspension, a withdrawal, a 
perplexity, an “environmental etiquette,” as Cheney puts it, that  includes ethical gestures in 
the epistemological apprehension of the other and allows nonhumans to emerge.165 
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The question concerning how relationism can create the space for overcoming the 
objectifying dimension of representation and its domination of the subject onto the natural 
object remains open. 
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CHAPTER 3 - EQUIVOCAL NATURE
3.1 - AMBIGUITIES OF NATURE IN ENVIRONMENTALISM
Cerco un gesto un gesto naturale 
per essere sicuro che questo corpo è mio. 
Cerco un gesto un gesto naturale 
intero come il nostro io.
I am looking for a natural gesture
to make sure that this body is mine
I am looking for a natural gesture
Whole, just like our I166 
The ambiguities, and even the paradoxes affecting Naess’ references to nature are not 
simply  Naess’ problem, but are recurring themes in environmentalism. As Kate Soper 
noted, nature is, maybe, the term carrying the greatest variety  of ideologies and 
acceptations. Its fundamental conceptualization in the West has always been framed as an a 
priori otherness to humanity:
“the opposition between the natural and the human has been axiomatic to western 
thought. [...] Whether we are asked to view nature as an external realm, or ourselves as 
belonging within its order; as vitalist  or mechanistic; as the mere object or instrument of 
human purposes, or as dialectically  shaping us as much as we shape it; all such thinking 
is tacitly reliant on the appreciation of our difference from nature or ‘the rest of 
nature’ [...].”167
Environmentalism, despite its vast variety of approaches, attempts the strenuous quest 
of recombining or bridging the two poles of humanity and nature. It is no accident Kohák 
defines environmental ethics as a “tar baby” with which he wrestles. The struggle is 
congenital to the task of finding the place for anthropocentric categories within an 
ecocentric evolutionary reality:168 a reality in which the ecological crisis is merely the most 
recent set of events dislocating humanity  from its comfortable throne at the center of the 
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world. Quite plainly, ecology stresses the continuity between humanity and nature and still 
needs human discontinuity to even imagine the possibility  of an “ecological” limit to 
humanity’s voracity.
Hence, in Naess’ case relation exposes this ambiguity  in the open, in all its extent and 
tragic weight  for environmentalism. In particular, the dissolution of fixed identities and 
separate positions of human beings vs natural beings (a dissolution that is sacrosanct in the 
front of current ecological issues), and its related affairs of continuity and difference, 
otherness and belonging, all point to environmentalism’s endless swinging back and forth 
on the humanity/nature axis in search for a more satisfactory and less dysfunctional 
positioning.
3.1.1 - The Nature/Artifact Axis
In her work mapping different  ethics of nature, Angelika Krebs offers an outline of the 
mainstream account of nature regarded as the objective region for environmental ethical 
reflection. This account does not differ substantially  from the traditional Aristotelian idea 
of nature, as she writes:
Following the etymology of “nature” from the Latin “nasci” = to be born, to arise, to 
develop, “nature” may be defined as that part of our world which has not been made by 
human beings, but comes into existence and vanishes, changes and remains constant in 
virtue of itself. The opposite of “nature” in this sense “artifact,” is something that is 
made by human beings: tables, computers, statues, and so on.169
Several issues immediately arise from this dualistic setting, and Krebs accounts for 
them. First of all, both dimension are hard to find in a pure form. On the one hand, she 
affirms we can think of something like “pure nature,” or wilderness, even though it  is 
harder and harder to find in our world. On the other hand, there is no such thing as a pure 
artifact, since no poiesis occurs ex nihilo, but always needs a material substratum. 
Moreover, she points out that limiting our concern for nature to wilderness is not 
meaningful for nature conservation concerns, and that environmental ethics deal with both 
“pure” and “cultivated” nature. In addition, she admits there are ambiguous cases such as 
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biotechnology  products. Finally, in light of the precedent caveats, she discusses the 
opportunity of understanding nature in terms of environment, or natural surroundings.
In the face of these observations, she offers the diagram of an axis running from the one 
pole “nature” to the opposite pole “artifact,” positioning in the middle all kinds of material 
mixtures of the two dimensions.
The logic of this axis is interesting, inasmuch as it establishes the same ambiguities of 
otherness and continuity we have already addressed. The axis, indeed, establishes not only 
two poles, but also a continuous line joining them. 
Within the line continuity, we do not  know anymore where (and if) we can place a 
barrier between what is nature, what is “manipulated” or “influenced” by humans and what 
is “artifact.” For example, we might have difficulties in distinguishing a clear nature/
artifact caesura between the dimension of farmed food (which is not merely farmed, but 
for the most part  has been displaced from “original” ecosystems and bred for thousands of 
years), and an oral contraceptive pill. A difficulty that is already comprised in the simple 
admission that no artifact is ever free from a natural material basis. There is, for sure, a 
difference, but not the dualistic ontological kind that would guide us in our environmental 
decision making concerns. 
It appears the nature/artifact distinction should become clear through an articulation of 
difference, but it remains, instead, presupposed within the articulation itself. In fact, we are 
supposed to know where to place this regional barrier, since, as Krebs writes, 
environmental movements are not  concerned with the conservation of cars or nuclear 
plants. If we distinguish artifacts from both “pure” and “cultivated” nature, we presuppose 
that we already know what the character of “nature” that runs under both is. What is 
assumed is deeply  connected with the “naturalness” of nature that makes “green” nature a 
family member of other senses of nature, such as substance or essence, that  Krebs 
excludes, maybe, too hastily, from the range of interests of environmentalism. 
Naess’ critique points precisely in this direction, when he writes that our ecological 
relation to nature is biased too much on the characteristics of nature as material substance 
of primary qualities.170 
We are supposed to distinguish in advance what this nature is, even if we replace it with 
the environment concept, since our surroundings have all kinds of human and nonhuman 
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elements all entangled. We are surrounded by  furniture, cell phones, and all kinds of 
technical objects which are fabricated with natural resources, energy, and water to run the 
factories, whose production and disposal produces pollution. People who produce them 
have certain material lifestyles, with certain ecological footprints. It is really  hard to say 
that artifacts are not of ecological interest.
The nature-artifact dualism is actually a circular movement that poses both the necessity 
of distinguishing the human/nature dimensions in terms of origin, and of considering their 
continuity since mediation between the two is not removable. 
We can leave out for the moment important observations about the impossibility  of a 
“pure nature,” since even wilderness is not a fixed sector of reality, but always a 
fluctuating, historical concept built around (or outside) man, and, therefore, dependent on 
human activities, knowledge, mundane practices, and modes of being in the world. The 
very possibility of the existence of “wilderness” is tied to social practices like the 
institutionalization of boundaries and the material creation of reserves.171  Several hot 
topics for environmentalism create severe problems for the nature/artifact divide. We can 
think of the topic of human overpopulation: is it a natural or a human issue? It has 
biological and ecological dimensions, but  we can probably find no topic that is more 
political, cultural, technological,172 and has to do with all the dimensions of both human 
civilization and ecology. Moreover, if we go back to the Variola virus example, we realize 
how the definition of the nature/artifact axis already presupposes the realm of “nature” that 
interests environmental conservation decisions. The virus was certainly an issue of nature 
and, again, of human civilization, but in a very  different way  than the determination of a 
tree as natural and, therefore, automatically as object of concern for environmental 
preservation.
We can also stick, for the moment, to the domain and purpose of a managerial approach 
to environmental issues and values. In this sense, we can avoid asking questions about the 
human side of the axis, whether it should be called into question. The double dimension of 
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the question would inquire into both what it means to be human in the ecological crisis, 
once the biospheric conditions of our existence that we took for granted emerge as 
necessary  and threatened by our own activity; and into what it means for nature to be 
singled out from human mediations: what are the dimensions of human influence, 
manipulation, and practice? Are we so sure the only relevant ones can be assembled under 
the category of pure material fabrication? Is the otherness of nature left untouched, if the 
ecological crisis entails a revision of its human counter-category?
What is presupposed in the nature/artifact axis is the temptation to rely  on a kind of 
commonsense naturalism, so that environmentalists’ nature is something that can be agreed 
upon or mutually  understood: roughly, green and biological. But Naess’ indications we saw 
earlier regard precisely this: that our sense of reality is called into question when we face 
environmental conflicts; not merely different opinions on value attached to the same 
object, but what these objects are and do, and in what relation they are to us. Maybe Latour 
is right when he writes that, from the point  of view of his field, science and technology 
studies, philosophers’ examples of objects are never complicated or equivocal enough.173 
Environmental philosophers usually  pick trees and rives as opposed to cars and power 
plants, so every  reader in our contemporary  environmental consciousness knows from the 
beginning that some objects have an ecological value to be experienced while others do 
not.
In materialist terms of manipulation and origin the axis translates into a separation 
between the human dimension, activities and practices on the one side, and nature on the 
other. The nature/artifact axis is, therefore, a function of the more general separation 
between the order of human culture and that of nature.174
The logic of the nature/artifact axis opens, then, aporias, unsolvable contradictions, of 
continuity  and otherness. On the one hand, humans ended up in a global ecological crisis 
because they denied their belonging to nature. Environmentalism stresses continuity and 
accuses human western civilization of alienation from nature. Mastery  over nature is, 
consequently, possible because nature is seen as an object dispossessed of any subjective 
quality. 
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On the other hand, nature is by definition otherness to humans. We ended up in a global 
ecological disaster because we did not respect its otherness. Mastery  over nature is due to 
humans ignoring nature’s character of limit to possession and exploitation. 
There is continuity even though continuity does not exclude human specific difference. 
We are continuous to nature because humans are embedded in nature, nature is not a 
resource but also a source, it sustains us and our activities. Nevertheless, continuity risks 
naturalizing humans and all their products and actions so that there is no room for an 
ecological choice.
As Vogel expressed, the nature/artifact and the nature/humanity axes are not viable 
discourses of nature on which to base environmentalism. Indeed, they bring up an 
insurmountable contradiction in the fundamental prescription of environmentalism itself 
that paralyzes the efficacy and influence of environmental discourse altogether: “humans 
are (a) part of nature and (b) ought not interfere with it.”175
3.1.2 - Some Articulations of the Humanity/Nature Axis in Environmental Literature
In light of this impasse of environmentalism, most ecocriticism has attempted to offer 
acceptations of nature that articulate the tension in the human/nature separation or attempt 
to bridge it.
The “Integral ecology” approach offers three definitions of nature in response to the 
main denunciation of ecologism about the externalization of the natural world in the 
modern culture. The authors call them: “NATURE,” “Nature,” and “nature.” With the term 
“NATURE” they frame discourses that refer to the cosmos, and to Being, including 
“exterior” and “interior” elements, “the Great Nest of Being.” The label “Nature” frames 
the acceptation that appears in the natural sciences object, or “the Great Web of Life.” 
Finally, the lower case “nature” is the “empirical-sensory world” or “the Great  Biosphere,” 
the world of experience both in terms of “exterior world” disclosed by senses, and “interior 
world” of feelings, emotional-sexual impulses and somatic experience, as opposed to 
rational mind and to culture. Each acceptation is the ecological redeployment of 
philosophical traditional views of nature: “NATURE” is worshipped by romantics, 
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“Nature” is studied by  rationalist materialists, and “nature” is raised by environmentalists 
who bring forth a prereflective experience of the world and an idea of alternative 
rationality based on life activity instead of separate theoretical consciousness.176
Also in reference to different philosophical traditions, Vogel, instead, accounts for four 
fundamental acceptations of nature relevant to contemporary ecocriticism.177  “Nature as 
origin” is the account that traces back to Romanticism, vitalism and neo-Kantianism. In 
this sense, nature as a complex organic whole is contrasted by the category of “artificial.” 
Poststructuralist “critique of nature” forms can be considered its opposite acceptations, 
associated with an anxiety for foundational and immediate natural dimensions. In this 
second concept, the axis is solved on the side of social and historical construction, where 
nature does not exist. Nature is always already a product of humanity  and there is not much 
space left for environmental theorizing, inasmuch as it risks imposing an ideological 
“natural” order on humanity. A third fundamental account, also within poststructural 
topics, is the idea of “nature as difference.” In this sense nature is not “origin,” nor is it the 
rejection of origin. Nature is the irreducible moment of otherness of the world which 
cannot be entirely captured in a finite worldview. The natural world is both revealed and, at 
the same time, concealed. Finally, a Marxist materialist analysis ties “nature and practice” 
together. The natural world is materialistically constituted by  practical labour, and any 
dualistic distinction between the physical world of nature and the social world of artifacts 
is pointless: “there is no deep ontological difference between cities and natural parks.”178 
This fourth acceptation of the natural dimension focuses on material practice as 
ontologically prior to both poles of nature and humans, so that both the subject and the 
world come to be what they are always in media res, through practical action.179
Linked to nature as it is met in a philosophy of practice are recent environmental 
employments of the concept of alienation, again in debt to Hegel and Marx. Vogel reminds 
us that, in this context, “nature” is exactly what is alienated. Alienation occurs when we 
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consider as perfectly natural what is actually social.180  This is problematic when we 
consider that popular environmentalism commonly turns to the idea that humans are 
alienated from nature. Biro suggests, then, that alienation in environmental discourse can 
be defined as “human beings’ self-conscious transformation of their natural 
environment,”181  that is to say, the process of having culture and history, breaking free 
from the dictates of nature.182  While nature is alienated, the environment is always lived 
and transformed in practice. Nevertheless, the risk of subordinating nature’s otherness to 
the practice of environmental manipulation replicates the problem of nonhumans’ 
representation outside a mere material substratum: the appeal of ecology to an egalitarian 
awareness of nature and the limits it  poses on humans’ hubris fades in the opposition 
between an alienated natural transcendence and a manipulated material humanized 
environment. As suggested by Vogel, the problem of the treatment of nature is situated 
within “the ethical imperative towards self-knowledge:”183  self-consciousness of the 
consequences of our actions and humility  as opposed to a domineering manipulation of 
nature for pure human motives and recreation.
Hailwood brings up the category of alienation in environmental political theory in order 
to articulate the nature/artifact axis, precisely accounting for the two counter-issues it 
raises: that  of respect for nature’s otherness, and the human dimension of our environment. 
Hailwood distinguishes three different occurrences both of nature and of alienation. What 
we refer to as “nature” can be: a) “the natural world,” (what he also called “overall nature” 
and tried to define through a deployment of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “flesh”);184 
“nonhuman nature,” and “humanized nature.” He then specifies the experience of 
alienation in reference to the materialist and critical tradition in terms of “estrangement,” 
“reification” and “alienation.” Hailwood aims to highlight that alienation has different 
political values in relation to different acceptations of nature. For instance, “alienation” 
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from “nonhuman nature” can be desirable to the extent that  it denotes a renunciation of 
ownership and letting go of purely anthropocentric conceptions of mastery of nature; 
“estrangement” from the “humanized nature,” instead, translates into a lack of homeliness 
and breaks the “practice of place.”185  It is an important account of the complexity of the 
otherness/continuity issues that ecology brings up  in the face of our concept of nature as 
humans’ otherness, but it still presupposes a fundamental naturalism, for which the 
different realms of nature and humanity are distinguishable a priori,186  although they are 
recognized as problematic. Indeed, their separation is eventually  entrusted to “practical 
needs” and common sense, even though we could see the entire effort of articulating the 
different occurrences of natures and alienations as a sign and an attempt to open a viable 
alternative to naturalism.187
Other ecological attempts aim to bridge the poles of the human/nature axis, refuting 
naturalistic premises by offering a phenomenological constitution of the environment. 
Embree speaks, for example, of “environment-as-encountered.” The encountered is 
constituted in the encounter, therefore, “nature” would be an abstract term, an abstract 
aspect of the cultural world, which would come to be the counterpart of naturalistic 
thinking, an ontological prejudice for environmentalism. In opposition to “naturalistic” 
nature, we find the “lifeworldly nature,” encountered in prereflective sensuous perception 
and in the positioning of humans within their lived worlds. Therefore, all objects, for 
Embree, are encountered. All objects are socio-cultural objects, which does not mean they 
are all constructed. Studying what is nature is, therefore, studying the different typologies 
of encounters: political, practical, volitional, valuational, aesthetic-recreational, cultural-
scientific. The environment is a cultural world made up of objects that are not described by 
a mere naturalistic foundation (organic constitution), but are also pretheoretical, valued and 
willed.188
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The bridging of the human/nature poles is similarly stressed by Brown in a continuous 
reopening: the constant intersubjective reassessment of the experience of value. One issue 
here is to assert the experiential and objective dignity both of evaluation of nature and of 
the evaluated, simultaneously  given in intentional consciousness. Another point is to offer 
dignity to the necessary  intersubjective dimension of value, which cannot be simply 
dismissed by naturalist-materialist conceptions of what is nature.189
In an attempt to account for the tension between non reducible otherness, the human 
pole situatedness, and continuity or non-separability between the two in the sensuous 
encountering of nature, Cheney  refers to a “more-than-human world” in terms of wider 
biological dimensions in which we are embedded.190 He also recalls Rolston’s “emphasis 
on nature as source, rather than merely resource for human appropriation,”191 stressing that 
human difference and peculiarity is due to our position in evolutionary and ecosystemic 
history: a combination of the two tensions to immanence and to transcendence. A very 
different accent, instead, is to be encountered in the same paper, when Cheney refers to 
Plumwood’s “earth others,”192  agents who do not allow an epistemological attitude of 
frontal observation and objectification. In this case, the discourse shifts from the great 
nature-otherness to plural differences of nonhumans, and ecologism is subordinated to the 
problem of recognition of difference and negotiation among equals.
Difference as adopted in ecofeminism aims to shift the problem of nature from the 
otherness/belonging framework to a multiplication of differences of nonhumans. A similar 
articulation shows, indeed, how dualism is a function of a more general inclusion/
exclusion framework. The axis that goes from natural to artificial poses difficulties 
inasmuch as it is a line drawn between two tensions towards unity, between two poles that 
function as great collectors. Nature as a great otherness is not much a realm of reality, but 
an oscillating ally  of discrimination siding with each of the poles alternatively: external 
world vs human subjectivity; rationality vs human nature as instinctual; mind vs body; 
western civilized men vs tribal cultures, to name a few.193
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Whether environmentalism accepts the axis as a given, and formulates managerial 
questions beginning from the acknowledgment of the humanity/nature dualism;194 whether 
environmental reflection requests the problematization of the humanity/nature axis which 
is placed at the speculative root of environmental issues, such as in the case of radical 
ecology; in both cases the aporia between continuity  and otherness, between humans and 
nature remains presupposed. Even attempts at bridging the gap swing between the two 
collectors. It is hard to imagine an articulation of the axis that does something different 
than extend the realm of subjectivity  onto the nonhumans and the influence of objectivity 
onto human subjects.
A political dilemma for environmentalism is opened in the aporia of otherness and 
continuity. On the one hand, we need to save some natural reference, based on which we 
have the possibility  to judge our environmental practices and revise them in order to 
answer the ecological crisis. On the other hand, a predetermined concept of nature has 
been used to justify  social oppression. Moreover, naturalism does not account for the lived 
environment and the belonging, practice and mediations of humans in nature, just one 
more issue raised within radical ecology.
It appears that the basic a priori determination of nature as otherness to humanity is 
hard to overcome inasmuch as it constitutes our western basic metaphysical apparatus, the 
usual two bricks we constantly  try  to match, separate, and recombine in the attempt to 
build always new and different edifices.
3.1.3 - Nature or “Nature”
Nature is a highly ideological and fluctuating term that causes several ambiguities 
within ecological discourses. As Kate Soper highlighted in her report on the different 
occurrences of nature within western cultural, philosophical, and political traditions, the 
fluctuation of the concept of nature within different discourses is always a function of the 
otherness-to-humanity framework. Nature is, each time, the opposite of culture, history, 
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convention, artifact: everything in the order of humanity.195 It is the object for a subject, the 
animal for a culture, the primitive for a civilized, the body for a mind, the mother-virgin-
lover for a masculine culture producer, the fatherland for other peoples, the sexual norm 
for homosexuals, the rustic simplicity, countryside life and artesan’s poiesis for the 
urbanized and consumerist citizen. 
Soper highlights that the human-otherness framework is commonly intended as the 
material world given prior to any human activity in the concept of nature as environment. 
It is also intended as the collection of, literally, nonhumans. But  the framework is the same 
within cosmological concepts of nature, the totality  of Being to which humanity both 
belongs and from which it differentiates.196 Even discourses regarding “human nature,” put 
the emphasis on our difference from other natural species, from animal and inorganic 
modes of beings, as well as on behaviors that are associated with them, such as instincts 
and emotions. Therefore, the fluctuation of the human/nature axis involves fluctuations not 
only on the side of nature, but also on the side of what is considered human each time, just 
just as eco-feminists highlight. In the case of human nature, ethical, political and aesthetic 
discourses can be divided around a main opposition: from culture as a corrective to a 
bestial nature, underlying, for example, the Enlightenment idea of subjectivity; to nature as 
a corrective of the deformations of culture such as in the Romantic reaction and the 
Frankfurt school critique of instrumental rationality;197  to counter-Romantic reactions 
questioning the “naturalness” of nature in front of the violence of ethics based on natural 
norms in sexual condemnation of “deviants,” as well as in the resort of forms of racism and 
nationalism to a natural dimension of salvation and authenticity.
Representations of nature vary  quite emblematically for environmentalism, even though 
one of the elements of its popular rhetoric is precisely a return to nature, in terms of 
respecting the ecological and biological conditions of life flourishing, both of our selves 
and of our world; conditions that have been overlooked by  a western capitalist and 
industrialist way of life based on material standards of living.
For Soper, there is a central tension beneath the disparate discourses that make use of 
“nature,” a fracture that is in some sense a function of the otherness-to-humanity 
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framework. It occurs between what she calls “nature-skeptical” and “nature-endorsing” 
discourses.198  The fracture very loosely overlaps the core distinction between ecological 
concerns, which hold on to some acceptation of nature to produce better environmental 
policies, and the concerns expressed in constructivist, postmodern, poststructuralist 
questioning of what is, and whether there exists, a signified to the “nature” signifier.
The two opposed perspectives actually  have a lot in common. They both start as forms 
of resistance to modernity, criticizing the western model of progress, the faith in scientific 
rationality, and the domineering attitude towards nature and other cultures. Nevertheless, 
they  irreparably diverge. On the one side, environmentalism invokes some degree of 
realism of nature, both as a natural world that is being destroyed by human activity and as 
a set of processes and powers independent of human will that serve as limit to human 
activity. On the other side, culturalist  critiques tend to deny any realism to nature and stress 
its constructed character, as well as the dangers of its normativity.199
The core of the tension is due to the fact that ecologists are usually not interested in 
issues regarding the representation of nature, as opposed to the evident  instability of its 
cultural, historical and linguistic representations.
Soper regards the tension between realist nature and represented “nature” as irreparable, 
although necessary of exploration. According to her, each of the two attitudes should take 
into consideration the concerns of the other, since they  both deal with nature and yet 
produce two antithetical normative tensions.
Nevertheless, if we give into an irreparable tension between the necessity of a reference 
to nature and the impossibility of it, environmental theorization can be doomed as 
impossible, or, even worse, as a mere form of reactionary, nostalgic and romantic view of a 
unity  that does not exist. Ecology is, instead, concerned with our earthly conditions of 
existence and ecological problems such as: climate change, ozone holes, species’ 
extinction, resource depletion and the overshooting of complex thresholds in the carrying 
capacity of global systems. These problems are real threats to the existence of our world, 
maybe not to the planet itself, or to the mere existence of life, but  certainly to our 
meaningful world.
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Bruno Latour’s political ecology  is able to provide us with a perspective that combines 
both preoccupations. Representations of “nature” and the political representation of 
nonhumans in our common world are, in his thinking, the same problem. His concern will 
be with relationism; not in the sense of Naess’s relation with nature, but in terms of relation 
itself. That is what we need in order to think without making use of the subject-object 
dichotomy, or getting stuck in the struggle to bridge the gap. If anthropos and physis are 
the two fundamental metaphysical bricks of reality, what we need is an “experimental 
metaphysics” that takes into account the connections and mediations that make up both 
humans and nonhumans, a “radical realism” that does not resort  to any naturalism, and yet 
treats nonhumans as equals.
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CHAPTER 4 - BRUNO LATOUR’S POLITICAL ECOLOGY
The distinction between nature and humanity, in all of its various forms, is for Latour an 
impossible paradox. When we stick to the separation between subjects and objects, 
between mind and world, we are thrown into a double bind between two contradictory 
orders: “Be absolutely disconnected!” and “Find absolute proof that you are connected!”200
The problem is that nature and humans in their philosophical, abstract, essentialist ideas 
are dysfunctional, or better yet, more functional to the settlement of power conflicts201 than 
to understanding who we are, and what the world is that we live in. The ecological crisis 
turns this warning into a concrete threat.
The fracture in the concept of nature highlighted by Soper is ultimately the one between 
realist and constructivist ideas of nature. The two critical moves of constructivism and 
realism are, also for Latour, hardly combined in one movement. Facts are attacked as 
always made, and all the power comes from humans; human beliefs and constructions are 
attacked by “matters of fact,” in which all the power belongs to the reality  of things.202 The 
fracture remains open in a “critical barbarity” where the critic is always right.203 In the case 
of the ecological crisis, nonhumans are the victims of this barbaric treatment, and 
consequently, humans are too.
In his science studies, Latour worked to offer a “more realistic realism”204 of science, in 
which scientific facts are reconnected (but not absorbed) to the scientific practices through 
which they concretely emerge, instead of lingering in the idealistic realm of naive realism. 
The defining feature of science studies was never to point out a social constructivism of 
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scientific facts, reducing the realism of science to the history of scientists and the social 
and political context of their findings. Science grasps things in themselves, for science 
scholars, but in order to understand facts, we have to multiply the mediators, the 
connections and the relations that make facts up. Facts are never pure matters-of-fact. The 
singularity of their existence includes the material, local, historical, mundane dimensions 
of scientific practice.
 In continuity with his works on science and technology, Latour’s political ecology  is 
concerned with conferring reality with the common world through politics and the 
sciences. The common worlds are the places in which humans and nonhumans, 
symmetrically, have always been folded into each other, creating ever changing collectives 
(but never natures and societies).
4.1 - MODERNIZE VS ECOLOGIZE
As Latour argued in We Have Never Been Modern,205  before developing his political 
ecology, the price we are paying for not reopening the question of the collective of humans 
and nonhumans (the collective of natures-cultures), is the overwhelming and uncontrolled 
proliferation of hybrids of nature and culture, such as, for example, climate change or 
ozone depletion. Are these natural or man made? Do they  belong in the realm of nature or 
do they interest human beings and civilizations? Does climate change follow the laws of 
nature, or those of industry, finance and globalization? Latour writes: “If we do not  change 
the common dwelling, we shall not absorb in it the other cultures that we can no longer 
dominate, and we shall be forever incapable of accommodating in it the environment that 
we can no longer control.”206
Other cultures and the otherness of nature are precisely the “Great Divide” of 
modernism between “Us” and “Them,”207 the elements through which western modernism 
constitutes the common world. The constitution of the common world is, indeed, a political 
constitution. The modern constitution is composed, in Latour’s words, of two Houses: that 
86
205 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993).
206 Ibid., 145.
207 Ibid., 12.
of society  and that of nature. The separation of powers in it splits nature from culture, the 
object for the subject, reason from belief, epistemology from psychology, Science from 
practice, facts from values, and human freedom from nature’s necessity. Dualisms are “so 
well drawn up  that this separation has been viewed as a double ontological distinction:”208 
on the one side, the realms pertaining to politics and society, on the other side, the natural 
realms. Nevertheless, all these different  spheres are part of one and the same political 
modernist settlement.209 It is a settlement that, just like any  other constitution, is not the 
only possible one for our world. Plato’s allegory of the cave does not merely  concern itself 
with the essence of truth, but also with the political dimension of truth inasmuch as it 
establishes a world constitution where the cave is the Lower House, in which people, the 
realm of politics and opinions, feelings and interests are confined in the chains of 
ignorance and mere appearances. The sky of Ideas is the Upper House, the outside world 
with reality and nature, which are cold and indifferent to human quarrels and 
representations. A central role is given to the philosopher who frees himself, the Scientist 
of today, who with a very small group of people have the privileged access to both 
dimensions, imposing the authority of the outside world on the social world, and the 
demands of politics to the research on the facts of nature.210 Therefore, “Science” (with a 
capital S), the subject of the popular expression “scientific worldview,” so often criticized 
in environmentalism,211 is merely the philosophical idea of what the sciences in practice 
do, with their laboratories in which our objective knowledge of the world is made.212
Similarly  to the dualism of otherness and continuity emerging in environmental 
discourses, in the fracture between humans and nature that characterizes the modern 
constitution there is at work a simultaneous play of immanence and transcendence. This 
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double cross makes the settlement inapt in offering a clear understanding of our current 
world, and opens, instead, a battle field for incessant power struggles. The fracture, indeed, 
produces two sets of paradoxes for moderns. The first paradox sees nature as a 
transcendent realm external to us, while society  is a freely and humanly  constructed 
immanent realm of the world. The second paradox sees, on the contrary, nature as an 
immanent product of our research and laboratories, while society  transcends individuals 
and sets all our frameworks.
On the one hand, the laws of nature elude human influence, but are invented through 
instruments and laboratories. Even if fabricated, nature is completely external to humans. 
On the other hand, humans build their societies mobilizing objects of all kinds. Society is 
the realm of men, even though it  would not stand without its nonhumans (animals, food, 
houses, industries, to make a few simple examples).213 
In order to clear these paradoxes, “modernism” is defined by Latour as two opposite 
groups of practices: translation, the practical activity that  brings to emergence all kinds of 
nature-culture hybrids that make up our world; and purification, the cutting of the 
relational networks and the institutionalization of essences, areas of humans, and 
nonhumans. The different forms of critique of modernism214  all expose the fact that 
modernism makes the whole work of mediation invisible through purification.215 
Modernizing means purifying the entanglements, clarifying confusion, selecting facts and 
forgetting the network of attachments, dependencies and conditions of existence that 
sustains them, in the name of progress and reason.
In Latour’s terminology, “ecologizing” is the opposite of modernizing. This does not 
mean we have to go back to a pre-modern state of affairs to be “ecological,” just like many 
strains of anti-modern popular environmentalism are tempted to preach.216 Ecologizing is 
nonmodern because it  runs from the observation that we are entangled with nonhumans, 
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“to greater entanglement.”217  We need to explore and experiment even more with what 
kind of associations and relations our lived world is made of, and only  by doing so can we 
learn to distinguish “those attachments that save from those that kill.”218
4.1.1 - The End of Nature
The re-composition of the common world is only  possible through the abandonment of 
the “metaphysics of nature,” while at the same time reopening the problem through the 
political and scientific task Latour calls “experimental metaphysics.”219
 The “metaphysics of nature” is used by Latour as a “deliberately  paradoxical 
expression”220  by highlighting the metaphysical character of physis (metaphysics being 
obviously what  lies beyond the realm of physis, nature). With the expression, Latour wants 
to stress how our concept of nature pins down a “traditional solution” to the question, 
“what is our common world?” by cutting short the discussion and thus entrusting nature 
with an a-critical political role. The metaphysics of nature distribute a priori primary and 
secondary  qualities.221 In other words, they define the axiomatic opposition between the 
human and the natural that streams through all discourses on nature, whether endorsing 
difference or continuity.222 The opposition runs along the line separating the realms of an 
independent external reality/order (physical, biological, universal and determining) and the 
conventions of the human cultural/social life, leaving behind all kinds of excluded entities, 
such as: civilizations, races, gender roles, sexual preferences, feelings, nonhuman living 
beings, among others.
With experimental metaphysics, then, Latour does not suggest an alternative 
metaphysical theory  of nature, even if provisional or revisable in principle. On the 
contrary, he means to open the experimentation of the common world, and to do without 
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the principle of “a unified, unifying, universalized common world.”223 It is necessary work, 
which is otherwise undertaken covertly  by  the belief in the ontological monopoly of 
Science: the “scientifically” proven is real, the rest is made of belief, opinions and 
politics.224
Another element of the “metaphysics of nature,” that “experimental metaphysics” avoid 
replicating, is the replacement of the ontological question, “what is there?” with the 
epistemological question “how do we know it?.” According to this setting, nature would be 
there as external reality  unified by some transcendental or external authority. Its 
composition would be established once and for all, enforcing its authority through what 
Latour calls, sarcastically, “the epistemology police.”225
Another element experimental metaphysics do not entail is a mere pluralism of 
worldviews. Pluralism in this sense would show to be a cheap epistemological way  out of 
the ethnocentric and imperialistic dualism of subjects and objects, a condescending kind 
tolerance “obtained at the price of relinquishing any requirement of reality.”226 The reason 
for this rejection lies in the refutation of “multiculturalism,” the subjective byproduct of 
the “mononaturalism” he is trying to dismiss, which for him is the commandment of one, 
transcendent nature common to all, accessed exclusively by the “universal Science,” as 
opposed to the different opinions and habits people relativistically develop about it. Once 
again, multiculturalism, the relativistic plurality of representations of nature, and 
mononaturalism the unifying world, common to all, together are the perfect yield of the 
modern constitution.227 According to Latour, there is no mononaturalism/multiculturalism. 
There are only natures-cultures.
It is, indeed, through the renowned idea of the “end of nature” that Latour engages with 
the ecological movements, including Naess’s ecosophy. Naess is taken by Latour as the 
model of reference to nature and its protection that struggles within its paradoxes and 
ambiguities. More tragically, by  ultimately maintaing a modern form of naturalism, this 
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model fatally  prevents the ecological movements from accomplishing their goals and 
understanding their practices.228
Latour, actually, combats the idea of “the ‘cold and hard’ nature of the primary 
qualities,”229 just as Naess does. All the same, if the “grey  nature” of primary qualities is of 
no use to political ecology, neither is the “green nature” invoked by  environmentalism. 
Latour defines “the ‘warm green’ nature of the ecologists”230 (a natural world in which we 
belong) as an equivalent misunderstanding that reiterates the pre-unification of nature into 
something both other and continuous to humanity.
For Latour, even the notion of ecosystem is not adequate to solve the problem of nature:
The same problem arises with the notion of ecosystem. In supposing that they had 
surpassed the old limits of anthropomorphism because they were integrating nature and 
society, users of the term ‘ecosystem’ were retaining modernism’s basic defect, its 
penchant for composing the whole without the explicit will of those humans and 
nonhumans who find themselves gathered, collected, or composed in it. They  had even 
found a way  to array all beings, humans and nonhumans alike, under the notion of 
“global ecosystem,” in a totality  constituted outside the political world, in the nature of 
things.231
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When Bill McKibben published his book The End of Nature in 1989, he meant to show 
how human influence and exploitation is now omnipresent. Especially considering global 
warming, we have changed the atmosphere and we cannot find any corner of the Earth that 
is unspoiled by human activity, not  even the highest mountain peak.232 As Vogel notes, the 
kind of end of nature McKibben was talking about only reinforced the dualistic distinction 
between humans and nature, inasmuch as “once the human touch is on something, 
[nature’s] ontological status shifts: no longer natural, it is now an artifact. The human 
world and the natural one are thus treated as separate realms.”233  Nevertheless, Vogel 
suggests to solve this unviable paradox by abandoning the notion of nature altogether and 
shifting to that of environment. Latour, instead, follows a different strategy.
The end of nature Latour talks about occurs once nature’s genesis and intrinsically 
political quality is exposed, so that nature simply stops being the only  possible unification 
of our world.234 Nature is one way of constituting the common world, of accounting for 
reality, but the term itself obliterates the practices through which nature as a collector (and 
human society as its counterpart) is constituted. Through the purification of practice, the 
“natural order,” the “natural laws,” the “natural rights,” the “inflexible causality”235  and 
many other formulations of nature present themselves as transcendent, universal, 
indisputable, and accessible only to white coats or experts. Latour accuses deep  ecology of 
maintaining the “modern, smooth, risk-free, stratified objects,”236   and they are precisely 
the result of a lack of the political work experimental metaphysics of the common world is 
capable of.
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4.1.2 - Nonmodern Mediation
Since object and subject are not politically neutral terms, but highly polemical (in the 
sense of polemos),237 there is, for Latour, no room for overcoming dualism.238 Subject and 
object need to be replaced entirely with a perplexity about what the actors are and do, a 
definition of capacities and properties that cannot be attributed in advance, because this 
pre-attribution would descend upon them from a higher authority (nature, neurosciences, 
society, politics, God...).
Instead of relying on the subject/object  axis, or, what is the same, the human/nature axis 
that organizes the world in the modern constitution, one of Latour’s suggestions is to add a 
second axis of nonmodernity. This second axis can be pictured perpendicular to the first 
one, like a Cartesian coordinate system. On the horizontal axis we keep the human/nature 
poles; on the vertical axis we position the two poles of “essence” and “event” (or 
“existence”).239 Beings are mediated, their ontology  has a variable geometry on this plane. 
They  do not simply  jump, like old phenomena, between objects and subjective 
representations. The second axis adds their situatedness and the practice through which 
they  emerge to their very  definition. Existence of humans and nonhumans is an event. 
Their existence is unstable and never ex nihilo, but situated and historical. Their 
“nature” (being out there) or “social construction” (being made into a fact) is part of a 
gradient, not an essence, that also accounts for their stabilization as entities (essence) and 
their relative event-character. This is, actually, what has always happened in practice. The 
peculiarity of the modern constitution was exactly  in the purification of the axis of 
practice, of the work of mediation of entities, jumping without chains of reference to a 
definition of entities’ essences.240 This is also one of the messages in Pandora’s Hope; the 
modes of technical mediation reveal the idleness of the distinction between facts and 
artifacts, since what we know about the world emerges in laboratories and through the 
practice of the sciences (both humanistic and “scientific”!) that makes nonhumans speak. 
Existence is not a fact of nature, an all-or-nothing, but relative, historical and local.
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The task is always the same for Latour, even in his new collective and multimedia 
project, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. The project has been open for contributions 
through its web platform241 and is still going on. Supposedly the inquiry  group will publish 
its “final-ish” results in 2015. 
An Inquiry into Modes of Existence undertakes the task of a completely egalitarian 
ontology. Ontology  is not a theory of Being in the group’s understanding. It is, instead, the 
attempt of offering an anthropology  of the moderns (that is, of us), by accounting for the 
complex different ways being is being: a “flat ontology.”242  For example, the mode of 
existence of religious experience cannot be reduced to its historical, psychological and 
social explanations. At the same time it does not reveal a supernatural existence. The mode 
of existence of religion is not in the alternative “God exists” or “social explanations exist.” 
The portion of the world religious experience arranges is an enigma that can be understood 
only in its differences and its clashes against other modes of existence.
Once we stop  relying on the dualistic framework of the substratum of external nature on 
the one side, and on the world of ever changing society on the other, we cannot reduce any 
being to any field or definition. This is what Latour called in 1984 the principle of 
irreduction: “Nothing is, by itself, either reducible or irreducible to anything else.”243 All 
the actors are distributed on one single plane where they have a mediated, relational, local, 
network of existence. Humans, texts, objects, concepts, animals, traditions: everything is 
an actor, has its own voice and agency, and equally exists in the world allowing for a 
“chain of reference.”
In his continuous reworking of the problem, Latour invents the term “matters-of-
concern” as an alternative to objectivity  conceived as “matters-of-fact.” The expression “as 
a matter of fact” shows, even in everyday  language, its authoritarian load in its appeal to an 
objective external reality of things. On the contrary, “matters-of-concern” account for the 
connections between the constitutive work of reality and its political, collective and 
practical character. This political character is not a mere collection of different opinions 
and preferences, but a gathering of the human and nonhuman elements that define the 
matter.
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For political ecology, the traditional concept of politics as concerning human affairs, 
interests, preferences and passions, comes from the ontological cleavage between the 
subjects of politics and the objects of “Science.” In other words, traditional politics are 
embedded in the sharp distinction between epistemological concerns and “the lowly 
political questions - on values and the difficulty of living together.”244According to Latour, 
“green nature” still relies on this idea of politics. By treating nature as something out there 
to which we belong, even more authentically  than to our social dimension, we do not solve 
the fundamental separation of modernism. On the contrary, nature brought inside the 
political debate is inevitably  the green nature of our feelings, our preferences, our 
attachments: conventional, subjective, interested, and even worse, in a desperate 
opposition to the nature explored by Science, the grey  nature object of the “scientific 
worldview.”
This classic notion of politics precisely  prevents ecologists from securing their own 
political weight and the changes they  promise, condemning ecological movements to 
stagnation; ecologists fight an uneven battle, nurturing the same settlement that is 
responsible for the ecological crisis. For example, as we saw, Naess’ politics still comes as 
a second order of reflection, based on the inquiry into nature, as if the two were two 
separable domains of reality. If we want “green” politics to be effective, we need not only 
to let go of the concept of nature, but also of its counterpart, the classic concept of politics.
As Latour points out, the myth of the new collective is already there, in the narrations 
and hopes of ecological practice, it just does not have a conceptual institutionalization 
available. Politics have always been concerned with questions of nature: population, 
biology, objects of everyday use, agriculture, and so on. There has never been in practice a 
naked political dimension made and played by humans only. The very existence of society 
is based on nonhumans. Just like in the case of “nature”, replaced entirely by the locution 
“collective of associations of humans and nonhumans,” the concept of politics will shift 
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from “power politics,” the realm of human affairs, interests, preferences, and power 
relations to “politics conceived as the progressive composition of the common world.”245
What political ecology claims to be able to do is, finally, to show that the “modern 
constitution” is not the only  possible way to constitute our common world; it is not  the 
only way to accord citizenship and recognition to the legitimate nonhuman members of the 
world we live in. In order to do this, political ecology has to rework the idea of 
representation.
4.1.3 - Political-Scientific Representation
Latour’s analysis of representation shows the common ground between two problems: 
the political and the epistemological notions of representation. This distinction can be more 
easily seen, for example, in the Italian language. Unlike in English, Italian provides two 
different terms for representation: rappresentazione and rappresentanza. The first frames 
the problem of the representation of things,246 while the second designates that  of political 
representation. However, rappresentazione and rappresentanza do not articulate two 
separate problems in Latour’s analysis, but  one. The split  between the two is, once again, a 
derivation of the modern dualism between culture and nature. We do not find neutral 
scientists anywhere in scientific praxis, who are the simple invisible intermediaries of the 
mute things of nature, representatives who say “nothing but what the things would have 
said on their own, had they only been able to speak.”247  Conversely, no political 
representative, no Sovereign is a simple intermediary  of his citizens, who says “nothing but 
what the citizens would have said had they all been able to speak at the same time.”248 
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Objectivity and political will are both a matter of giving form and voice. Both scientists 
and the Sovereign represent by “translating” their objects. And since every  translation is 
also a betrayal,249  within the translation of representation we always have a doubt, an 
uncertainty both of epistemological and political nature. There is no safe and absolute way 
of telling whether the scientist translates or betrays, as well as we “shall never know 
whether representatives betray or translate.”250 The issue cannot be undersized to a matter 
of deviation from normal representation, out of bad conscience, self-interest, or lack of 
impartiality. This is clear when we consider that a third sense of representation is involved: 
re-presentation [ita: ripresentazione], which is the bringing to presence again through a 
translation. Every translation is a reduction to some other definite form, and it cannot be 
divorced from difference. Indeed, writes Latour, “no being, not even humans, speak on 
their own, but always through something or someone else.251
 This is the reason why  political ecology extends the doubt of a good representation to 
nonhumans as a way to deal with the challenges of the ecological crisis. Political ecology 
needs to reopen the political work that gives representation to nonhumans. The very 
concept of democracy  needs to be reopened in light of the ecological crisis in order to 
include voices that will multiply and threaten us if we keep ignoring them. Instead of 
relying on the great transcendence of nonhuman nature, political ecology urges us to slow 
down and ask once again who are the citizens of this common world of humans and 
nonhumans.
The concept of “matters-of-concern,” therefore, follows in Heidegger’s footsteps: not 
just the critique of representation as Vorstellung,252  but most  importantly the “gathering” 
character that Heidegger attributes to the “thing” as opposed to the object [Gegenstand].253 
As Heidegger notoriously brings out, “thing” means something that is out there, but it  is 
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also the ancient word for Parliament in all European languages.254 Therefore, thing is not 
the object. It is the matter that preoccupies (concerns) a community; the matter that gathers 
an assembly  in order to deal with it, to decide what it  is, what is going on and how to 
handle it.
Objects have a form of realism like the one imposed by matters-of-facts, but the realism 
of matters of fact does not entail any great transcendence. All objects, including scientific 
facts, can go back to being a “thing.”255 Events such as climate change cannot be objects. 
They  cannot be understood, nor tackled through the concept of object. A lot of 
spokespersons (scientist, politicians, associations, international commissions, etc.) are 
gathered around climate change in the parliament of things256  in order to give the best 
possible representation to what is going on in our warming planet. Climate change (but, 
similarly, the Anthropocene) needs to be represented both scientifically, collecting all 
possible data that increase the degree of accuracy of the description and prediction models, 
and politically. Climate change needs to show that it exists, that it is there, in our own 
world, and we have to take action. The kind of politics pertaining to ecological issues are, 
then, called by Latour “Dingpolitik,”257  in opposition to “Realpolitik” or “Naturpolitik” 
and the modern acceptation of realism.
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Giving representation to nonhumans means, simultaneously finding a way to say  what 
they  are, while also giving them voice and political consideration. While Naess’ ecosophy 
maintains a separation between the problem of objectivity and that of green policies, 
Latour convincingly  shows the coincidence of the two. However, a common 
misunderstanding in Latour’s approach mistakes political ecology for advocating a socially 
constructed idea of nature. It is not a matter of politicizing nature. Abandoning the belief in 
the transcendence of nature, in its universal and mysterious origin, does not entail asserting 
that nature is artificial or man-made. On the contrary, Latour proclaims that “it is perfectly 
possible to speak of external reality  without immediately  confusing it with its hasty 
unification by  a power that dares not bear that name and that still displays itself under the 
less and less protective cover of the epistemology police.”258 
4.1.4 - Redistribution of Properties Between Humans and Nonhumans
By distancing himself from both nature as socially constructed, and from nature as 
naked external reality, Latour brings up the formulation of “hybrid.” Remarkably, the idea 
of hybrid frames a wide space of ambiguities and equivocations in the concept of nature 
and the human-nature relation. What are genetically modified organisms? Are they natural 
or cultural? Is climate change a human or a nature problem? 
Once we extend doubt of good representation to nonhumans, reopening the democratic 
process, anthropocentrism appears as simply rationalistic259 and unsuitable to deal with the 
hybrids of nature and culture, of human and nonhuman agencies. But  the answer to 
anthropocentrism is not ecocentrism, which does nothing but make the problem worse, by 
strengthening the bond to nature, emerging as a category  in opposition to the humanistic 
one. Hybrids always have an anthropomorphic element in some sense. The problem with 
anthropomorphism, however, is in the tendency to reaffirm the human/nature bi-
dimensionality. Anthropomorphism conveys the projection of “human” characters, taken in 
a reductionist, essentialist way, as if we had a universal definition of the essence of the 
anthropos ready at hand. 
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Therefore, the reopening of the collective does not only entail an experimental 
metaphysics through which we can reframe the old “natural” world. Humanism, too, needs 
to be experimental.260 Indeed, “so long as humanism is constructed through contrast  with 
the object that has been abandoned to epistemology, neither the human, nor the nonhuman 
can be understood.”261 
Far for providing an essence to the human, Latour prefers the term “morphism” to 
announce the “agency of the anthropos.”262  With this term, Latour tries to capture the 
artificial side, the action or role the human has, without thinking of the human as a pure 
subject. The human is a mediator, a translator. The human does this, not based on a 
predefined set of capacities, but through its presence, its action, its grasping, the very 
material setting of the conditions that bring aspects of the world to emergence.
Nevertheless, humanity does not occupy any special position in the universe. Humans 
are not the sole translators. Humans make nonhumans and nonhumans make us. 
“Morphism” is simply equated with the dimension of our practices of knowledge, be they 
speech, texts, narrations, or scientific laboratory  setups. Practice allows the mediation 
between humans and nonhumans all the time, while the modern constitution denies it, 
purifies it  from its outcome, from the represented object. Morphism, then, belongs to 
representation in its practice. Morphism is a “common trading zone - [...] a property  of the 
world itself,”263  as opposed to a shape arbitrarily superimposed by the observer, the 
speaker, or the writer. As an example we can think of carbon. What is carbon? It is a 
chemical element, the basis of life, a discovery  of Lavoisier, 18% of the composition of the 
human body, the component of carbon dioxide (the gas we breathe out, the gas trees 
transform into oxygen, the gas responsible for the green house effect and the acidification 
of oceans). Is carbon absolutely human? Is carbon absolutely nonhuman? Carbon is the 
trace between all its translations, in which something is conserved and something is left 
behind. 
If we abandon a reductionist, underestimated notion of the human as defined, for 
example, by his rationality and other mental qualities, agency is redistributed among the 
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mediations, the relations, the translations, whenever “things” assume a shape. “It is true 
that by redistributing the action among all these mediators, we lose the reduced form of 
humanity, but we gain another form, which has to be called irreducible.”264  Morphism is 
also the property of another term Latour ascribes to things: that of “factishes,” a play on 
words between “fact” and “fetish,” reality  and belief, in which the human and external 
reality once again cannot be told apart.265
The alternatives to the subject/object couple such as hybrids, factishes, things, and the 
associations of humans and nonhumans open a reality in which the properties of subjects 
and objects are not pre-distributed into two realms. 
First of all, subjectivity  is redistributed. A subject is an agent  that translates.266  It is 
attached, active within the network of relations and mediations. The subject is not the 
fundamentum inconcussum267 anymore, the unmovable foundation, such as in Descartes. In 
ecological terms, understanding the subject as foundation means, for Latour, proposing 
again the “Male Western Subject  [that] dominated the wild and savage world of nature 
through His courageous, violent, sometimes hubristic, dream of control.”268 It is the same 
model of subjectivity that instigates the realist’s protests in the face of the idea that there is 
no ontological split between nature and artifact: as if humans’ hubristic interference 
overflowed, spoiling the whole natural world and leaving only a constructed artificial 
milieu. Subjectivity is redistributed because being a subject means being subjectum, 
“subjected,” indeed, related, conditioned, connected, mediated, entangled just like ecology 
says: “to be a subject is not to act  autonomously in front of an objective background, but to 
share an agency with other subjects that have also lost their autonomy.”269
Not only subjectivity, but also humanism is redistributed. The powers and capacities 
that characterized the reductionist concept of human do not define a separation between 
matter and spirit anymore. Humans are not just the asymmetrical counterpart of Science’s 
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objects. The human regains in political ecology “the other part of itself, the share of 
things.”270
Similarly, activity  and passivity are redistributed. They correspond to a crucial 
anthropomorphic distinction that made it impossible to confer agency, history, and locality 
to nonhumans by means of separating epistemology (who discovers facts and how) from 
ontology (what are the matters of fact).271 
The capacity of speech is also redistributed. It is not just human, when nonhumans 
cease to be objects looking for a designative word, and start to be given a voice, offered in 
their singularity as propositions, as articulations of chains of reference that define their 
agency.272 
Finally, agency is redistributed; instead of subjects and objects Latour notoriously 
speaks of actors or actants. Beings, before being something, do something. We can say 
what they do, their performance, notice that there is an agent, an interference in a process. 
Only afterwords can we purify their agency into a black box that says what they  are, an 
essence.273
Who has the capacity  to represent such hybrids? The work of representation of 
nonhumans does not remain the task of traditional professional politicians. The sciences 
(as opposed to “Science”)274 are the key to the phonation of nonhumans: “We can go much 
further in the redistribution of roles between politicians and scientists if we agree to take 
seriously the little suffixes “-logies” and “- graphies” [...]. Each discipline can define itself 
as a complex mechanism for giving worlds the capacity to write or speak.”275  Politics, 
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redefined, simply  gets rid of nature and society as two distinct realms of reality, and 
replaces them with a gradient of nature-culture hybrids, as well as a redistribution of the 
role of sciences in democracy with their complex and unpredictable things.
4.1.5 - Ecological Crises as Crises of Objectivity
In a world of hybrids, the reading of the ecological situation shifts from a crisis of 
nature to a crisis of objectivity. 
The destruction of the natural world perpetuated by the ideological means of the human/
nature dualism was a side effect  of the effectiveness and instrumental excellence of the 
modern constitutional enterprise:
Modernization, although it destroyed the near-totality of cultures and natures by force 
and bloodshed, had a clear objective. Modernizing finally  made it possible to 
distinguish between the laws of external nature and the conventions of society. The 
conquerors undertook this partition everywhere, consigning hybrids either to the domain 
of objects or to that of society. [...] The past was a barbarian medley, the future a 
civilizing distinction.276
The main focus in Latour’s account does not stop  at the acknowledgement of the degree 
of environmental degradation. Nor does it promote a double dimensional reading: a crisis 
of ecosystems and an existential crisis of the subject. 
The character of the ecological crisis lies in the instability  of the concept of nature and 
of the nature/society distinction. It is worth noting that, in Latour’s words, natures and 
cultures have been destroyed, in their local and historical characters, rather than external 
nature in its abstract wholeness. Even the global frameworks of the crisis, such as the 
Anthropocene, climate change and Gaia, show the agency of global processes without 
ontological unification. They show, instead, a redistribution of agency in different 
processes that involve both the side of nature and human, “Earth” and “Earthlings.”277
In We Have Never Been Modern, the ecological crisis is framed as one of the most 
relevant effects of the modern constitution, together with human population growth. 
Thanks to its separation between nature and society, modernism has allowed for the 
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development of the sciences and techniques on such a large scale that hybrids, so 
mobilized, spun out of control:
If we had been able to keep the human multitudes and the nonhuman environment 
repressed behind us longer, we would probably  have been able to continue to believe 
that modern times were really passing while eliminating everything in their path. But 
the repressed has returned. The human masses are here again, in the East as well as in 
the South, and the infinite variety of nonhuman masses have arrived from Everywhere. 
They  can no longer be exploited. They can no longer be surpassed, because nothing 
surpasses them any longer.278
The ecological crisis is, then, the consequence of modernism and cause for its end.279 
The modern constitution is exhausted because it  does not guarantee its original task 
anymore: the separation of external reality  and social/subjective world. The efficacy  of the 
modern constitution depended on the concealment of mediation that the proliferation of 
hybrids instead exposes. According to this first formulation, then, we need to change the 
categories of subjective and objective if we finally want to understand our western 
contemporary  world and, at the same time, start accounting for “the totality of the human 
and nonhuman third worlds.”280
Only in Politics of Nature, however, does Latour offer his definition of the ecological 
crisis (or better, plural “crises”) as “crises of objectivity,” as opposed to “crises of nature.” 
The ecological crises appear as general crises of “constitution” bearing “on all objects, not 
just on those on which the label natural has been conferred.”281  The objects involved in 
these crises are matters-of-concern, “associations of beings that take complicated forms - 
rules, apparatuses, consumers, institutions, mores, calves, cows, pigs, broods - and that it  is 
completely superfluous to include in an inhuman and ahistorical nature.”282  A perfect 
example of this notion of ecological crisis is, then, the Anthropocene: the era in which 
humanity as a whole has become a genuine geological force. 
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In other words, the crisis comes from the emergence of phenomena that disconcert our 
previous established ideas about nature and the environment, about the nonhumans that 
surround us. A doubt is raised, by an ecological crisis, about what we are related to. The 
ecological crisis that carried the name of “ozone hole” let ozone emerge not just as a 
material component of the atmosphere we took for granted. The ozone’s agency emerged 
as different than what we expected; it could be depleted by human emissions. Its 
objectivity and the consequences of its performance had to be studied and handled again. 
The ozone was thrown into our public life and our industrial policies. 
We are thrown into crises by acid rain, species extinction, and ecosystem deterioration 
because we do not know anymore if their agency is following anthropic causes or the 
causality  of the laws of nature, if it is affecting our civilization, or if we need to rethink our 
place in the world and our relation to it.
What comes knocking on the door, says Latour, “no longer has the polemical form of a 
silencing matter of fact, but the ecological form of a perplexed nonhuman entering into a 
relationship  with the collective and gradually being socialized by the complex equipment 
of laboratories.”283  The ecological crisis, understood in terms of crises of objectivity, 
explains why, paradoxically, we worry  about the environment “when there is no more 
environment;”284  through its crisis, we find ourselves deprived of a zone of reality, an 
external nature “that would serve politics simultaneously as a standard, a foil, a reserve, a 
resource, and a public dumping ground.”285 An environmental crisis reveals some of the 
conditions of our very own existence, opening at the same time the question about natural 
objects and our human identity and activity.286 
Ecological crises do not happen in nature, but in the complex associations of humans 
and nonhumans. These associations have risky, furry, uncertain outlines. Uncertainty is an 
intrinsic character of ecological crises. An ecological crisis as crisis of objectivity bears 
intrinsic uncertainty because it  is not clear anymore who is the subject and who is the 
object, who acts and who is acted upon, who has agency  and who is inert, who is an end to 
itself and who is a mere means.
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The uncertainty  regarding the ontology  of nonhumans is, at the same time, the 
uncertainty about the ethical imperative that concerns them. As a consequence, Latour 
addresses the ecological crises also in terms of “generalized revolts of the means:”
[...] no entity - whale, river, climate, earthworm, tree, calf, cow, pig, brood - agrees any 
longer to be treated “simply as means” but insists on being treated “always also as an 
end.” This in no way entails extending human morality to the natural world, or 
projecting the law extravagantly onto ‘mere brute beings,’ or taking into account the 
rights of objects “for themselves;” it is rather the simple consequence of the 
disappearance of the notion of external nature.287
An ecological crisis as a crisis of objectivity means that a nonhuman which was 
categorized as an object, as a means to other ends, shows its connections within the 
collective and demands to be treated as an end in itself. We can make the example from 
fisheries. They have been considered for a long time as a mere reserve for fishing. In 2002 
the Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that 75% of the world’s ocean fisheries 
are overfished, beyond capacity or at the limit of their capacity for sustainable replenishing 
without pushing the species to extinction.288 Starting as a mere resource-object, the North 
Atlantic cod demanded to be treated as an end in itself, as a part of the collective, our 
common world; we just took it  for granted. While depleting, fisheries show not only the 
value and meaning they had in our human world, but  all the entanglements that make them 
a part of our common world in the network of relations within the ocean ecosystem and the 
human food habits.
Consequently, reopening the constitution of the collective in order to include 
nonhumans as citizens is something we can do as an act of civilization, or under the 
pressure of ecological crises. In both cases, it  entails its doing without the separation 
between facts and values because recognizing the intrinsic connections of a nonhuman in 
our world means offering it political representation and citizenship, a value to be carefully 
taken into consideration.
If ecological crises open a doubt about who is a means and who is an end, the Kantian 
obligation, not to treat human beings simply  as means but always also as ends cannot be 
limited to some categories of beings (in Kant’s case, to humans). Latour acknowledges that 
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Naess brings up the same formulation. Nevertheless, comments Latour, “Naess’s limitation 
to ‘living beings’ reflects the same error Kant made, even if what he takes into account is a 
little broader.”289  Latour’s attack is on the way Naess maintains naturalism, even if he 
wishes to dismiss it. From Latour’s point of view, Kant’s obligation is extended by  Naess 
to nonhumans as already (or still) unified as nature, transported en mass to invade human 
politics.
Latour and Naess also share a reference to nature’s primary and secondary qualities in 
order to rethink the spilt between facts and values:
Here I am politicizing Whitehead’s critique of the distinction between primary and 
secondary  qualities, as well as of the strangeness of the role given to the human mind: 
“The theory of psychic additions would treat the greenness [of a blade of grass] as a 
psychic addition furnished by  the perceiving mind, and would leave to nature merely 
the molecules and the radiant energy which influence the mind toward that 
perception.” [...] The same critique, based on Whitehead and James, of the division 
between primary and secondary attributes is also found in Naess 1988, but with a very 
different solution.290
Latour’s utilization differs from Naess’s in that, after the end of nature, the point is not 
to naturalize the secondary  qualities, by making nature “green and warm.” Once again, 
what is lacking in Naess’ account is the amount of political work that is necessary291 after 
we have realized that the House of nature and the House of society are not the only 
possible institutions of our common world. Moreover, Naess lacks an elaboration of the 
problem of the modern constitution, precisely of the a priori unification that happens 
without directly  interrogating the citizens, distributing from above properties and agency 
potentials.
107
289 Latour, Politics of Nature, 276n44.
290 Latour, Politics of Nature, 260 n56.
291 Cf. Latour’s opinion on Naess’ ecosophy: “Even if Arne Naess’s work goes a little deeper 
than deep ecology, he aims at ‘self- realization’, which confuses the issue, for we return finally to a 
solid anthropocentrism. He nevertheless addresses a question that I have left aside, that of the 
psychology of citizens linked by what he calls relational fields to the totality of the biosphere, 
thanks to ‘ecosophy.’ We shall see [...] how to grant ethics a completely different role and what 
political work is necessary before we can speak of ‘relational field’, ‘ecospheric belongings’, or 
even any sort of unification. Naess, in his pleasant gobbledy-gook, is a good representative of this 
philosophy of ecology that does feel the metaphysical limits of the division between nature and 
humanity, but that strives to ‘go beyond’ the ‘limits of Western philosophy’ instead of delving into 
the political origins of this division. If we are to combat this division, it is by adopting a different 
politics, not a different psychology.” Latour, Politics of Nature, 256-257 n29.
“Politicizing” the split between primary and secondary qualities means, then, that 
constitutional work regards not merely the problem of a common world, but that of a 
“good common world,” asking the question, in what kind of world do humans and 
nonhumans want to live together:
The modernist constitution in fact saw debates over ecology merely as a mixture to be 
purified, a mixture combining rationality and irrationality, nature and artifice, 
objectivity and subjectivity. The new constitution sees in these same crises disputes [...] 
a completely  different topic: every where, every day, people are fighting over the very 
question of the good common world in which everyone - human and nonhuman - wants 
to live. Nothing and no one must come in to simplify, shorten, limit, or reduce the scope 
of this debate in advance, by calmly asserting that the argument bears only on 
‘representations that humans make of the world’ and not on the very essence of the 
phenomena in question.292
Facts and values belong to the same political task. That is to say, there is not one unified 
Scientific protocol, exclusively accessing things as they are on one hand, and a plurality  of 
affective representations of them on the other. Sciences are reliable, local, historical 
practices of knowledge, which deliver the common world to us. By doing this, they do 
politics: they  interrogate nonhumans about what they  are, what they do, and therefore 
reopen the question about who should have citizenship.
4.2 -  A CONSTITUTION OF A COLLECTIVE OF HUMANS AND NONHUMANS
The composition of the common world and the composition of a “good common world” 
need to be reassembled into one and the same problem. In order to do this, Latour suggests 
a possible protocol to create an ecological constitution, that redistributes powers in a 
different way than the old bicameralism of nature and culture did.
The first step  is to disentangle the confusion in the power distribution that is included in 
the concepts of fact and value. Both facts and values are transversely crossed by  two 
contradictory powers: the “Power to take into account” and the “Power to Put in Order.”293
The Power to Take into Account is present in the concept of fact  because an 
interrogation of what are the facts opens the question about what is there. In the 
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experimentation of the sciences, facts present themselves as uncertain actors that present 
their candidacy for existence. In this power of facts resides the whole sense of research, 
and its freedom of exploration. The Power to Put in Order is also a power of the concept of 
fact because, at  some point, facts institutionalize actors. Facts need to be made in order to 
close the discussion about “what it is.” They  need to be accepted or denied based on 
evidence that agents have presented as candidates for existence, and then established as 
entities within a state of nature, as real. 
The same two contradictory  powers are exercised by  the concept of value. The Power to 
Take into Account is the power to open the discussion about what has value, the core of all 
ethical discussions. The concept of value is constantly brought up together with the 
warning that “some voices are missing from the roll call;”294 we are leaving someone out 
of our moral consideration.
In its contrary  movement, value also responds to the requirement of closing the 
discussion about what has value through the Power to Put in Order. With this movement, 
values establish who are those we have to live with. The concept of value includes the 
necessity to make life together compatible for those who have been institutionalized as 
citizens of the common world.
Therefore, Latour suggests that we represent the collective of humans and nonhumans 
as constituted by the two Houses of “Taking into Consideration” and “Putting in Order,” 
which are transversal to the two old facts/values (or nature/culture) Houses.295 
The House exercising the “Power to Take into Consideration” will ask the question: 
“How many are we?,” and by doing so, it will answer two requirements. 
The first requirement already pertained to the old notion of fact, and is the requirement 
of “Perplexity.” No one can simplify, in advance, the number of agents making up  reality. 
This is, for example, what social conventions, superstition and other obscure authorities 
were accused of doing by the Enlightenment movement. 
The second requirement pertained to the old concept of value: the requirement of 
“Consultation.” Consultation reinforces the opening work of Perplexity about the 
composition of the common world, by making sure that “reliable witnesses,” 
spokespersons, for example scientists who give voice to nonhumans, are consulted. 
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Therefore, no other authority short of legitimacy can cut, in advance, the number of agents 
who participate in this examination of the reopening of the collective, for example, by 
consulting only humans’ preferences reductively  considered as the only beings who have 
the power of speech.
The second House exercises the “Power to Put  in Order,” and will ask the question: 
“Can we live together?”
Here again, the first requirement that the answer to this question needs to match is an 
old  pertinence of the concept of value: “Hierarchization.” Instead of the old order disposed 
of by  the concept of nature, the order here establishes all the states of the world that need 
to be considered as a premise for further discussion. We can think of the example of human 
rights. In the new constitution their establishment becomes public, and openly  discussed 
and supported by evidence that makes the case, instead of hiding in some essence that 
relies on the authority of nature.
The second requirement met by the House of “Putting in Order” is an old task of the 
concept of fact: “Institution.” It answers the necessity of a closure of the discussion that 
determines that facts are real. 
What really changes in comparison to the modern constitution is the idea that this 
constitution is always re-discussible, and able to be re-opened. On the contrary, the modern 
constitution considered only the side of society as uncertain, with its multitude of 
preferences, opinions, interests and illusions, and the plurality  of representations that 
humans had of the one and same world. The House of nature was established once and for 
all out there. 
A third power is, instead, added by  Latour: the “Power to Follow Up,” a power of 
periodical, but permanent control of the protocol of the common world representation, 
which coincides with the art of governing.296
The reopening of the collective needs to happen, remarkably, when an ecological crisis 
emerges. Ecological crises are, then, constitutional crises of objectivity. In light of this 
reflection, Latour reformulates the task of environmental ethics.
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4.2.1 - The Role of Morality
A crucial role of control of the way the common world is represented is played, indeed, 
by morality: one of the professional competences that participate in the discussion about a 
good common world, together with the other professional bodies of scientists, politicians, 
economists, etc.
In the nature/society split, morality used to be praised as the research of the universal or 
formal foundations of ethics, or as the discipline that knows “what must be done and not 
done.”297 
In the ecological constitution, instead, moralists are the ones who “know that everything 
that will be done well will necessarily be done badly, and as a result will have to be done 
over again right away.”298  The closure and stabilization of the collective are always 
dangerous and artificial in the eyes of morality, no matter how progressive and provisional. 
Morality’s role lies in calling for suspension and inclusion, a reexamination of the 
excluded from the common world, of the “new externality.” 
External reality in the modern constitution was the world, nature as other than human. 
With the inclusion of nonhumans in the political representation of our common world, 
external reality becomes what remains excluded, both human and nonhuman. Latour brings 
the example of the eight thousand people who get killed every year from car accidents in 
France. These dead are outcasts, devoid of a full citizenship, considering that in their name 
no intervention is made to modify  our mobility  habits, our infrastructures or the 
automobile industrial policies.299  The car accident victims belong to the problem of the 
representation of a good common world just as much as ocean acidification.
The other, then, is not the nonhuman, but the outcast from the collective. Our beloved 
houses, for example, are nonhumans but are obviously and gladly included in our world, as 
are our pets, tomatoes and recreative landscapes. The other is not nature as opposed to the 
human. The other simply does not have full citizenship in our common world and makes 
herself heard in an ecological crisis that can be very dangerous for our present  world: “the 
exterior is not a nature, but an otherness capable of doing us harm.”300 
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For this reason, being moral, in principle, means including in our consideration all there 
is both morally  and ontologically: “Thanks to morality, outcasts will be able to make 
themselves heard once again. Keeping this virtue for humans alone will soon be seen as the 
most immoral of vices.”301
The ethics of suspension are, therefore, the opposite of the ethics of foundation. We can 
reformulate the concept of value with reference to Latour’s parliament of things. The 
Heideggerean “thing,” that gathers a preoccupied assembly, negotiates and brings evidence 
both around what the thing “is” and around its value (using the old term). The thing is 
discussed for its relational weight in our common world, the degree of its connections with 
the rest of us and the emergency with which we have to handle it.
In the end of nature, something like Naess’ formulation of intrinsic value cannot but be 
understood as the continuous reopening of the ontological question, as suggested by Latour 
with the new role of morality. The uncertainty about the nature of humans and nonhumans 
prevents them from being attributed with the roles of means or ends in advance. This kind 
of continuous exercise of doubt, of epoché, would be the moral thing to do.
Both in Latour and Naess the value of nonhumans does not come from altruistic care 
but from an actual reformulation of the ontological question. Regardless, in light of 
Latour’s political ecology, Naess fails to follow up all the way through his non-dualistic 
attempt. This becomes clear if we consider how the normative system of “Ecosophy T” 
combines, juxtaposing, prescriptive moral norms (“N!”), and descriptive hypotheses about 
the state of the world (“H”).302 
Latour, on the contrary, rejects for political ecology both the label of normative and 
descriptive, since this distinction depends on that of facts and values, which are also 
rejected. Moreover, Latour warns us that, “there is in ‘mere description’ an overly  powerful 
form of normativity: what is defines the common world and thus all that must be - the rest 
having no existence other than the nonessential one of secondary qualities.”303  Precisely 
because of the normative weight of ontology, the ontological question needs to be 
constantly reopened.
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4.2.2 - Cultural Policies
The articulation of the representation of the collective of humans and nonhumans is not 
a task of politicians who make decisions based on the information coming from a restricted 
number of Scientific bureaucrats. The answer to the ecological crisis and the ambition of 
political ecology to give representation to nonhumans can be achieved by  bringing the 
sciences into democracy.304 This means two important things.
Firstly, the sciences become a responsibility  of the citizens of the collective. It is less 
about basing political decisions on indisputable facts, and more about taking the 
responsibility to support  more research, more experimentation, in the concrete, practical 
interest of every citizen, human and nonhuman, that needs to be fairly represented.
Secondly, after the end of nature, the distinction between hard sciences and human 
sciences becomes pointless. All the different sciences are scholarships.305 That is to say, 
they  are sciences not on the basis of the hardness of their objects, but based on the capacity 
to reopen black boxes and retrace all the paths that bring back their objects from essences 
to performances. “Humanities” and “science” stand on the same side. Their split was due 
to the modern split, where the former dealt with mobile, uncertain subjectivities and the 
latter represents hard objectivity. In Latour’s view, instead, they all offer a phonation of 
common worlds, because worlds are made up symmetrically of humans and nonhumans. 
They  deliver variable ontologies. The geometry of these ontologies includes networks of 
equal mediators: texts, discourses, practices, habits, agents, things, among others.
Also, in the ecological reopening of the common world, the role of the sciences (both 
ecology and philosophy!) is that of experimenting, taking risks, and assembling.306 
Experimentation and research in response to the ecological crisis may sound unusual, 
considering that  a big part  of environmentalism insists on withdrawing from interference, 
on acting less on the side of humans.
According to Latour, however, the precautionary principle is completely misinterpreted. 
Ignorance about our ecological conditions and the ecological consequences of our actions, 
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which is also a warning invoked by Naess,307 does not mean that we should abstain from 
acting. This interpretation of the precautionary principle holds if we rely on a decision 
model in which “action follows knowledge without adding much to it, except in its final 
application and realization.”308 A science-based rational action is not realistic in the case of 
phenomena such as climate change, which show the constitutive uncertainty  of the 
“experts” agreement, since every  action or non-action we undertake everyday changes the 
base line. Moreover, with the ecological reopening of the collective, the work of scientists 
and of politicians is not distinct anymore because the decision making process is not 
merely human, but participated in by nonhumans in their scientific phonation.
Re-assembling the collective is a slow task. We need to retrace our steps, instead of 
struggling to overcome an impossible human/nature split. Latour appeals to the end of war 
between humans and nature, and against radical epistemological breaks or revolutions. 
Seeing things from a network, retracing their emergence as events, makes them more 
ordinary, even banal, in their locality. Even the endeavors of the modern remain important 
and clear achievements, although they lose their fatal, epochal, radical destiny.309
Political ecology means, in Latour’s understanding, giving an institutional form to what 
already exists in everyday practice, a common world of humans and nonhumans.
4.3 - THE  “KING-SELF”
Latour’s political ecology is focused on finding a protocol to deal with ecological issues 
and their contradictory, but as merited and ambitious demands. Humans are part  of nature; 
humans are the other to nature. Humans and their activity  belong to the biosphere; humans 
should leave nature alone. In Latour’s proposal, the common world of humans and 
nonhumans is constituted by a network of constitutive relations and mini-transcendences. 
We can experiment in this direction as an alternative to the Great Division between humans 
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and nature. The common world is constituted by  humans and nonhumans together. This 
does not mean that cats will now be sent to vote, but that nonhumans are asked by the 
sciences to show their existence, to let us know what they  do and what they  are. The 
nonhumans, who take part in our common world as equal citizens, participate in the public 
question about what kind of world we want to live in. 
The change in constitution is made by letting go of the subject-object couple. Instead of 
overcoming it, it is retraced to its origins and political use, and deemed simply  as one of 
the products of the moderns. In place of the couple, according to Latour, we may think of: 
actors, propositions,310  and associations of humans and nonhumans. The double bind 
paradox between being connected to the world and being other to it  is loosened and 
scattered in the wider enigma of the cosmos.
Nevertheless, we cannot be completely sure that the paradox simply vanishes. The grip 
of subjectivity onto the world posing its object in front of herself, the longing of the subject 
towards the unity of her “I” are matters hard to weaken.311 At the end of the Politics of 
Nature, Latour makes a fleeting reminder of how the old idea of republic (res publica) in 
the modern constitution was ultimately built  on “the most arbitrary of smallest 
denominators: the king-self.”312  The materialization of the subject into its relational 
conditions, translations and agencies, as well as the anthropological symmetry between 
“Us” and “Them” (westerners and other cultures, humans and nonhumans), are powerful 
political and collective frameworks that can replace the subjective center. In order to 
accomplish their tasks, we need to find a way to loosen the grip of the subject that 
perceives itself as “I, mine, my self”313 against the rest of the world.
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Buddhism and exposes the central task of showing how the empirical self, personal identity as 
psychophysical unity, is nonexistent, anattā.
This is a central question in Naess, framed in terms of wisdom and an expanded 
“ecological self.” In Naess, the ecological crisis opens a space for a spiritual question, 
rethinking the situatedness of the subject in the world and its belonging to a wider reality. 
Despite the very  different (opposing for Latour) solutions to the problem of relationism 
and representation Naess and Latour offer, the knot of subjectivity  remains the hardest to 
unfasten, even though this unfastening appears to be, within this perspective, a 
fundamental condition for dealing with ecological issues.
It is not by chance, therefore, that Naess turns, among his various sources, to Buddhist 
elements. Even though Buddhisms do not have the word “subject,” most of the Buddhist 
enlightenment quests revolve around the knot of not-self, and make the issue of egocentric 
tendencies of subjectivity  something similar to an ancient problem that might go beyond its 
modern constitution in proper “subject” terms. We will see through an interpretation of 
Nāgārjuna’s thinking in which sense, and to what extent, this is meaningful for a dialogue 
with current environmentalism.
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EQUIVOCATIONS OF NATURE AND BUDDHISM
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CHAPTER 5 - BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTALISM AND EMPTINESS
5.1 - BUDDHISM IN NAESS’ ECOSOPHY
Buddhism is a recurring reference in Naess’ environmental writing as well as a 
philosophical-religious world to which he looks up to through his idea of deep ecology.314
There are two sites in which Naess instills a dialogue between relevant topics in 
ecosophy  and Buddhist teachings, namely  the articles “Gestalt  Thinking and 
Buddhism” (1985) and “Through Spinoza to Mahāyāna Buddhism or Through Mahāyāna 
Buddhism to Spinoza?”(1977).315 
In particular, “Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism” makes mixed references to a variety of 
Buddhist schools: both Theravāda and Mahāyāna; the Majjhima Nikāya and the 
Dhammapada in the Pali Canon; the Visuddhimagga by Buddhaghosa; the “The Diamond 
Sutra” of the Prajñāpāramitā; Dōgen; and the haiku poetry of Bashō. Dean Curtin mainly 
recognizes references to Nāgārjuna and Dōgen.316 The Buddhist references are brought up 
as a suggestion of a parallelism or dialogue with central ecosophical ideas such as 
overcoming the subject/object dualism, identification with all life, the insubstantial and 
impermanent self, intrinsic value, and egalitarianism.
“Through Spinoza to Mahāyāna Buddhism or Through Mahāyāna Buddhism to 
Spinoza?” discusses instead the concept of liberation in reference to the idea of vita activa.
Moreover, all over Naess’ environmental, philosophic production are scattered 
references to a Sanskrit “Buddhist formula,” “sarvaṃ dharmaṃ niḥsvabhāvaṃ,” that 
119
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for the 21st Century, ed. George Sessions (Boston and London: Shambala, 1995), 75.
315 Arne Naess, “Gestalt Thinking and Buddhism,” in The Ecology of Wisdom: Writings by Arne 
Naess ed. Bill Devall and Alan Drengson (Berkeley: Counterpoint, 2008) 195-203. Arne Naess, 
“Through Spinoza to Mahāyāna Buddhism or Through Mahāyāna Buddhism to Spinoza?,” in 
Spinoza's Philosophy of Man. Proceedings of the Scandinavian Spinoza Symposium 1977, ed. Jon 
Wetlesen (Oslo: Oslo University Press, 1978), 136-158.
316 Deane Curtin, “A State of Mind Like Water: Ecosophy T and the Buddhist Traditions,” 
Inquiry. Special Edition. Arne Naess’s Environmental Thought 39, no. 2 (1996): 239-255.
Naess renders with the idea that “every  element” has no separate and self-subsistent self.317 
This is to be read as a reference to Nāgārjuna’s main idea of emptiness.318
From a philosophical point of view, the reference to Nāgārjuna and emptiness is the 
most relevant because it  revolves around the central problems Naess raises about the 
impossibility  of a rift between self and nature, which is consequently replaced by the idea 
of intrinsic relatedness. This usage can be read in excerpts such as the following, “If 
interrelated phenomena lack substance, essence, or self-existence, as suggested by the 
Buddhist formula sarvam dharmam nihsvabhavam, there is no ultimate ontological gap 
between self and not-self, humanity and nature.”319
The depth of Naess’ references to Buddhism is shallow at best. Padmasiri de Silva even 
criticizes Naess for making use of different works for the same purpose. He references 
both the Buddhist anātman and the Hindu ātman, one of the main oppositions in Indian 
philosophy.320
Naess, himself, considers Buddhism as an area of interest and possible parallelism, but 
not one that is necessary for his ecosophy:
“relata [...] are not things or entities in themselves, in spite of the existence of words 
and phrases suggesting the possibility  of isolating each of them. The relations between 
relata are internal. There is a similarity between this view and those expressed by the 
Buddhist formula sarvam dharmama nihsvabhavam. Every element is without ‘self-
existence.’ But the views I defend need no support from Buddhist  philosophy. Western 
tradition suffices.”321
Nevertheless, Naess’ reference to emptiness is worth exploring because, despite its 
peripheral weight in Naess’ production, it allows us to see even more clearly  the problems 
with Naess’ relationism as exposed by the parallel with Latour’s political ecology. In 
particular, an analysis of the meaning of emptiness shows that the structure of 
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Ontology,” The Trumpeter 21, no. 1 (2005), 121; Arne Naess, “Heidegger, Postmodern Theory and 
Deep Ecology,” The Trumpeter 14, no. 4 (1997): 4, http://trumpeter.athabascau.ca/index.php/
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318 As also Colette Sciberras does. Colette Sciberras, Buddhist Philosophy and the Ideals of 
Environmentalism (PhD diss., Durham University, 2010), 138. http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/535/.
319 Naess, “Heidegger, Postmodern Theory,” 4.
320 Padmasiri De Silva, Environmental Philosophy and Ethics in Buddhism (London: 
Macmillian Press LTD, 1998).
321 A. Naess, “Concrete Contents,” 419.
representation, and the reliance on the “natural” character of nature are the obstacles that 
impede ecological relationism from fully understanding itself and from providing an 
insightful alternative to the humanity/nature divide.
5.2 - EQUIVOCATIONS OF NATURE IN “ECOBUDDHISM”
There has been a considerable amount of interest in the association between various 
forms of Buddhism and various concepts of environmentalism coming both from Buddhist 
scholars, engaged Buddhists,322 and Western philosophers.323 A few years ago, Ian Harris 
and Donald Swearer both offered a categorization of the possible approaches that have 
become established references.324 A spectrum of proposals have been pinpointed. This runs 
from an enthusiast endorsement of an environmental value of Buddhist thinking (e.g. 
Martine Batchelor);325  to writers who consider Buddhism to have intrinsically 
environmentalist teachings, and resort to original sources in order to single them out (e.g. 
Johanna Macy);326  to skeptical scholars who accept the possibility of constructing an 
environmental ethics based on Buddhist teachings, although classical Buddhism does not 
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322 Engaged Buddhism is a term created by the Vietnamese Buddhist monk Thich Nhat Hanh. It 
refers to activist social movements that emerged during the last century applying traditional 
Buddhist principles to issues of war and peace, economics, the environment, and human rights. The 
most famous “engaged Buddhist” can be considered H.H. the Dalai Lama. Cf. Sallie B. King, 
Socially Engaged Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2009).
323 Some fundamental references include collections such as: Allan Hunt Badiner, Dharma 
Gaia: A Harvest of Essays in Buddhism and Ecology (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1990); Tucker and 
Williams, Buddhism and Ecology.
324 Ian Harris, “Getting to Grips with Buddhist Environmentalism: A Provisional Typology,” 
Journal of Buddhist Ethics 2 (1995): 173-190; Donald K. Swearer, “An Assessment of Buddhist 
Eco-Philosophy,” The Harvard Theological Review 99, no. 2 (2006): 123-137. Pragati Sahni, 
Environmental Ethics in Buddhism. A Virtues Approach, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 8-31.
325 Martine Batchelor and Kerry Brown, Ecologia buddhista, trans. L. Dal Lago (Vicenza: Neri 
Pozza, 2000).
326 Joanna Macy, Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory: The Dharma of 
Natural Systems (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); Joanna Macy, “The Greening 
of the Self,” in Dharma Gaia, ed. Badiner, 39-52.
clearly  endorse any respect for nature (e.g. Lambert Schmithausen);327  to, finally, critical 
scholars who consider the association between Buddhist teachings and environmental 
tenets as fundamentally based on a series misunderstandings (e.g. Ian Harris).328  
We can notice a tendency where Buddhist academic scholars are usually  more critical 
about the possibility of simply making parallelisms between ecology  and Buddhism. One 
main criticism regards the lack of a rigorous hermeneutics that can maintain the meaning 
of the distance (geographical, cultural, and historical) between the discourses in 
dialogue.329 
This hermeneutical awareness includes the obvious observation that classical Buddhism 
has no anachronistic concern, whatsoever, for ecological issues. For example, in his 
extensive work on environmental attitudes in Early  Buddhist primary sources, Lambert 
Schmithausen points out that Buddhisms show antithetical attitudes to nature, summarized 
in a “pro-civilization strand” and a “hermit strand.”330 Moreover, from the point of view of 
the Buddhist analysis of existence nature is practically  irrelevant, if not part of the issue, 
being ultimately unsatisfactory and impermanent.331 
Another severe element of difficulty is highlighted by Harris when he points out that 
Buddhism has no idea of nature.  He suggests a list of possible commonly  mentioned Indic 
terms that may  constitute an equivalence to the western nature: saṃsāra, prakṛti, 
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331 Ibid.
svabhāva, pratītyasamutpāda, dharmadhātu, dharmatā, dhammajāti.332 He also underlines 
that the question to which extent these richly  nuanced terms can refer to nature “has [not] 
even begun to be answered.”333 According to Harris, the West has developed its concept of 
nature, first, through the distinction between natural and supernatural, and later on, after 
the scientific worldview denied the supernatural pole, through a re-appropriation of pre-
scientific wholeness similar to a Spinozist natura naturans. In order to articulate the 
impossibility  of bringing any of those Indic renderings of nature into the western pattern, 
Harris develops the example of saṃsāra, which, denoting “in its usual sense the totality  of 
sentient beings [sattvaloka] caught in the round of life after life,”334  includes, from the 
point of view of the West, beings that can fall under the concept of nature, such as animals 
and beings below sentience, but also “supernatural” elements: hell beings, gods, as well as 
other regions of reality such as the “triple-decker” classic Buddhist view of the universe.335 
Some scholars find it safer and more consistent to “limit” themselves to a virtue 
environmental ethics approach which highlights, for example, the meaning of non-harm 
[ahiṃsā] or compassion [karuṇā] for the emancipation of individuals in a, possibly, 
environmental sense, although Buddhist virtues do not have, once again, nature in the 
range of their interest.336
The problem with the criticism of the possibility of a dialogue between Buddhism and 
environmentalism is that its understanding of nature rests on the same kind of naturalism 
we have discussed in the previous chapters of this work. Nature having the character of an 
external reality to the proper human dimension causes equivocations and ambiguities not 
only to any kind of Buddhist environmentalism, but also to western environmentalism. 
This is what Prof. Schmithausen, for example, has in mind when working on Buddhist 
attitudes towards nature: the nature that is today  destructed, exploited or subjugated in the 
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degree of simplification, possible translations are: saṃsāra = existential cycle of death-birth; 
prakṛti = fundamental causal force; svabhāva = intrinsic nature, identity; pratītyasamutpāda = 
arising from conditions; dharmadhātu = essence of the dharmas, dharmatā = reality, dhammajāti = 
things perceived by senses.
333 Ibid.
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335 Ibid.
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sense of individual and ecosystemic natural entities.337  In another work, Schmithausen 
refers precisely to Krebs’ definition of nature we discussed earlier.338
As Latour points out, “nature” is only  one way of framing the world, that distinguishes 
it from what is considered human (mind, consciousness, opinions, culture, civilization, 
men, etc). It is precisely this framework, according to the analysis we have unfolded so far, 
that creates difficulties in the sacrosanct and ambitious objectives of most environmental 
movements: the possibility of a framework of a common world of humans and nonhumans. 
As Latour writes, “non-western cultures have never been interested in nature; they have 
never adopted it as a category, they have never found a use for it.”339  Quoting François 
Jullien’s works on the Chinese world, Latour highlights how western nature is the peculiar 
result of a historical dramatization of nature as externality, and of the battle between 
human freedom and natural necessity.340
The fact that Buddhism does not have an equivalent concept of nature, therefore, does 
not have to be regarded as an obstacle to environmental meaningful discourses. The West 
itself has shifting concepts of nature, and should even consider eliminating it altogether, if 
we listen to Latour’s idea of political ecology. Rather, this difficulty is proof that the 
human/nature axis is not the only way of looking at the world. 
The problem, therefore, does not lie in the excellent  work of scholars in unfolding 
complications in “ecobuddhism,” nor in the respect they show for the texts, sources, and 
context, avoiding easy  mystifications within difficult  intercultural discourses: a guarantee 
that only their scholarship can grant us. On the contrary, the problem lies in basing the 
possibility of a meaningful environmental dialogue with Buddhism onto the (im)possibility 
of the correspondence between Buddhist categories and Western naturalism.
In the association that follows in this work, between Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness 
and the previous work on Naess and Latour, there is no attempt to import a “Buddhist idea 
of nature” or worldview that could replace the western one, not even if “relative” and 
“insubstantial.”
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338 See Chapter 3 of this work. See Schmithausen, “Buddhism and the Ethics of Nature,” 26.
339 Latour, Politics of Nature, 43.
340 Ibid., 265.
The aim is not to offer a plain relational ontology, a representation of nature through an 
ontology  of not-self. Naess risks proposing something like this. The same risk is in Macy’s 
utilization of the doctrine of “dependent origination” [pratītyasamutpāda] as a description 
of ecological open self-regulatory systems.341
We will see the kind of movement, and the way of being in the world that  “the 
emptiness of all beings” can offer through the act of deconstructing any “nature”, any 
independent thing, or essence of anything in existence.
5.3 - NAESS, LATOUR, NĀGĀRJUNA
The parallel between Naess, Latour and Nāgārjuna is motivated by the following 
hypotheses:
• Naess’ references to emptiness are mistaken, inasmuch as they  essentially  put 
forth an ecological vision of interrelation and insubstantiality of selves, while 
Nāgārjuna’s premise is the inconsistency of any vision or worldview precisely as 
vision [dṛṣṭi].
• Relationism in ecological thinking entails a more sophisticated operation than 
simply  a paradigm shift to a relational worldview. One viable way  of 
understanding this problem is through Latour’s reworking of representation and 
the idea that the “nature” character of nature is itself an obstacle and a source of 
insurmountable ambiguity  for environmentalism, inasmuch as representation is 
the structure that maintains the subject/object dichotomy in which the two poles 
posit each other.
• The misunderstanding Naess demonstrates in relation to emptiness is the result of 
the same difficulty  Naess has with representation. Naess poses the problem of the 
subject/object dichotomy, without acknowledging that his own solution is trapped 
in the same problem he denounces.
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Sponberg, “Green Buddhism and the Hierarchy of Compassion.”
• Looking in depth to the meaning of emptiness (in this case mainly through Jay 
Garfield’s interpretation) can help in understanding the import and limits of 
Naess’ relationism for environmentalism.
• The problem of emptiness and the problem of representation can dialogue with 
each other. Emptiness opens a meaningful space for dialogue with ecology, even 
though not for the reasons it is usually brought up (ultimately, as a worldview). 
Emptiness can spark thinking about the kind of exercise required in order to 
release the grip of the subject  onto its external object, as in the structure of 
representation. This movement can dialogue with the idea of “the end of nature,” 
the central point in Latour’s political ecology.
5.4 - THE INTERCULTURAL OPERATION
The distance between Nāgārjuna on the one side, and Naess and Latour on the other is 
nothing less than immense. The operation of bringing them together is not comparative. 
Just like in Jullien’s accusation, comparison allows for the idea that the different texts and 
the different cultures ultimately speak on the same universal object, as multiple cultural 
representations of the same underlying positivity.342  This would be the first and most 
obvious instance of the multiculturalism/mononaturalism framework (many 
representations of the same thing out there) from which Latour’s critique of nature 
started.343
Nevertheless, there is here a risk to be taken. We can concretely apply the same 
principle of irreduction we saw in Chapter 4 where “Nothing is, by itself, either reducible 
or irreducible to anything else”344 to the relation between two (or more) texts. We cannot, 
and do not want to say that Latour says the same as Nāgārjuna, or that Naess’ problem of 
the subject/object dichotomy is the same as the emptiness of svabhāva [own-nature].
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Been Modern; Latour, Factish Gods; and Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. 
344 Latour, Pasteurization, 158.
In the relation between them, however, a displacement, a translation, and a betrayal 
happen between different actants, which are in this case the texts, their traditions, their 
scholarships, their problems, the network of their conditions of existence. What Latour 
wrote about actants can also be set into motion in this little concrete case: “Either the same 
is said and nothing is said, or something is said but it is something else. A choice must be 
made. It all depends on the distance that we are prepared to cover and the forces that we 
are prepared to coax as we try to make words that are infinitely distant equivalent.”345
In the hope that this work can create the space for thinking endowed with a geometry 
that would not be possible without this dialogue, we can only  make sure that the steps and 
elements that come into play are traceable. This cannot but be an asymmetrical geometry. 
We do not possess the skills of a scholar in Sanskrit, therefore, we rely  on a higher number 
of passages, which in this case are recognized interpretations and translations through 
which Nāgārjuna’s main work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, has already been brought into 
accessibility for western philosophy.
In the unfolding of the concept of emptiness and its possible contribution to the problem 
of ecology without a worldview of external nature, we will only make use of Nāgārjuna’s 
exposition, as it is found in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā text, mainly relying on Garfield’s 
interpretation. We will try to respect the internal movement of the text and its concepts 
within its hermeneutical context in the hope that a little space is opened where our original 
problem can be tested.
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CHAPTER 6 - NĀGĀRJUNA: MUNDANE REALITY AND EMPTINESS
6.1 - NĀGĀRJUNA AND THE MŪLAMADHYAMAKAKĀRIKĀ
The Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna is probably the most important and influential figure 
in Buddhist history, after the historical Buddha Siddhārta Gautama. He is known as the 
founder of the Mādhyamika school [Middle Way] of the Mahāyāna Buddhism [Great 
Vehicle]. The most credited biographical interpretation speaks of a Buddhist monk who 
lived at the end the 2nd Century A.D. in the Andhra region, in the central-east India.346
As if the dialogical space to be bridged between current environmentalist theory  and a 
2nd Century Buddhist monk were not enough, historians and scholars do not even agree on 
Nāgārjuna’s identity. Historical sources are mainly hagiographical and contain numerous 
mythical elements such as the practice of alchemic arts and etiological episodes through 
which the name and relevance of Nāgārjuna are explained in the Buddhist world.347 Not 
only are the details of Nāgārjuna’s life hard to reconstruct, but even an agreement about his 
historical figure is not unanimous. There are some who maintain that his figure is the result 
of two to four overlapping different Nāgārjunas, who lived in different times and regions 
of India. Despite the impossibility  of resolving these uncertainties, recent studies348 defend 
the plausibility of the majoritarian interpretation of the monk Nāgārjuna who really existed 
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348 Cf. Walser, Nāgārjuna in Context, 60.
at the end of the 2nd Century A.D. and who is the author of some central works in the 
Mahāyāna literature.349
Even if questions of authenticity about Nāgārjuna’s figure and works have an intrinsic 
importance, his philosophical relevance is related to the exceptional grade of his historical 
and philosophical influence. 1800 years of hermeneutical tradition in Asia, and an 
increasing interest  of the West in the last century, make him one of the most relevant 
Buddhist philosophers of the Great Vehicle. His philosophical school of the Middle Way 
[Mādhyamika] or of Emptiness [Śūnyatāvāda] formulates the foundational doctrine of the 
Mahāyāna Buddhist world and the teachings at the basis of Tibetan Buddhism. It has 
spread throughout China, Japan, and Corea,350  and has influenced other Indian 
philosophical strains such as Vedānta.351 Despite the when, where, and how of many of the 
historical  Nāgārjunas, this intersubjective Nāgārjuna has a philosophical weight difficult 
to ignore. He lives through interpretations and traditions, always necessary in order to 
grasp the meaning of his thinking. This is not merely a general hermeneutical point, but 
also a necessity in relation to the hermetic character of Nāgārjuna’s texts, including his 
fundamental Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.352
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is the fundamental śāstra353  of Middle Way  Buddhism 
and its theoretical heart. The title is translated as “Stanzas - or Verses - on the Middle 
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349 Among the several works ascribed to Nāgārjuna, it is common to present as authentic and 
sufficiently representative the six works the Tibetan tradition of Buddhism credited to him.
This thesis is defended by Jan Westerhoff, Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka: A Philosophical 
Introduction (Oxford - New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 5-6. Cf. Paul Williams, Buddhist 
Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition (London: Routledge, 2000), 141-142; 
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350 Williams, Il Buddhismo Mahāyāna, 90-93.
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on historical exegesis. C.W. Huntington Jr., “The Nature of the Mādhyamika Trick,” Journal of 
Indian Philosophy, 35 (2007): 103–111. The most careful translators and commentators usually do 
not exempt themselves from declaring on which traditions their study is based, both in reference to 
the ancient interpretative distinctions that emerged in the Indian and Tibetan debates (the two main 
lines of Mādhyamika philosophy: Svātrantika and Prāsaṅgika), and in terms of western 
philosophical provenance.
353 “treatise” (sanskrit).
Way.”354  As explained by Siderits,355 the text is conceived in complement to a master’s 
commentary. The verse form [kārikā] is meant to ease its memorization for the student, 
who later explored its philosophical content through the masters’ comments. These 
comments put in written form are the origin of the tradition of commentaries in which the 
Middle Way school unfolds its philosophy.356
The Mādhyamika, literally meaning “he who proclaims the middle way par 
excellence”357 presents itself as the philosophical, systematic exposition of the Mahāyāna 
strain. More precisely  it deals with the formulation of the emptiness of all things, which 
was already present in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. The middle way par excellence means 
that the Mādhyamika brings to its deeper consequences the middle way doctrine, which 
was already preached by the Buddha. The Buddha’s middle way [madhyamā pratipad] is 
the way  of liberation from sorrow. It has both theoretical and ethical significance of 
withdrawal from extreme positions. The ethical dimension focuses on aversion from 
mortifying the body and from exceeding in indulgent behavior, while the theoretical 
focuses on a retreat from the metaphysical extremes of both substantialism and nihilism.
The strategic objective of early Buddhism is the dismantling of the sense of “I” and its 
objects, which build up the necessity  and illusion of a personal identity. With the 
Mahāyāna, the accent shifts onto the lack of self, or intrinsic nature of all phenomena in 
existence. As Garfield summarizes, the central theme of most Buddhist traditions, in 
general, revolves around the existential problem of suffering, and the egocentric tendencies 
it generates, which in turn perpetuate it. These are grounded in a fundamental confusion 
about reality, because we take what is interdependent, impermanent and essenceless (both 
on the subject and on the object sides) to be independent, enduring and substantial. This 
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354 Williams, Buddhist Thought, 141; Magno, Nāgārjuna, 48.
355 In the most recent translation of the MMK available in a European language: Mark Siderits 
and Shoryu Katsura, Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Boston: Wisdom 
Publications, 2013).
356 Murti, La filosofia centrale, 55-89. Williams, Il Buddhismo Mahāyāna. Seyfort D. Ruegg, 
The Literature of the Mādhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 
1981).
357 Magno, Nāgārjuna, 68. Both the term Mādhyamika and the title Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
are not self-definitions by Nāgārjuna, but are to be found in Candrakīrti (VI-VII sec. d.C.). Ibid.
attitude, as urged in Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra358  is considered an innate cognitive 
instinct. The extirpation of this “ignorance” requires both philosophical reflection and the 
cultivation of a moral sensitivity  that loosens the attachment and aversion gestures 
implicated in the instinctual metaphysical error.359  Reflective thought has to become 
“experiential knowledge,” a spontaneous cognitive set, a way of being in the world.
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is one of the highest and sophisticated interpretations of 
Buddhist phenomenology, and of the famous “silence of the Buddha” in front of 
metaphysical definitive affirmations.360
The continuity  of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā with the original word of Buddha and its 
critical belonging to the cultural and religious Buddhist framework361 is reclaimed in the 
text on an apparently curious road: a reductio ad absurdum to a logical contradiction of all 
the Buddhist doctrines from within a Buddhist framework.
Nāgārjuna’s critical target is the Ābhidharmika scholastic: the phase in Buddhist 
reflection that began after the death of Gautama Buddha (486 B.C.), in which different 
sects soon differentiated within the Buddhist community  and systematized the Buddhist 
doctrinal identity.362 Abhidharma [metaphysics or ulterior doctrine] aims to give a rational 
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358 Maybe the most important text about ethics for Mahāyāna Buddhism. Jay Garfileld, “What Is 
It Like to Be a Bodhisattva? Moral Phenomenology in Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra,” Manuscript. 
http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/documents/WhatisitLiketobeaBodhisattvaforJIABS.pdf
359 Ibid.
360 Murti, La filosofia centrale.
361 See Williams, Buddhist Thought, 140: “Just as Mahāyāna Buddhism as a whole can best be 
seen as a vision, an aspiration, within a Buddhism which therefore in itself is non-Mahāyāna, 
mainstream Buddhism, so I think Mahāyāna philosophy should be understood as a particular 
expression of and response to Buddhist philosophy as a whole. The name for Buddhist philosophy 
as a whole, it seems to me, is ‘Abhidharma’, in the sense that Abhidharma sets the agenda, the 
presuppositions and the framework for Buddhist philosophical thought.”
362 There are two Ābhidharmika canonical collections surviving today: the Theravāda 
Abhidhamma of the Pali Canon, and the Sarvāstivāda (Vaibhāṣika) Abhidharma, mainly in Chinese 
translations. Williams, Buddhist Thought, 87. Nāgārjuna’s opponent is established to be, in 
particular, the Sarvāstivāda school. See Murti, La filosofia centrale; Magno, Nāgārjuna, 55-67. The 
characters common to the Ābhidharmika schools are summarized by Siderits and Katsura, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 4-7: 1) There are two levels of reality or truth: a conventional and an 
ultimate one; 2) Only dharmas(elements) are ultimately real; 3) Dharmas are originated in 
dependence of causes and conditions; 4) Dharmas have intrinsic nature [svabhāva]; 5) Liberation 
from sorrow is achieved through knowledge of the ultimate reality of self and world.
and systematic sense to the ultimate truth underlying Buddha’s teaching, which originally 
is characterized by a rather pragmatic, pedagogical and soteriological accent.363
The relationship of Nāgārjuna’s text  with his tradition are the political and sociological 
dimensions that have been highlighted by Walser’s recent study. Walser’s hypothesis has 
the value of deflating the traditional Murti’s Hegelian reading of the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, which risks presenting the Mādhyamika as the Aufhebung of 
Buddha’s word in a linear progression of Buddhist exegesis history.364 Moreover, Walser 
demythologizes Nāgārjuna’s figure, as well as the theoretical purity of the reasoning in his 
text:365  a problem that should be taken into consideration in intercultural operations of 
comment. If we avoid falling into a completely sociological reductionism of the 
philosophical significance of the text, it is interesting recognizing to recognize the 
hermeneutical space of Mahāyāna’s transformations and practices intertwining new 
watchwords and teachings, most significantly of all with the expansion of the Buddhist 
community to lay dimensions (from which the term Great Vehicle comes).366
133
363 Cf. Huntington, “Mādhyamika Trick,” 112. See the metaphor of the raft, current in canonical 
texts, according to which the Dharma, the teaching, is a raft that needs to be abandoned on the river 
bank after it is crossed. See “Alagaddūpamasutta,” Majjhima Nikāya, 22 in La rivelazione del 
Buddha, ed. Raniero Gnoli (Milan: Mondadori, 2001), vol. 1, 239-240; “Mahātaṇhāsaṅkhayasutta,” 
Majjhima Nikāya, 38 in La rivelazione del Buddha, ed. Gnoli, vol. 1, 29; Suttanipāta, 1, in La 
rivelazione del Buddha, ed. Gnoli, vol. 1, 847. A post-canonic variation of this strongly pragmatic 
and transformative nature of Buddha’s messages, as opposed to truth formulations, is to be found in 
the Mahāyāna doctrine of the upāya kauśalya or “skill in means [for salvation].” Teachings are here 
conceived as stratagems that can be adapted to the audience in order to trigger a change. Damien 
Keown, Dictionary of Buddhism (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press 2003), 318; Michael 
Pye, Skilful Means. A Concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism (London: Duckworth, 1978).
364 See for example in reference to the examination of the silence of the Buddha: Murti, La 
filosofia centrale, 40-54.
365 Nāgārjuna’s monastic context, for example, was a mixed one from the a doctrinal point of 
view. Mahāyāna was still in the minority and the dialogue with the authority of the Buddhist 
tradition at the time was a premise for putting forth new ideas, and have the discontinuity of the 
Great Vehicle accepted. Walser puts it with an interesting metaphor: it is like saying that the monk 
needed to get published. Walser, Nāgārjuna in Context. Cf. Magno, Nāgārjuna.
366 From this expansion and opening of the Buddhist community come the terms Mahāyāna and 
its derogatory counterpart Hīnayāna [small vehicle] accorded to canonic Buddhism. See Williams, 
Il Buddhismo Mahāyāna. See distinctions between “canonic Buddhism,” Hīnayāna, Theravādin, 
Pali Buddhism and Early Buddhism in Magno, Nāgārjuna, 44.
6.2 - EMPTINESS AND ITS FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS IN THE 
MŪLAMADHYAMAKAKĀRIKĀ367
The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is a small treaty on the fundamental theme of emptiness 
[śūnyatā]. The central concept around which the whole text revolves is that everything is 
empty [śūnya] of its own nature [svabhāva].368  The philosophical and soteriological 
objective of the treaty is the attack on the ontological prejudice of the “in itself” of entities. 
The emptiness of every being means, in its first sense, that everything existent is 
conditioned and relative. This is the meaning of the pratītyasamutpāda [dependent 
origination], the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism together with that of not-self 
[anātman]. Everything arises from causes and conditions, has no substance and cannot be 
conceived as independent. 
The ontological prejudice of the essence of things hides at the bottom of every dṛṣṭi. 
Literally speaking, dṛṣṭi is vision,369  and its translation is delimited by  the concepts of 
opinion, point of view, perspective, worldview, theory, and philosophical system.370 
Every  conceptualization, then, brings with itself an irreconcilable contradiction. Both 
every  naive object present in perception and experience, and every philosophical 
speculation about the world reify something that is entirely relative and insubstantial.
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367 I will refer mainly to Jay L. Garfield’s translation and interpretation, comparing it within 
central points to the recent translation by Mark Siderits and the translation by Emanuela Magno, as 
well as to other interpretations. It is more of a philosophical than a philological choice because 
Garfield’s way of highlighting the paradoxical character of emptiness both on epistemological and 
ontological levels seems more pregnant than other readings for a dialogue with the kind of topics I 
have brought up in this work. Nevertheless, Garfield’s effort of making the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā accessible for philosophical dialogue does not sacrifice philological 
commitment and a precise hermeneutical contextualization within the Indo-Tibetan tradition of 
interpretation of Nāgārjuna, in which the scholar has been directly trained.  Jay L. Garfield, The 
Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); Siderits and Katsura, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; Magno, 
Nāgārjuna. For an account of translations and critical editions of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, see 
Appendix 5.
368 Thanks to Candrakīrti’s comment, svabhāva is translated as “intrinsic” or “own nature.” In 
Sanskrit, sva is equivalent to the English own, and bhāva comes from the root √bhū, to be, to 
become, to exist. Candrakīrti (VI-VII secolo d.C.) is maybe the most important commentator on the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, at least among the commentaries extant today. To Candrakīrti we owe the 
“original” Sanskrit text of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā within his commentary, the Prasannapadā.
369 From the Sanskrit root √dṛś, “to see.”
370 Cf. Rohana Seneviratne, “Seeing is Believing thence Knowing,” manuscript, University of 
Oxford, http://users.ox.ac.uk/~pemb3753/media/Seeing.is.Believing.pdf. The author, for example, 
highlights that the declension of √dṛś, “darśana,” means “philosophy” or “profound thinking” and 
is “heavily pregnant with both meanings ‘seeing’ and ‘knowing/perception’.” Ibid., 4.
Making sense of emptiness and seeing its deep implications means, therefore, 
circumscribing a paradox that has to do with a practical and ethical dimension of thinking 
in its gesture of grasping reality, and in direct connection with the possibility  of 
enlightenment [bodhi] and liberation from sorrow. 
In order to outline a possible understanding of emptiness and its implications, it is 
necessary  to refer to some fundamental elements of the emptiness discourse contained in 
the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā.
Emptiness is never defined in the text. It is merely associated with the operations of 
negation of all the possible positions that describe any  Buddhist philosophical element 
describing existence, the sphere of personal self, or the world. Every  chapter of the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā deconstructs a theory or a doctrine, and its defining value, using 
the critical method of prasaṅga, literally  “bringing to consequence,” or reductio ad 
absurdum. 
Every  possible predication of an object is negated by making use of two-valued logic. 
Differing with the Aristotelian logic, a foundational framework is rejected and any attempt 
to resort to an essentialist view leads to contradiction. This is testified by the possible 
predications of every entity, which are not two but four in the renowned “four-cornered 
negation” or tetralemma [catuṣkoṭi], according to which, either something: 
1) is
2)  is not
3) both is and is not
4) neither is, nor is not
Everyone of the 4 conceivable predications is negated through a reductio ad absurdum. 
The logical methodology of the text immediately creates a paradoxical atmosphere. Not 
only the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of tertium non datur are not 
reliable instruments for the knowledge of reality, but Nāgārjuna’s logic itself, which still 
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makes use of a two-valued logic in which contradictions are meaningful,371 creates its own 
short-circuits.372
The discourse, indeed, proceeds indirectly  evoking a continuous impurity: not pointing 
to an error in reasoning to be fixed, nor an irrational strategy, nor an agnostic epoché,373 
but the effect of a necessary movement of thought, a swinging between different logic 
plans that are invoked every time the discourse attempts to stick to one in order to describe 
“what something is.” Every possible predication of an existing object  is affirmed and 
immediately negated. Any act that tries to cut this referential swinging condemns our 
knowledge to convention, opinion, or worse, condemns our “I” to surrender in front of its 
desperate need of foundation, dwelling in sorrow.
The negation of all the four possible predications, by showing that each and any of them 
has an empty object, does not aim to discover a possible ulterior view or position. The 
operation of rational thinking, which cannot but disprove itself through its own power and 
making use of its own rational rules (which are, therefore, affirmed as valid), is one of the 
fundamental elements of Mādhyamaka. This fundamental element never recurs to posit 
emptiness as an ulterior vision or philosophical position.374 
This theme is not secondary, and marks one of the fundamental philosophical knots of 
the Middle Way school. In regard to this, it is necessary to mention that in the 
Vigrahavyāvartanī375  Nāgārjuna defends himself from the objection of his contemporary 
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371 There are not other truth value in use, other than the two true and false. See Magno, 
Nāgārjuna, 123-124. Cf. Jay L. Garfield and Graham Priest, “Nāgārjuna and the Limits of 
Thought,” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 1 (2003): 7-10.
372 This vision of logic that destroys itself is adversed by the formalist interpretation of 
Robinson who talks of a mere “Mādhyamaka trick.” Richard H. Robinson, “Did Nāgārjuna Really 
Refute All Philosophical Views?” Philosophy East and West 22, no. 3 (1972): 325-331. Magno, 
Nāgārjuna, 242.
373 On emptiness and ancient skepticism see Jay L. Garfield, “Epoché and Śūnyatā: Scepticism 
East and West,” Philosophy East and West 40, no. 3 (1990): 285-308.
374 At least in the strain of interpretation we are following. Indeed, around the question of 
whether the Mādhyamaka is a philosophy or merely a deconstructive act, the two main schools, 
Svātrantika and Prasaṅgika separate relatively soon. Garfield refers to the prasaṅgika line, that runs 
from Candrakīrti’s commentary to Āryadeva and Śāntideva up to Tibetan Buddhism today. See also 
Seyfort D. Ruegg, “Does the Mādhyamika Have a Thesis and Philosophical Position?” in Buddhist 
Logic and Epistemology, ed. B.K. Matilal and R.D. Evans (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1986), 233-236.
375 The other text attributed to Nāgārjuna without much disagreement. See Williams, Buddhist 
Thought, 142: “The Vigrahavyāvartanī; verses extant in Sanskrit together with an autocommentary
—a reply by Nāgārjuna to his critics.” The objections taken into consideration come from both 
Buddhist and non-Buddhist adversaries, such as the Vedic school Nyāya.
critics that accuse him of proposing emptiness as an absurd. In their understanding, in fact, 
the Mādhyamika statement par excellence, “all entities [bhāva] are empty  [śūnya] of self-
nature [svabhāva]” represents an absurd, inasmuch as it would be an empty statement if it 
were true, and therefore it could not affirm what it  affirms.376 To the accusation, Nāgārjuna 
replies that there is no absurd, because he simply  does not have a thesis [“I have no 
pratijñā”].377 
As Seyfort Ruegg explains, the refusal of a “philosophical thesis of emptiness” is based 
on three internal premises of the Middle Way.378 
1) On a logical, ontological, and epistemological level,379  the binary structure of 
conceptual thinking carries the original mark of contradiction. Every affirmation not  only 
raises a negation, but reveals to be in itself a negation, not standing, inasmuch as it 
predicates an empty  object.380 Neither a thesis, nor a counter-thesis holds in fact, even less 
does a thesis about emptiness.381
Understanding the emptiness of things as a theory  means reifying emptiness itself, 
completely missing the point and turning philosophy into a discourse that can only reify or 
annihilate, instead of understanding the relatedness of reali ty. In the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.11, Nāgārjuna admonishes not slipping into a dangerous 
misunderstanding of emptiness: 
By a misperception of emptiness
A person of little intelligence is destroyed.
Like a snake incorrectly seized
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376 “If [as you maintain] no-self-nature (svabhāva) exists for all entities (bhāva), then your 
[own] statement (vacana) [that all bhāvas are empty of self nature, which is therefore itself] also 
without self-nature, cannot controvert self-nature [which I maintain].” Ruegg, “Does the 
Mādhyamika Have a Thesis,” 229.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid., 230-231.
379 Ibid., 231.
380 See Ian W. Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” Philosophy East & West 45, no. 2 
(1995): 203-225.
381 Ruegg, “Does the Mādhyamika Have a Thesis,” 230-231.
Or like a spell incorrectly cast.382
Indeed, strictly  speaking, the emptiness of things cannot be either said, nor negated. As 
argued in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 22.11:
Empty should not be asserted.
“Nonempty” should not be asserted.
Neither both nor neither should be asserted.
They are only used nominally.383
As Siderits and Katsura comment, empty is itself empty.384 All conceivable predications 
of emptiness [catuṣkoṭi] need to be rejected. This is not absurd. Emptiness can be at best 
nominated with a practical, pedagogical value. The authors add a comment from 
Bhāvaviveka clarifying this topic:385 those who claim the absurdity of emptiness because 
affirming that all entities are empty  of self-nature equals making a positive statement on 
reality’s self-nature are mistaken. It is like someone who, wishing to prevent sound, utters 
“Quiet!”386 The two ways this comment can be interpreted highlight a fundamental tension 
in the predication of emptiness: on the one hand emptiness is emphasized in its negative 
task of rejecting false statements about reality; on the other hand, emptiness can emphasize 
the necessity  of making statements about reality, although these are only effective in 
different contexts inextricably correlated to their practical aims.387
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382 Garfield’s translation. Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 68. 
383 Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 280. Siderits’ translation is in tune: “It is empty” is not to 
be said, nor “It is non-empty,” / nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only / for 
the sake of instruction. Siderits and Katsura, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 247.
384 As it will be explored more in depth with the central “metaphysical” stanza, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 24.18.
385 Siderits and Katsura, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 248. 
386 Ibid., 247. Nevertheless, Siderits proposes a semantic interpretation of emptiness that is not 
the same as Garfield’s, where the latter points out both the epistemological and the ontological 
importance of it. The way Siderits puts it highlights that emptiness means the impossibility of 
predicating anything about the ultimate nature of reality. See: Jay L. Garfield, “Mādhyamaka is Not 
Nihilism,” in press. http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/docs/garfield_nihilism.pdf; Jay L. Garfield, 
“Dependent Arising and the Emptiness of Emptiness. Why Did Nagarjuna Start with Causation?” 
Philosophy East and West 44, no. 2 (1994): 219-250. Mark Siderits, “On the Soteriological 
Significance of Emptiness,” Contemporary Buddhism 4, no. 1 (2003): 9–24. See also Mark 
Siderits, “Nāgārjuna as anti-realist,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 16, no. 4 (1988): 311–325. See 
also Giuseppe Ferraro, “A Criticism of M. Siderits and J. L. Garfield’s ‘Semantic Interpretation’ of 
Nāgārjuna’s Theory of Two Truths,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 41 (2013): 195-219.
387 Siderits and Katsura, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 247-249.
The second premise of the Middle Way  that excludes the possibility of understanding 
the śūnyatā as a speculative element regards the ethical character of reasoning through 
emptiness:
2) The deconstructive reasoning of the prasaṅga [reductio ad absurdum] is the opposite of 
fighting a conflict between philosophical positions. The prasaṅga has an ethical purpose of 
reducing hostility by leading the rival to self recognize a contradiction in his vision, 
without attempting to convince him of someone else’s vision.388 
There is an ethical aspect in emptiness that  is related to loosening the affirmative, 
superimposing force of one’s vision. Finally,
3) At the level of ultimate reality  [paramārtha], only the “silent of the saints” is 
appropriate.389
As Ruegg explains, this is not to be understood as agnosticism or an antirational, 
antiphilosophical statement. “I have no thesis [pratijñā]” about emptiness is not to be 
understood as a prohibition to talk. The problem with predication in general is seen in the 
character of positing an entity (a svabhāva) typical of the assertive character of 
language.390
Nevertheless, this last point might be the most delicate, which concerns the emptiness of 
all existence. The point introduces a central aspect of the Middle Way “tool box,” which is 
necessary  to mention in order to understand the swinging between affirming and not 
affirming emptiness. This is the doctrine of two truths or realities [dve satye]. These are 
enunciated in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.8-10:
The Buddha’s teaching of the Dharma 
Is based on two truths:
A truth of worldly convention
And an ultimate truth.
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388 Ruegg, “Does the Mādhyamika Have a Thesis,” 231.
389 Ruegg is quoting Śāntideva’s Bodhicāryavatāra here.
390 Ibid., 234-236.
Those who do not understand
The distinction drawn between these two truths
Do not understand
The Buddha’s profound truth.
Without a foundation in the conventional truth,391
The significance of the ultimate truth cannot be taught.
Without understanding the significance of the ultimate
Liberation is not achieved.392
The ambiguity in the translation of dve satye, often indifferently rendered as “two 
truths” or “two realities” is not always openly  explained.393  This point does not merely 
raise a problem of translation entanglement, but rather the necessity  to reckon with the 
philosophical sense of emptiness itself between semantics and ontology.394
The relative truth of the mundane dimension, saṃvṛti satya o vyavahāra satya, 
describes the conditioned, dependent, and relative nature of all phenomena. The Buddhist 
doctrine par excellence describing the emergence of phenomena as events, according to 
relation and condition is the pratītyasamutpāda.
In a first sense, the conventional truth refers to phenomenal reality, existence itself, 
described in the Buddhist phenomenology by the simultaneous emergence of phenomena 
in their dependent  origination. The short formula recounted in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
recites, “When this exists so this will be.”395 Phenomena are not  separate events, which we 
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391 This verse (24.10a)  is translated by Gnoli as “without relying on the practical order of 
things.” Raniero Gnoli, La Rivelazione del Buddha (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), vol. 2, 634. My 
translation. Siderits stresses the meaning of vyavahāra as “customary ways of talking and thinking” 
or “commonsense beliefs.” Siderits and Katsura, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 274.
392 Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 296-299.
393 Cf. for example Williams, Il Buddhismo Mahāyāna, 85 where the scholar says Buddhism had 
established for a long time a distinction between two truths, “or better, two levels of reality.”
394 In fact, the two truths are not a new concept in Buddhism. The Abhidharma distinguished 
between naive, commonsense convictions useful in the everyday world, and statements of 
metaphysical import about the nature of reality. Siderits and Katsura, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 4. 
Therefore, the interpretation of emptiness clarifies that of the dve satye and its peculiarity in the 
Mādhyamaka context.
395 Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 4 (Verse 1.10). For the long exposition of the 
pratītyasamutpāda see Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 26: the examination of the twelve links that 
describe the conditionality and interdependence in the context of human existence. We remind here 
the twelve links: 1) ignorance; 2) volition; 3) consciousness; 4) nāmārūpa (the groups of 
psychophysical elements); 5) the six sense organs; 6) contact; 7) feeling; 8) desire; 9) 
appropriation; 10) being; 11) birth; 12) suffering (old age and death). See Siderits and Katsura, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 307-308.
can connect by  causal relations, but they emerge conditioned and conditioning, as 
conditions of existence to all other phenomena.396 According to Garfield, the conditionality 
of phenomena is central for the understanding of conventional reality, and therefore, for the 
understanding of what emptiness is. The centrality of the pratītyasamutpāda would be 
testified by the position of dependent arising in the beginning of the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, being “Conditions” the first of the Buddhist doctrines criticized 
by the text.397  In particular, the thesis of Nāgārjuna in the interpretation of the 
pratītyasamutpāda defends the idea of phenomena as events arising by  multiple conditions 
of existence, expressing regularities in nature, and refuses to reify the relata of the 
dependent arising by  offering a reading of the pratītyasamutpāda as causation. Therefore, 
the doctrine of the emptiness of causation and the pratītyasamutpāda paradoxically 
coincide.398
Moreover, following Candrakīrti’s comment, Garfield explains that  the saṃvṛti 
[conventional truth of the worldly dimension] is conditioned in three senses:
1) the everyday perception of things, or common sense
2) a transactional agreement or social construction
3) a dependency on a particular linguistic convention.
In this sense, according to the conventional truth, things appear as objects in the 
moment we grasp them, we perceive them, we name them, and the procedure is legitimate 
in the everyday world of conventions. 
Saṃvṛti is also presented as the concealing, deceiving character of phenomenal reality. 
Still following Candrakīrti, what the saṃvṛti occults is simply  and precisely the relativity 
and conditionality of phenomena, that is to say, their emptiness.399 
The ultimate truth [paramārtha satya], according to the prasaṅgika tradition conveyed 
by Garfield’s interpretation, is neither an extra-worldly  dimension, nor the noumenon 
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396 Cf. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 1.
397 Garfield, “Dependent Arising.”
398 As will be clearer in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 24.18, “the central verse” of the work. This 
concept is looked at more closely later on in this chapter. See Garfield, “Dependent Arising.”
399 Garfield and Priest, “Limits of Thought,” 5.
underlying phenomena,400  nor the ineffable that cannot be predicated. It is a change of 
look, the look of those who have realized the conditionality and interdependent relativity 
of all entities, freeing themselves both from a representative illusion where language 
matches its objects, and from the natural cognitive tendency to consider phenomena as 
independent external objects that can be possessed, desired, and observed. The difference 
between the dve satye is to be understood in this sense.401
With this said, it  is possible to disentangle the meaning of śūnyatā a little in the way it  is 
presented within the celebrated “central” stanza of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. The 
stanza is considered to contain the whole Mādhyamika system in a nutshell.402
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 24.18:
Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That being a dependent designation,
Is itself the middle way.403
The verses condense the quadruple equivalence of:
• dependent origination [pratītyasamutpāda]
• emptiness [śūnyatā]
• linguistic designation [prajñaptir upādāya]
• Middle Way [madhyamā].
First of all, emptiness is “dependent origination” [pratītyasamutpāda]. The idea that all 
existents are dependently arisen phenomena, empty of intrinsic nature, means that  the 
Middle Way refuses the idea of a substance. Everything is interdependent and radically 
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400 vs Murti’s classical Kantian interpretation, according to which the saṃvṛti is the phenomenal 
world, while the paramārtha is the absolute of the noumenon that can be accessed by the non-dual 
intuition of prajñā, cultivated insight or wisdom. See Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 297.
401 Garfield and Priest, “Limits of Thought,” 5-6.
402 Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 304.
403 Garfield’s translation. Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 304. The Sanskrit text recites: 
“yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe / sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva 
madhyamā //. Siderits and Katsura, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 277. Katsura and Siderits translate 
the central verse as: “Dependent origination we declare to be emptiness. It [emptiness] is a 
dependent concept; just that is the middle path.” Magno translates prajñaptir upādāya as “linguistic 
designation,” instead of dependent designation. Magno, Nāgārjuna, 323.
relative. The levels of this interdependence are the ones attributed to conditioned reality: 
language, social transaction, perception, and the phenomenology of the pratītyasamutpāda. 
Therefore, reality is conditioned, the world is empty of essences.
Emptiness is, moreover, a “dependent designation” [prajñaptir upādāya]. Emptiness 
itself is empty. It is not an object to be predicated. This is what Candrakīrti will later call 
“the emptiness of emptiness” [śūnyatāśūnyatā], in which emptiness, the key concept of 
Mādhyamaka, is deconstructed and, indeed, can never be offered as a thesis itself, a 
worldview. Emptiness cannot be objectified. It is not nihilistic essence, which would make 
it precisely an essence of nothingness, and, therefore, would reduce emptiness to the 
circularity of the two hypostatizations of substance and nothingness, which the Middle 
Way refutes. 
Finally, emptiness is equivalent to the “Middle Way,” that is to say, to the Buddha’s 
teaching as a middle path. In this sense, the character of emptiness is to avoid both 
reification and annihilation. The two extremes presuppose the idea that  to exist is to exist 
inherently, have a nature. Therefore, they  entail each other. If we reify the conventional 
world, emptiness cannot but  be nihilistic. If we reify emptiness, our phenomenal world 
cannot but be denied nihilistically.
Emptiness cannot be a representation of reality, but it  is the act of emptying every kind 
of representative thinking. This gesture of emptying is the soteriological exercise that 
constitutes the practice of the Middle Way philosophy. Emptying is not the annihilation of 
thought. It is the exercise of a look that does not see an object out there, nor a solid reality 
identifiable as its counterpart, ātman.404 Through emptiness reality emerges as a complex 
of conventions and relations, both because of its relativity in reference to multiple 
conditions, and because every  existent is inseparable from its linguistic and social 
designations. Not even naming things as empty frees them from their conditionality. 
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404 In canonic Buddhism identified with the formula “This is mine. This is my self. This is what 
I am” Cfr., Saṃyutta Nikāya, 22.59, trans. Thanissaro Bhikkhu, Access to Insight, 2013, http://
www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn22.059.than.html The concept of ātman, criticized by 
the Mādhyamaka, is presented by Murti in two extensions: a restricted concept meaning the soul, 
spirit, and the subject of experience; a wider concept as the substance in general. Both acceptations 
circumscribe the main category of permanence. There are two main vision of the ātman: the 
Brāhmanic vision of ātman as substance, criticized by Buddhism, and the Buddhist vision of ātman 
as conventional, as a construct [vikalpa] that falsely posits a unity for a modal flux of momentary 
states. The Mādhyamaka also criticizes the modal concept of the Abhidharma in 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 18.8. See Murti, La filosofia centrale, 163-167.
Emptiness does not unfold things completely  because it is not a speculative theory: a 
description. It is the exercise of thinking itself. 
He who relies on emptiness as a theory about reality is, indeed, said to be 
“incurable:”405
The victorious ones have said
That emptiness is the relinquishing of all views.
For Whomever emptiness is a view,
That one will accomplish nothing.406
The therapeutic metaphor brings the logical critique back to its nest: the liberation from 
the sorrow of existence, that is the practical significance of the Middle Way.
6.3 - INTERPRETATION AND PRACTICE OF ŚŪNYATĀ
Almost two thousand years of exegetical and philosophical history have attributed to the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā a multitude of interpretations of the śūnyatā, some even radically 
conflicting. We can read the unceasing interest  in the text, that makes it one of the highest 
Buddhist philosophical expressions, symptom of the presence of an irreducible 
philosophical knot in the concept of śūnyatā. The hermeneutical problem of emptiness 
brings its radical and fundamental philosophical knots to the surface. 
Western scholars have taken interest  in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, and have 
attempted to explain the concept of emptiness with reference to several different 
philosophical western schools. We can even dare to say within the crossing of these 
different interpretations of emptiness, problems about what philosophy is altogether have 
emerged.
The different accents and purposes of philosophy inform the disparate available 
interpretations of emptiness.
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405 By Magno and Siderits translations: Magno, Nāgārjuna, 291; Siderits and Katsura, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 145
406 Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 212. According to their semantic interpretation, instead, 
Siderits and Katsura translate sarvadṛṣṭīnāṃ as “all [metaphysical] views.” Siderits and Katsura, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 145.
As Ruegg mentions,407 each interpretation is sustained in some respect by text and has 
its own raison d’être. 
Siderits analytic approach divides the possible readings of emptiness into two groups: a 
semantic and a metaphysical approach (the latter being both nihilist and absolutist). He 
positions himself on the semantic problematization of emptiness, according to which the 
dve satye open a problem in the discourse of truth, on the limits and capacity of our 
representation of things, and not on reality as being non existent. In a nutshell, we can only 
offer limited, conditioned descriptions of reality, while an ultimate truth is empty, and 
cannot be given.408 
Outside of Siderits’ dualistic categorizations of possible “emptinesses,” Magno singles 
out a wider panorama: a nihilist reading, typical of the first European translations such as 
La Vallée Pussin’s and Stcherbatsky’s; an absolutist reading such as Murti’s, offering the 
negative exposition of an ontology; the “orthodox” reading, that traces the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā back to a simple therapeutical reworking and systematization of 
canonical teachings (Kalupahana); a mystical, irrationalist  reading, that insists on the 
ineffability of the paramārtha satya and on the contradictory nature of logos; a Kantian 
critical interpretation associated with a dialectical accent, also present  in Murti, according 
to which the saṃvṛti/paramārtha distinction overlaps the one between phenomenon and 
noumenon; and a “post-analytic” approach that presents Nāgārjuna’s thinking as anti-
metaphysical and contextual, at  the very limits of the philosophical discourse.409  We can 
also add recent attempts to compare Nāgārjuna and deconstruction.410 
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407 Ruegg in Magno, Nāgārjuna, 223. Ruegg mentions the following readings of emptiness: 
nihilist, monist, irrationalist, misologist, agnostic, skeptical, critical, dialectical, acosmist, 
absolutist, relativist, nominalist, and therapeutical analysis of language.
408 Siderits, “On the Soteriological Significance of Emptiness.” Siderits, “Nagarjuna as anti-
realist.”
409 Magno, Nāgārjuna, 223-250. See also Andrew P. Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the 
Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990).
410 Ian W. Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” Philosophy East & West 45, no. 2 (1995): 
203-225. See also Garfield and Priest,“Limits of Thought.”
6.3.1 - The Paradox and Practice of Emptiness
Through Garfield’s reading of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā we have seen the tension of 
transposing the prasaṅgika tradition and contemporary Tibetan interpretations in western 
serviceable philosophical terms.
His reading revolves around the exposition of the paradoxical character of emptiness. 
Garfield proposes two deeply  entangled levels of emptiness’ paradoxical character, the 
epistemological and the ontological. 
At first  glance, emptiness is a paradox of expressibility, not unknown to West.411 In the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 22.11, as we saw earlier, Nāgārjuna, indeed, refutes the catuṣkoṭi 
of emptiness itself.412  Language is by definition one of the dimension of relativity and 
conditionality. At the same time, we have nothing but language for our attempts at ultimate 
truth. We cannot transcend the conditionality and relativity of language. Therefore, nothing 
can be said, not even that phenomena are all empty, or its negation, or that “nothing can be 
said.” Nevertheless, we just did say it, and we have to say it. Therefore, in the way Garfield 
puts it, “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth.”413
It is essentially important that we say emptiness, even though we cannot really  say it, or 
predicate it. Without saying emptiness there is no liberation, but we have to let it go 
immediately, at  the same time. And right afterward, we have to say it again because there is 
no path of silence. It has been argued that it is not by chance the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
ends with a salutation to the Buddha who, out of compassion, taught the Dharma, “which 
leads to the relinquishing of all views.”414 This final aspect revolves around the paradox of 
the relinquishment of all views, and yet, the true doctrine [Dharma] needs to be taught.
The tension of the paradox remains open and gives rise to a second sense of the paradox 
of emptiness, the ontological one. In fact, emptiness is not an attribute, it  is not a 
predication of things. This means that, as Candrakīrti comments, “things are not empty 
because of emptiness; to be a thing is to be empty.”415  Within this line of investigation, 
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411 Garfield and Priest, “Limits of Thought,” 12-13. Reference to the second Wittgenstein.
412 “Empty should not be asserted / “Nonempty” should not be asserted / Neither both nor 
neither should be asserted. / They are only used nominally.”
413 Garfield and Priest, “Limits of Thought,” 14.
414 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 27.30. Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 352-359.
415 Candrakīrti in Garfield and Priest, “Limits of Thought,” 15.
emptiness cannot merely be limited to a semantic interpretation. It is not the case that the 
dve satye are alternately rendered as “two truths” and “two realities.”416
The ontological paradox centers around the equation with existence and emptiness on 
either side of the equal sign. Nāgārjuna does not limit himself to an analysis of language. 
In continuity with the Buddhist motifs, he undertakes an inquiry into experience, into our 
access to the world, into the nature of reality: questions raised by the existential 
interrogative about sorrow and its extirpation. Emptiness in this context means that a 
foundational ontology that serves as reference to language is impossible. As Nāgārjuna 
puts it: “All things have one nature, that is, no nature.”417 Emptiness is not a (problematic) 
predication of things. Being a thing is not being an empty thing, but being emptiness. 
Being, is being emptiness. Existence is the emptiness of existence. But emptiness also is 
empty, it is not a reified emptiness that causes annihilation. So, existence is the emptiness 
of existence. 
In Garfield’s philosophical unfolding of emptiness, then, “emptiness is immanent in the 
conventional world.”418  Saṃvṛti in this sense is concealing: conventional reality is 
conventional because of ignorance about its conventionality. The ultimate truth or reality 
is, then, the acknowledging of the relativity  of conventional reality. In other words, it is the 
accepting that relative things are, indeed, relative. 
The paradox of emptiness is a fundamental part of the Mādhyamika path to liberation. 
As the Indo-Tibetan tradition reported by Garfield puts it, one has to come “to tolerate the 
groundlessness of things.”419
This reading has the important  merit of bringing the logical and philosophical discourse 
within a revaluation of everyday experience: the ultimate reality  of conditioned things is to 
be conditioned. Eventually  saṃvṛti and paramārtha coincide. The important difference 
between the two is in that  paramārtha is a way of looking at the world, of being in the 
world from the internalized standpoint of emptiness. There is no space left for nostalgia of 
a lost unity, nor for any  myth of the deep, in which the authenticity of Being can one day 
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416 A similar interpretation is summarized by Williams, Buddhist Thought, 148.
417 Nāgārjuna, Vigrahavyāvartanī in Garfield and Priest, “Limits of Thought,” 16.
418 Garfield and Priest, “Limits of Thought,” 16.
419 Ibid., 15.
finally be found.420  The ultimate truth is “taking conventional truth seriously.”421  The 
nature of reality  is precisely  not having any nature. Reality simply unfolds - never 
completely, or plainly  - in our experience and all the dimensions of its relatedness: 
language, conventions, and conditions of existence.
This is also why nirvāṇa is said to be the same as saṃsāra.422  There is no difference 
between the two: “nirvāṇa is simply saṃsāra seen without reification, without attachment, 
without delusion.”423
There is an important critique to Garfield’s reading. Magno sees in this 
“conventionalist” position a possible problem. She points out that revealing the ultimate 
truth of emptiness as being the conventionality of conventionality, may leave out an 
ulterior element. She does not refer to this residue, this “ulterior,” as a foundational value 
of the ultimate reality to which we need to resort once the limits of conceptual thought are 
torn down. Rather, she points out the necessity of not losing the sense of the operation 
intrinsic to the prasaṅga, of the fundamental mechanism of Nāgārjuna’s refutations: the 
systematic deconstruction through thinking of the very  instruments that construct 
thinking.424
The risk is that emptiness turns into the acceptance of an empty phenomenal dimension, 
that emptiness turns into a pacified skeptical stand point, and that, in the end, we find 
ourselves with a wiser subject, that finally sees things more clearly. Emptiness, instead, is, 
in her view, something that is still to be realized. The realization of emptiness that 
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420 Garfield and Priest, “Limits of Thought,” 16.
421 Jay L. Garfield, “Taking Conventional Truth Seriously: Authority Regarding Deceptive 
Reality,” Philosophy East and West 60, no. 3 (2010): 341-354.
422 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 25.19-20. Garfield’s translation: “There is not the slightest 
difference / Between cyclic existence and nirvāṇa. / There is not the slightest difference / Between 
nirvāṇa and cyclic existence. // Whatever is the limit of nirvāṇa / That is the limit of cyclic 
existence. / There is not even the slightest difference between them / Or even the subtlest thing.//” 
Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 331.
423 Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 331.
424 Magno, Nāgārjuna, 249-250.
corresponds to prajñā [insight]425 or to the bodhi [the Buddha’s enlightenment]426 entails a 
practical-experiential-soteriological dimension that has to do with Nāgārjuna’s 
fundamental operation: “uprooting every vision pertaining to the mind [dṛṣṭi] and its 
powerful matrix: self.”427
Theorizing a change of attitude/look about the nature of the world is different than 
realizing it. The leap, the change that is expressed in the concept of nirvāṇa or liberation 
translates into a leap from conceptual thinking as appropriation [upādāna] to conceptual 
thinking as detachment.
The text (especially the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā text) does not remain speechless, 
because it continues to rely  on logic and rationality. Nevertheless there is a movement of 
thinking in the understanding of the text, the analogous of a meditative practice that 
teaches us to “see without seeing.”428
The text does not  turn into a mere instrument to be used for liberation, as it seems to do 
in those interpretations that privilege the soteriological import of it.429  It is not a mere 
exercise of style nor the application of emptiness as a method. 
Conceptual thinking itself can be both valid and relative. It is through philosophy, logic 
and rationality  that we can liberate ourselves from the residue of attachment. Appropriation 
or attachment [upādāna] are the cognitive acts through which the “I” gives herself a 
reality, an identity, declaring time by time “this is me.”430
Therefore, the last  outpost  of representative thinking, of a dṛṣṭi, is the self, the I, and is 
the fear of thinking of herself and of her world without an absolute foundation, losing 
every ethical reference.
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425 See Murti defining the concept of philosophy for the Mādhyamaka as Prajñāpāramitā, 
perfection of insight or wisdom. Murti, La filosofia centrale, 169-184. See also Magno, Nāgārjuna, 
255. 
426 See Mabbett, “Nāgārjuna and Deconstruction,” 206. The author identifies the bodhi, rather 
than the nirvāṇa at the core of the Mādhyamaka message. In fact, the spiritual ideal of the 
Bodhisattva in the Mahāyāna procrastinates nirvāṇa. See Murti, La filosofia centrale, 210-218.
427 Magno, Nāgārjuna, 250. My translation; my emphasis.
428 Magno, Nāgārjuna, 253-255.
429 C.W. Huntington Jr. and Geshé Namgyal Wangchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness: An 
Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika, University of Hawai’i Press, Honolulu 1989.
430 Garfield, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 182.
The liberation from sorrow comes through the extinction of representational thinking, 
through the way we think of our sense of reality  and the practices of the confirmation of 
self in experience. 
Existence in terms of saṃsāra (the sorrowful wheel of existence and rebirth) and 
existence in terms of svabhāva [own-nature] are part of the same soteriological and 
philosophical quests for liberation.431  Liberation in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā is in 
condensed in the praxis-ethics of philosophical thinking and in the extinction of 
subjectivity’s grip and attachment.
The emptiness of all things means taking the saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth and 
reality) seriously. The conditioned and unstable world in which we are entangled emerges 
as the only possible reality  through the interplay of the dve satye. From the stand point of 
conventional truth, the world is conventional, and, therefore, sorrowful, impermanent, and 
always slipping away. From the standpoint  of ultimate truth, the world is conventional and 
its conventionality is its ultimate reality.
From Garfield’s reading of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā’s movement of emptiness432 
the two truths coincide, and yet remain two opposite ways of being in the world, as well as 
two opposite potentials of logical thinking.
Emptiness runs between the possibility  of saying, of predicating, and its impossibility. 
Emptiness does not annihilate thinking. “The true Dharma of the abandonment of all 
views”433 needs to be taught. Without relying on the saṃvṛti-satya, “the practical order of 
things,”434 the paramārtha-satya cannot be taught.435
The catuṣkoṭi affirms in order to negate. Propositions are affirmed and immediately let 
go. Emptiness is not silencing. The kind of negation we assist in is not a falsification in 
terms of bad correspondence of words to their object. It is not a misrepresentation. Instead, 
precisely in virtue of the relativity  of language itself (one of the senses of conventional 
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431 See the extinction of the dṛṣṭi that keep us chained to the saṃsāra. Garfield, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 343.
432 We would be tempted to say “concept of emptiness,” but certainly emptiness is no concept, 
no thesis. It is maybe a movement, an agent without ontological status. From a conventional point 
of view, that is the impossibility of leaving the reality of language, any of these renderings can 
work, up to a certain extent.
433 Siderits and Katsura, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 334.
434 Gnoli, La Rivelazione del Buddha, 643. My translation.
435 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 24.10.
truth, [saṃvṛti-satya]), linguistic convention can never separate a positive object from 
itself. 
This is an extremely delicate point, dancing on a slippery line. We can be prone to 
emphasizing the deconstructive and self-deconstructive character of every instrument of 
thought, or, on the contrary, we can emphasize the affirmative character of accepting 
relativity for what it is, playing with it, giving back authority to the conventional truth and 
existential meaning to the conventional world.
Certainly, what emptiness cannot be said to be, within this reading, is a mere therapeutic 
expedient, although it is also a practical and soteriological exercise. Emptiness is telling us 
something about existence: that the nature of things is that there is no nature. Being in the 
world and defeating suffering comes, then, after an exercise of emptiness as knowledge or 
wisdom [prajñā]. 
The ethical meaning of emptiness is in this wisdom, not in the formulation of ethical 
norms. Indeed, although Buddhisms have ethical paths and virtues, these are frequently 
seen as preparatory to the understanding of reality. Liberation from sorrow is the practical 
implication of prajñā.436
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436 Murti, La filosofia centrale, 179.
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CONCLUSIONS
What has emptiness to do with environmental issues? Nothing, if we expect it  to deliver 
us the naturalistic basis for an ethics of nature.
Maybe everything, if we do not look into the śūnyatā in hope to find an organicist, 
relational image of nature. Emptiness is a critique of the svabhāva [own nature] of all 
things, and for this reason has triggered parallelisms with those western instances of 
environmentalism that strive for a non-substantial image of entities, humans, and 
nonhumans. Emptiness would “prove” the impossibility of a “grey nature,” to use Latour’s 
term, of nature as the materialistic substratum described by primary qualities. 
Nevertheless, there is nothing in the śūnyatā at work in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 
that allows us to see in emptiness a sign of “green nature,” a cosmological wholeness to 
which we belong in relational unity. And, in fact, “relation” is yet another category victim 
of the emptiness deconstruction.437
Emptiness does not provide an image of relational nature because every  dṛṣṭi is 
dogmatic inasmuch as it poses a “nature,” however, we want to intend it. Even emptiness is 
empty. Emptiness as a view is empty.
Possibly  the only direct “environmental” value we can derive from Garfield’s reading of 
emptiness is in taking the conditionality  of conditional reality  for what it is. In fact, one of 
the main objections to the possibility of a Buddhist environmentalism is the “escapist” 
character of Buddhism (at least Early Buddhism).438  The mundane dimension is seen as 
sorrowful, intrinsically unsatisfactory out of its impermanent and insubstantial character, 
and the practitioner ultimately strives for nirvaṇā. But this unsatisfactory  character of our 
mundane reality acquires a whole different sense in the mundane ultimately seen as 
mundane, without nostalgia.
We see the power of the emptiness discourse for environmentalism in a whole different 
element. 
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437 Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 14. The chapter of “Examination of Connection.” Garfield, 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, 219: “That does not connect to itself. / Nor do different things connect to 
one another. / Neither connection nor / Connected nor connector exist.” Garfield points out this is 
another affirmation of the emptiness of emptiness, since it refutes not only macro-entities, but even 
the modal idea of compounds of existence typical of the Abhidharma.
438 Schmithausen, Buddhism and Nature, 12.
In Naess’ case, emptiness is brought up in order to find an alternative idea of nature 
outside the subject/object dichotomy. Nevertheless, Naess’ reference fails in understanding 
that emptiness does not  deliver this image. The reason of this failure is internal to Naess’ 
thinking. Although Naess’ relationism poses the problem of representation, of a subject that 
poses an object, he does not follow the problem all the way through.
Latour’s political ecology considers, instead, the problem of the representation of nature 
as central to the possibility of thinking of a common world of humans and nonhumans in 
the face of the ecological crisis. The character of nature is posited by  the representation 
structure itself. In order to do political ecology  we have to get rid of the “natural character” 
of nature, its transcendence, its reality  out there. Nature itself, as deriving from the human/
nature opposition instead of being a composition of the common world, is what traps 
environmentalism in the tension between belonging to nature and being other to it. 
The character of nature, its being an object, a definition, a portion of external reality is, 
for Latour, an all-modern and western way  of seeing the world as split  into two, a world of 
objectivity out there and outside the mind. Latour sees the common world as political with 
collective work to be done without sticking to nature as given on the human/nature axis.
Nevertheless there is one thing Latour leaves out, which was instead crucial in Naess’ 
concern of relationism: the difficulties of weakening subjectivity, or the power of the 
“king-self,” as Latour called it. For Naess, environmentalism is a matter of wisdom, a 
spiritual question of expansion of self in our relations. In this endeavor, Nāgārjuna’s 
emptiness proves to be a powerful tool. Nāgārjuna can add to the work in progress of 
creating a common world of humans and nonhumans a deep insight on one of its main 
obstacles. Emptiness offers a way of thinking about the tension between relative reality  and 
the loosening of the grip of subjectivity that  poses the representation of nature in response 
to its attachment and needs of assurance.
The outlined approach to ecological issues and its way of framing the speculative knots 
of the ecological crisis can be a fruitful basis for further developments. These would go in 
the direction of exploring environmental practices which show how the human and 
nonhuman dimensions are simply entangled and translate each other, instead of fighting an 
ecological battle. Here we can imagine projects such as permaculture or the 
implementation of the sciences in political decisions. This entanglement can become a 
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political task with the purpose of including nonhumans in our everyday  concerns as full 
citizens of our lived world. It is utterly necessary that  politics and environmentalism do not 
continue to see themselves as opponents, as if one defended the interests of humans, while 
the other defended the interests of nature. An exploration of environmental practices with 
this task in mind could be a pregnant framework for a more ecological collective.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1
The modernist settlement according to science studies.
Source: Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 14.
157
APPENDIX 2
The subject/object divide cannot be overcome, even in the attempt to do so.
Source: Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter. (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 58.
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APPENDIX 3
Instead of one human/nature axis, entities can be described by variable geometry 
ontologies on the plane created by the two axes subject/object and essence/existence. (In 
the present diagram Latour illustrates the geometry  of different concepts of void in the 
history of science).
Source: Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter. (London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), 86.
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APPENDIX 4
The new bicameralism suggested by Latour is transversal to the old bicameralism of the 
modern Constitution.
Source: Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. 
Trans. Catherine Porter. (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2004), 115.
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APPENDIX 5
What is the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Sanskrit Text.
Source: Emanuela Magno, Nāgārjuna: Logica, Dialettica e Soteriologia (Milano-
Udine: Mimesis, 2012), 261.
• 1903-1913: Luis de La Vallée Poussin edits Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā text 
based on three Sanskrit manuscripts and on the Tibetan version.
• 1959: From the Prasannapadā  P.L. Vaidya edits the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā text 
together with the commentary.
• 1977: Following the discovery of a fourth manuscript in Nepal by G. Tucci, J.W. 
DeJong completes and changes the previous critical edition, offering the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā text independetly from the commentary.
• 1985: Akira Saitō introduces more remarks to the text.
• 1988: Critical edition by R. Pandeya.
• We add the recent edition by Ye Shaoyong (2011) to Magno’s list, based on newly 
identified manuscripts of the Sanskrit text,439 possibly written in Nepal between 
the 6th and the 7th Century, which makes them the oldest Sanskrit 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā manuscripts available.
Main Accepted Translations  of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā in European 
Languages
• 1961 (Italian): Raniero Gnoli, Nāgārjuna, Le stanze del cammino di mezzo: 
Madhyamaka kārikā (Turin: Boringhieri, 1961). Reprinted in Raniero Gnoli, La 
rivelazione del Buddha (Milan: Mondadori, 2004), vol. 2, 585-656.
• 1967 (English): Frederick J. Streng, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning 
(Nashville and New York: Abingdon, 1967).
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439 http://en.cnki.com.cn/Article_en/CJFDTOTAL-BDZK201001023.htm
• 1986 (English): David J. Kalupahana, Nāgārjuna, The Philosophy of the Middle 
Way (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986).
• 1991 (English): R. Pandeya and Manju, Nāgārjuna’s Philosophy of No-Identity 
(Delhi: Eastern Book Linkers, 1991)
• 1993 (English): Kenneth K. Inada, Nāgārjuna: Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Delhi: 
Sri Satguru Publications, 1993)
• 1995 (English): Jay  L. Garfield, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: 
Nāgārjuna's Mūlamādhyamakakārikā (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)
• 2002 (French): Guy Bugault, Nāgārjuna: Stances du Milieu par excellence (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2002)
• 2004 (Italian): Marcello Meli, Nāgārjuna: Il cammino di mezzo (Padova: 
Unipress, 2004)
• 2012 (Italian): Emanuela Magno, Nāgārjuna: logica, dialettica e soteriologia 
(Milano-Udine: Mimesis, 2012)
• 2013 (English): Mark Siderits and Shoryu Katsura, Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way: 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2013).
We integrated the list reported in Magno’s study. Emanuela Magno, Nāgārjuna: Logica, 
Dialettica e Soteriologia (Milano-Udine: Mimesis, 2012), 84.
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SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Chapter 1 reaffirms the validity  of radical ecological approaches that think of ecological 
issues in terms of necessity of reassessing the nature-humanity reciprocal identities, instead 
of stopping at management approaches.
Chapter 2 explores Naess’ idea of intrinsic relation with nature and its internal critical 
aspects, providing a closer look to Naess’ philosophy. The traditional debate, indeed, 
usually  focuses on deep  ecology  in general. Naess’ problem of humanity’s intrinsic relation 
with nature poses valid questions about overcoming the modern subject/object  dichotomy 
in our understanding of nature, but eventually finds itself trapped in the same premises.
Chapter 3 examines the basic humanity/nature axis in environmentalism, which 
underlies the ever changing concept of nature. It concludes that when environmentalism 
uses a concept of nature framed as other-to-human, it falls into the ecological aporias 
between human continuity with nature and nature’s otherness.
Chapter 4 explores Latour’s solution of a non-modern framework that does not make 
use of the historical modern humanity-nature and subject-object axes. Latour’s constitution 
of the common world through political and scientific representation of nonhumans also 
offers a solution to Naess’ central pitfall of representation. Nevertheless, Latour’s political 
solution leaves one possible interrogative open: how to concretely weaken the centrality  of 
subjectivity in order to reopen the problem of the common world of humans and 
nonhumans.
Chapter 5 and 6 explore a parallelism with Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness [śūnyatā], 
also addressed by Naess. Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness [śūnyatā] proves to be a 
powerful insight into the tension between a radically relative reality and the attachment of 
the subject’s view to a “nature of things.”
______
Kapitel 1 bekräftigt die Gültigkeit grundlegender ökologischer Ansätze, welche über 
simple Bewältigungsstrategien hinaus gehen, und sich stattdessen ökologischen 
Fragestellungen, im Sinne einer Neubewertung des Konzepts der Menschheit und der 
Identität der Natur zuwenden.
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Kapitel 2 untersucht Naess’ Idee der intrinsischen Relation zwischen Natur und deren 
innerer kritischer Aspekte, wodurch tiefere Einblicke in Naess’ Philosophie gegeben 
werden. Der traditionelle Meinungsaustausch konzentriert sich normalerweise durchaus 
auf deep ecology im Allgemeinen. Naess’ Problematik der intrinsischen Relation zwischen 
Menschheit und Natur wirft zwar berechtigte Fragen in Bezug auf die Bewältigung der 
modernen Subjekt/Objekt Gegensätzlichkeit in unserem Verständnis von Natur auf, läuft 
jedoch in Gefahr, ins Spannungsfeld derselben Prämissen zu geraten. 
Kapitel 3 untersucht die grundlegende Menschheit-Natur Achse in der 
Umweltphilosophie, welche dem ständig wechselnden Konzept von Natur unterliegt. Das 
Kapitel gelangt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Umweltphilosophie, sofern sie ein Konzept der 
Natur benutzt, welches den Naturbegriff als das gegenüber dem Menschen Andere 
definiert, in die ökölogischen Aporien zwischen menschlicher Kontinuität mit Natur und 
deren Andersartigkeit fällt. 
Kapitel 4 erforscht Latour’s Lösung einer nicht modernen Rahmenbedingung, welche 
keinen Gebrauch der historisch modernen Menschheit-Natur und Subjekt-Objekt Achse 
macht. Latour's  Konstitution der gemeinsamen Welt, durch politische und 
wissenschaftliche Repräsentation von Nichtmenschen, bietet ebenso eine Lösung für 
Naess’ eigenen Problematik mit Repräsentation. Nichtsdestotrotz lässt Latour’s politische 
Lösung eine mögliche Fragestellung offen: Wie genau wird die zentrale Bedeutung der 
Subjektivität geschwächt um die Problematik der gemeinsamen Welt von Menschen und 
Nichtmenschen neu zu verhandeln.
Kapitel 5 und 6 setzen sich mit der Parallelität zu Nāgārjuna’s Konzept  der Leere 
[śūnyatā] auseinander, welches auch von Naess angesprochen wird. Nāgārjuna’s Konzept 
der Leere gewährleistet einen tiefen Einblick in die Spannung zwischen einer radikal 
relativen Realität und der Bindung der Sicht des Subjekts an eine „Natur der Dinge.“
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